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The enterprise of comparison has been regarded by some as one of the most vital 
characteristics of a healthy academic study of religion. However, the failed legacy of 
Eliadian Comparativism has caused others to suggest that the art of comparison has not 
yet lived up to its promise. This study brings together the best tools of what the author 
calls “Smithian New Comparativism.” In order to demonstrate concretely a rigorous and 
responsible critical comparative analysis, and to chart a course for academically 
beneficial future cross-cultural comparisons, this project presents a case study that 
compares two religious traditions’ doctrinal responses to a conceptually analogous 
ontological presupposition. Specifically, it comparatively analyzes the Reformed 
Christian doctrine of limited atonement and the J!do Shinsh" Buddhist doctrine of akunin 
sh!ki. The comparative examination of these teachings illuminates the respective 
traditions’ doctrinally divergent responses to a common understanding of the human 
predicament, reveals previously unseen structural and conceptual parallels between the 
traditions by examining deeply-rooted Western ideas through the lens of Buddhist 
theories, and suggests finally that despite the appearance of surface resemblances 
between Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian thought the two religious paths lead 
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Chapter One: Introduction  
Each of the modes of comparison has been found problematic. Each new proposal has 
been a variant of an older mode . . . We know better how to evaluate comparisons, but 
we have gained little over our predecessors in either the method for making comparisons 
or the reasons for its practice.—Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion (1982)1 
 
Comparison—“Surely It Is Possible” 
The enterprise of comparison has been called the “most central and distinguishing 
characteristic” of the modern academic study of religion.2 Some have suggested that 
cross-cultural and trans-historical comparisons are perhaps “our greatest claim[s] to 
originality as an independent academic discipline, distinguished from other disciplines 
like theology or anthropology.”3 Others have argued that critical comparative analysis is 
“intrinsic to the process through which we construct and apply” categories to interpret 
religious phenomena “such as symbol, myth, ritual, scripture, law, ethics, and 
mysticism.”4 One of the leading historians in the field of religious studies has even 
characterized the subdiscipline of comparative religious studies in this way: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1982), 35. 
 
2 Hugh B. Urban, “Making A Place To Stand: Jonathan Z. Smith and the Politics and Poetics of 
Comparison,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 12, no. 1-3 (2000): 340. William E. Paden affirms 
this notion when he argues, “it is the comparative, cross-cultural nature of religious subject matter which 
constitutes and justifies religious studies as a secular field of knowledge.” See William E. Paden, 
“Elements of a New Comparativism,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 8, no. 1 (1996): 5.  
 
3 Urban, “Making A Place To Stand,” 340. 
 
2 
So compelling has comparative religion become that it now tends to 
pervade religious studies in all of its aspects. It belongs to the context, the 
framework, of religious studies. It helps define the field’s direction and 
compelling interests. Indeed, from this time forward, no aspect of religious 
studies can be thought through systematically—no aspect of religious 
studies can even be approached—without explicit acknowledgement of its 
cross-cultural dimensionalities. Already it is impossible to conduct 
scholarly research in religious studies except within an intellectual 
framework that treats cross-cultural sensitivities as being regulative.5  
  
These ringing endorsements of the comparative endeavor in religious studies are not only 
apt but also inevitable, as comparison is the principal means by which humans interact 
with the world.  
When confronted with something “new,” something “other,” something 
“different,” we instinctually begin a process of comparative analysis and interpretation. 
We ask ourselves “Is this phenomenon ‘like’ anything else I’ve seen before?” This 
question is essential to our well-being, as the ability to recognize “sameness” enables us 
to construct order and make meaning out of our world. Jonathan Z. Smith, the preeminent 
contemporary comparative scholar, once noted that the “process of comparison is a 
fundamental characteristic of human intelligence . . . without it, we could not speak, 
perceive, learn, or reason.”6 The problem, however, is that the comparative enterprise has 
largely failed us. On the whole, comparison has been too concerned with similarities, too 
arbitrary, and largely devoid of meaningful analysis or interpretation. Just as Smith has 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Barbara A. Holdrege, “What’s Beyond the Post? Comparative Analysis as Critical Method,” in A Magic 
Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the Postmodern Age, ed. Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 2. 
 
5 Walter Capps, Religious Studies: The Making of a Discipline (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 340. 
 
6 Jonathan Z. Smith, “Adde Parvum Parvo Magnus Acervus Erit,” History of Religions 11, no. 1 (August 
1971): 67. 
3 
deemed comparison to be invaluable, he has also posited that comparative scholars “stand 
before a considerable embarrassment.”7 The art of comparison has not yet lived up to its 
promise.  
Despite the historical problems found within the discipline, some comparativists 
rightly argue that there is a responsible way to ask critically comparative questions that 
advance the academic study of religion. These scholars maintain that problems with the 
theories and tools of the past should not result in abandonment of the discipline itself, 
because the benefits of cross-cultural comparison far outweigh the liabilities. As Gregory 
D. Alles once put the matter, if “multicultural studies are to mean anything besides 
atomized, specialized accounts of different peoples, places, and times juxtaposed at 
random, cultural scholars will need once more to compare, and compare seriously and 
vigorously.”8 A crystallization of the issue can be heard in Wendy Doniger’s rhetorical 
question, “Surely it is possible to bring into a single (if not necessarily harmonious) 
conversation the genuinely different approaches that several cultures have made to 
similar (if not the same) human problems.”9 In other words, it must be possible to 
examine divergent responses to common quandaries cross-culturally. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Smith, Imagining Religion, 24. 
 
8 Gregory D. Alles, The Iliad, The R"m"ya#a and The Work of Religion: Failed Persuasion and Religious 
Mystification (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 5. A similarly urgent call to 
study cross-culturally is found in the work of comparative theologian Francis X. Clooney. “Diversity in and 
among religions is not novel, but its impact has intensified in recent decades as a pronounced and defining 
phenomenon that is global . . . [thus] we need to learn deeply across such borders . . . Our time and place 
therefore urge upon us a necessary interreligious learning.” Francis X. Clooney, Comparative Theology: 
Deep Learning Across Religious Borders (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 4-5.  
 
9 Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics & Theology in Myth (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), 71. Doniger’s question is also born out of her understanding of the relative strengths of cross-
cultural comparison. As she sees it, the “cross-cultural view is not an overview that subsumes the 
4 
My simple response to Doniger’s query is a direct and resounding “yes.” 
Comparing cross-culturally divergent approaches to common human problems is both 
possible and necessary, and the implications of this endeavor are manifold. First, cross-
cultural comparison enables us to begin questioning deeply-rooted assumptions regarding 
what is normative.10 In other words, this methodological approach allows us to 
defamiliarize that which we take for granted, thereby preventing monolithic thinking and 
the calcification of standard beliefs.11 This approach to comparison also allows us to 
balance concern for particularity with concern for more generalizing explanations and 
analysis. Generalizations that are too broad inevitably lead to abstraction and vacuity, 
whereas overly particularistic interpretations lack useful cross-cultural application. Thus, 
we must strike a comparative analytical equilibrium.  
Furthermore, responsible comparative analysis of this sort enables us to examine 
particular elements from religious traditions selectively rather than religions in toto. In 
other words, a framework of analytical control ensures that only “aspectual 
characteristic[s]” of a given tradition are examined, rather than entire religions.12 Finally, 
comparing cross-culturally divergent approaches to common human problems enables us 
to recognize and value difference as much as, if not more than, similarities. For, as Smith 
consistently argues throughout his scholarship, in any disciplined inquiry of comparison 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
contextualized view, but an alternative view that slices the problem in a different way, that slices sideways, 
horizontally, instead of vertically” (47). 
 
10 David M. Freidenreich, “Comparisons Compared: A Methodological Survey of Comparisons of Religion 
From ‘A Magic Dwells’ to A Magic Still Dwells,” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 16, no. 1 
(2004): 80-101. 
 
11 Doniger, The Implied Spider, 33. 
 
12 Fitz John Porter Poole, “Metaphors and Maps: Towards Comparison in the Anthropology of Religion,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 54, no. 3 (1986): 420. 
5 
it is difference that is of most interest and use to the scholar of religion.13 An emphasis 
upon difference ensures interreligious and cross-cultural reflection. Such reflection, in 
turn, engenders reciprocal illumination and interreligious learning, whereby religious 
phenomena are seen anew through the insights of another religious tradition’s response to 
a given problem.14 As Smith rightly intimated, methodologically manipulating difference, 
or “playing across the gap,” is the key to a healthy and serviceable comparative 
discipline.15  
In order to demonstrate concretely this sort of vigorous and responsible critical 
comparative analysis, I compare in the following chapters two religious traditions’ 
doctrinal responses to a conceptually analogous ontological presupposition. Specifically, 
I analyze comparatively the Reformed Christian doctrine of limited atonement and the 
J!do Shinsh" Buddhist doctrine of akunin sh!ki.16 A comparative examination of these 
teachings illuminates the respective traditions’ doctrinally divergent responses to a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1987), 14; Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the 
Religions of Late Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 51; Smith, Imagining Religion, 
35. 
 
14 Smith, Drudgery Divine, 42; Doniger, The Implied Spider, 3; Arvind Sharma, Religious Studies and 
Comparative Methodology: The Case for Reciprocal Illumination (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2005), 3; Bernard Faure, Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses, trans. 
Janet Lloyd, ed. Mieke Bal and Hent de Vreies (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); J. J. 
Clarke, Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought (New York: 
Routledge, 1998), 125; Clooney, Comparative Theology, 10. 
 
15 Smith, Imagining Religion, 35. 
 
16 As a matter of convenience, I henceforth use the accepted abbreviation “Shin Buddhism” to refer to J!do 
Shinsh" Buddhism. When discussing Shin Buddhism, I concern myself with the sectarian expression 
known as J!do Shinsh" Honganji-ha. This branch of Shin Buddhism, one of the two largest sub-sects of the 
Shinshu Federation (Shinsh$ Ky!dan Reng!), is more commonly referred to as Nishi Honganji or Honpa 
Honganji. Nishi (West) distinguishes the institution from Shinshu Otani-ha or Higashi Honganji (East 
Honganji), the other large sectarian expression of Shin Buddhism whose main temple and headquarters also 
reside in Kyoto.  
6 
common understanding of the human predicament. For the purposes of this project, I 
regard the “human predicament,” or “human condition,” in the manner of theologian Paul 
Tillich. Tillich understood the human condition as being one of existential estrangement 
from one’s essential nature and the ground of being. This state of estrangement, which 
the aforementioned traditions recognize, results in a sense of insecurity, inner conflict, 
and alienation.17 Thus, the human condition can be understood to “involve a predicament 
[of existential estrangement] that religions address as a problem.”18 
Previous comparative scholarship has focused primarily on perceived similarities 
between the two traditions. However, I argue that despite a conceptually analogous 
understanding of the human condition as being defiled and depraved, the traditions’ 
divergent doctrinal responses to this condition imply different salvations ultimately. This 
case study is the first comparative analysis of these traditions to examine the differing 
scopes of transformational response (i.e., limited and universal) to a common ontological 
presupposition. Furthermore, this study shows that it is possible to bring divergent 
cultural approaches to a similar human problem into a single comparative “conversation” 
and that by responsibly asking critically comparative questions that “slice the problem in 
a different way,” the promise of comparative religious studies can still be fulfilled.19  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 2, Existence and the Christ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1957), 25. 
 
18 Robert Neville Cummings, ed., The Human Condition (Albany: State University Press, 2001), 5. As 
Neville notes though, the “notion of ‘the human condition’ and the associated references to existentialist 
literature, art, ethics, and the critique of traditional religion through generalization, is a twentieth-century 
idea. It has a European origin and global dissemination through the effects of modernity . . . [As such] 
Eighth-century Christianity would no more have recognized talk of ‘the human condition’ than would have 
eighth-century Buddhism, Islam, or Ved#nta” (3).  
 
19 Doniger, The Implied Spider, 47. 
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My argument supports Smith’s dual assertions that contemporary scholars’ ability 
to evaluate comparisons has improved beyond our predecessors’ and that we need new 
comparative theories and methods if comparative studies is to rightfully assume its place 
of prominence in the field of religious studies.20 This study’s comparative undertaking 
directly addresses Smith’s challenge to scholars to establish and employ a new and useful 
comparative methodology.  
Unfortunately, the history of comparative analysis is filled with examples of weak 
applications of even weaker methodologies, which have typically engendered dismissive 
toleration, at best, and statements of cultural superiority at worst. Many of these prior 
comparative projects have done little in terms of responsibly and meaningfully advancing 
the academic study of religion. When scholars approach the comparative enterprise 
differently and new methodologies are employed, they will ask exciting new questions, 
eliciting dynamic new responses from which cross-culturally useful insights can be 
garnered. I have selected my case study as a vehicle for applying vigorous and healthy 
comparative methodology because the long history of comparing Reformed Christianity 
and Shin Buddhism is a perfect example of the “poverty of conception” that has 
habitually characterized many past irresponsible cross-cultural comparative endeavors.21 
A telling example of this can be seen in renowned theologian, Karl Barth’s summation of 
the matter: 
We can regard it as a wholly providential disposition that as far as I can 
see the most adequate and comprehensive and illuminating heathen 
parallel to Christianity, a religious development in the Far East, is parallel 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 Smith, Imagining Religion, 35. 
 
21 Smith, Drudgery Divine, 47. 
8 
not to Roman or Greek Christianity, but to Reformed Christianity, thus 
confronting Christianity with the question of its truth as the logical 
religion of grace . . . [Thus] Yodoism can certainly be compared without 
violence to the simple Christian “Protestantism” which countless souls 
have thought of as the true Protestantism ever since the 16th century . . . 
Only one thing is really decisive for the distinction of truth and error 
[though] . . . That one thing is the name of Jesus Christ . . . Therefore the 
true and essential distinction of the Christian religion from the non-
Christian, and with it its character as the religion of truth over against the 
religions of error, can be demonstrated only in the fact, or event, that 
taught by Holy Scripture the Church listens to Jesus Christ and no one else 
as grace and truth.22  
 
Barth’s use of the term “heathen” when seeking to introduce an “adequate . . . and 
illuminating parallel” for comparison, as well as his decision to frame the analysis 
in terms of “truth and error,” exemplify the type of apologetic assertions of 
uniqueness and poor methodological treatment that have marred many past 
comparative undertakings. Understanding the often-troubled history of the 
comparative endeavor is an important foundation for appreciating the responsible 
comparative analysis to follow.  
 
Brief Reflections on the History of the Comparative Endeavor 
 
We are always moving between worlds, trying to make sense of and orient our lives, and 
the trick of comparison is the trick of translating between these worlds.—Wendy Doniger, 
The Implied Spider (1998)23 
 
Ordering our lives as we seek to translate between the familiar and the unfamiliar 
has always been a difficult task. In fact, it might be argued that “the first ‘comparative 
religionist’ was the first worshipper of a god or gods who asked himself [sic], having first 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, trans. Rev. G. T. Thomson and Rev. Harold Knight, vol. 1 of 14, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956), 340-44. Barth incorrectly used the term “Yodoism” when writing 
about Japanese J!do Shinsh" Buddhism. 
 
23 Doniger, The Implied Spider, 4. 
9 
discovered the facts of the case, why his neighbor should be a worshipper of some other 
god or gods.”24 The systematic comparative study of religion only first gained public 
attention however in the 1860s and 1870s, with the rise of the scientific method. Prior to 
the mid-nineteenth century, the examination of religious traditions tended to take one of 
two general approaches: (1) the Christian theological approach, which, through doctrinal 
debate and reflections upon divine revelation, sought to establish the primacy of Christian 
soteriology over and against any competing claims, and (2) the philosophical approach 
(i.e., rationalism), which set forth criteria and theories by which to judge religions based 
on reason rather than revelation. Ultimately, each methodological approach was 
problematic enough to contribute to the embarrassing and inadequate comparative 
activity to which Smith refers. 
 
Theological Approach to Comparison 
The heart of Christian belief and doctrine revolves around the affirmation of the 
view that “Jesus Christ is the decisive, unrepeatable and unsurpassable ‘locus’ of divine 
revelation, and that consequently it is only by following the way of Christ that we can 
possibly hope for the ultimate salvation of mankind [sic].”25 Given this position, when 
confronted with non-Christian traditions, Christianity has employed a variety of 
theological approaches to account comparatively for and explain the “other.” These 
approaches have included: (1) the contention that nonbiblical religions are 
demonstrations of humanity’s separation from God and are likely of evil origin; (2) the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 Eric J. Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A History, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Open Court Press, 1986), 1. 
 
25 Kenneth Surin, “Revelation, Salvation, The Uniqueness of Christ and Other Religions,” Religious Studies 
19, no. 3 (1983): 323. 
10 
conviction that “everything truly religious in religious history was in fact historically 
derived from the original monotheism of the biblical patriarchs, whereas everything false 
in other religions was a degeneration from that once pure source;”26 (3) the contention 
that the best of all non-Christian traditions should be interpreted as allegories of Christian 
truths;27 (4) the argument that non-Christian traditions, while perhaps partially true are 
demonstrably inferior, incomplete, and insufficient;28 and (5) an optimistic appreciation 
of the innate spiritual ability of all people to come into contact with the divine, or “the 
holy,” present throughout all of creation. Examples of these comparative theological 
approaches can be found in works such as James Garden’s Comparative Theology, or, 
The True and Solid Grounds of Pure and Peaceable Theology (1700), George Faber’s 
The Origin of Pagan Idolatry Ascertained from Historical Testimony and Circumstantial 
Evidence (1816), and James Freeman Clarke’s Ten Great Religions: An Essay in 
Comparative Theology (1871).29 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 William E. Paden, Religious Worlds: The Comparative Study of Religion, 2nd ed. (Boston: Beacon, 1994), 
18-19. 
 
27 Examples of this can be seen in efforts to read the Hebrew scriptures as foreshadowing the life of Christ, 
and Greek and Roman myths as carriers of Christian messages.  
 
28 An excellent example of this can be seen in James Freeman Clarke’s Ten Great Religions: An Essay in 
Comparative Theology (Cambridge: Riverside, 1871). William E. Paden has usefully interpreted and 
summarized Clarke’s perspective: “For Clarke, comparison demonstrated that Christianity embodies 
greater transethnic universality and more complete spiritual balance than other religions. Thus Hinduism 
has a full sense of the reality of the spirit, but it is ‘defective’ in its appreciation of matter and the created 
world. Buddhism appreciates man’s [sic] nobility, but misses the dimension of divinity in the world. 
Confucianism understands religious harmony, but lacks historical dynamism and vision. And so on. 
Christianity for its part is complete and universal, free of the specific faults and one-sidedness of other 
faiths . . . It therefore represents the consummate fullness of all religion” (Religious Worlds, 24-25).  
 
29 James Garden, Comparative Theology, or, The True and Solid Grounds of Pure and Peaceable Theology 
(London, 1700); George Faber, The Origin of Pagan Idolatry Ascertained from Historical Testimony and 
Circumstantial Evidence, 3 vols. (London: Rivington, 1816); Clarke, Ten Great Religions, 1871. 
11 
Although possessing subtly different points of emphasis, each of the 
aforementioned theological approaches reflects a mode of intellectual inquiry into the 
dissimilarities among religious traditions that is firmly grounded in a commitment to the 
primary Christian statement of faith—the uniqueness of salvation in Christ. Each 
approach can be understood as a variation on a mode of interreligious reflection that is 
often referred to today as “comparative theology.” Comparative theology “marks acts of 
faith seeking understanding which are rooted in a particular faith tradition but which, 
from that foundation, venture into learning from one or more faith traditions.”30 In other 
words, comparative theological approaches to cross-cultural analysis are conducted in 
accordance with the goals and commitments of the Christian tradition. The terms of 
examination arise from Christian thought, and the comparison largely reaffirms Christian 
perceptions of uniqueness. Using these Christian theological approaches to account 
comparatively for non-Christian traditions has been done for centuries and persists to this 
day, and Barth’s comments comparing Reformed Christianity and Shin Buddhism are an 
excellent example of this comparative mode. Consequently, I return to Barth’s illustration 
again later in this study, as his approach demonstrates the poverty of conception implicit 
in many theologically comparative interreligious reflections.  
 
Philosophical Approach to Comparison 
A second general approach to examining and judging non-Christian traditions 
comparatively existed prior to the mid-nineteenth century as well. European rationalists 
of the time employed comparative methodologies, but they did so in an effort to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Clooney, Comparative Theology, 10. 
12 
counteract Christian explanations of religion that hinged upon revelation. By invoking 
reason and “natural” accounts of religion, rather than trans-human explanations, to 
demystify the universe, philosophers were able to examine histories of religion without 
resorting to Christian apologetics. This was an important step in the early history of the 
comparative endeavor, as rationalists sought to “seriously put forward a set of criteria by 
which religion might be judged, without calling in any kind of belief in revelation.”31  
We can look at Deist thought as an example of this sort of rationalist approach. 
Deists consciously discredited supernatural interpretations of history, seeing no need to 
affirm the existence of an intervening God who used miracles to reveal the divine.32 
Rather, Deists believed knowledge of the divine could only be attained through reason 
and logic. By their reckoning, reason and logic would lead to the discovery of a 
“common denominator for all religions.”33 The common notions (communes notitiae) of 
the religions of the world were believed to be eternal truths inscribed upon the hearts of 
all of humanity and thus were thought to inform all religious outlooks. This hypothetical 
set of common denominators upon which rational comparative analysis was conducted 
involved: (1) an acknowledgement of the existence of a Supreme Power; (2) a sense of 
duty on the part of humanity towards this Supreme Power; (3) a commitment to pious 
worship; (4) reparation for one’s sins; and (5) a belief in a state of rewards and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 Sharpe, Comparative Religion, 17. 
 
32 J. Samuel Preus, Explaining Religion: Criticism and Theory from Bodin to Freud (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000), 23-39.  
 
33 Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background: Studies in the Thought of the Age in Relation to 
Poetry and Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 123. 
13 
punishments after this life.34 Examples of these views can be found in works such as Lord 
Herbert of Cherbury’s De veritate (1625), Gottfreid Wilhelm Leibniz’s Essai de 
Théodicée (1710), and Voltaire’s Essai sur l’esprit et les moeurs des Nations (1756).35 In 
many ways, this philosophical belief in a commonality or unity undergirding all religious 
traditions of the world was a precursor to what would become one of the most ubiquitous 
and insidious forms of religious comparison—religious pluralism or universalism. 
In addition to the Deists, other philosophers, such as David Hume, maintained 
that religious impulses arose not from the divine but rather from individual and social 
concerns such as an “anxious fear of future events.”36 Hume deemed the origins of 
religious sensibilities to be commonly held primal and base emotions. Consequently, he 
contributed to a comparative evolutionary theory of religious development in which some 
religious traditions were deemed more primitive than others. In The Natural History of 
Religion (1755), Hume imagined a fictional dialogue between Catholic and Egyptian 
priests debating the relative merits of their respective practices.  
How can you worship leeks and onions [ask the Catholic]? If we worship 
them, replies [the Egyptian], at least we do not, at the same time, eat them. 
But what strange objects of adoration are cats and monkeys says the 
learned doctor. They are at least as good as the relics or rotten bones of 
martyrs, answers his no less learned antagonist.37  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Basil Willey, The Eighteenth Century: Studies on the Idea of Nature and the Thought of the Period (New 
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In a similar manner, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) employed 
comparative philosophical analyses as he sought to position comparatively the religious 
traditions of the world on the rungs of a developmental ladder, with Christianity at its 
apex. While Hegel “is commonly known (and routinely castigated) for the manner in 
which he makes the case for Christianity as the consummate religion, the critical edition 
[of his Lectures] clearly indicates that Hegel develops his argument by way of sustained 
attention to other religions and not in spite of them.”38 Hume and Hegel’s respective 
evolutionary and developmental theories of religion are each implicitly predicated upon a 
belief that comparable commonalities are found in all religions. These positions were yet 
another stream of thought that would ultimately enable the rise of universalist theories of 
religion.  
Overall, these philosophical approaches to explaining religion regarded 
Christianity as simply one religion among many, no more unique than any other. 
“Rationalists like to show that whatever one religion, like Christianity, could boast of as 
its unique possession—like having a God-sent savior or a doctrine of salvation by divine 
grace—was present in other religions.”39 Thus, whereas Christian theological 
comparisons largely sought to establish a schema of true and false religiosity, secular 
rationalist comparative theories began to flatten and homogenize perceptions of 
religiosity as they sought an underlying universal source for religious development. 
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Universalist Approach to Comparison 
In the 1860s, when the study of human culture began to include the application of 
the principles of scientific inquiry, such as inductive reasoning and pattern gathering 
(seen most especially in the fields of philology, archaeology, and history), it became 
possible to speak of the emergence of the social scientific study of religion, better known 
today as “comparative religion” or the “history of religion.” This approach to 
comparative analysis can be summed up in the words of one of the discipline’s founding 
fathers, Max Müller: “He who knows one, knows none.”40 Put another way, to base one’s 
understanding of any cultural or religious phenomenon solely upon one example is to 
limit one’s knowledge of the human experience. For that reason, comparison is essential. 
As a more contemporary comparative scholar put the matter, “Whichever way one 
imagines religion and the study of it, it will not be possible to do so without the activity 
of comparison, without the evaluations of resemblances and differences.”41  
Modern historians, sociologists, psychologists, and anthropologists began 
comparatively addressing variations on the same question: “Why had humanity ever 
found it necessary to be religious? What was there in the human make-up which made it 
seemingly imperative for man [sic] to perceive, or postulate, or imagine, a world beyond 
the senses?”42 In other words, is there some essential, trans-human religious 
consciousness that is responding to some transcendent dimension? The systematic 
comparative study of religion had begun. 
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 First, modern social scientists began comparatively exploring religious 
phenomena such as ancestor reverence (Herbert Spencer); the centrality of social 
structures, relationships, and institutions (Emile Durkheim); mythology and language 
(Max Müller); cultural processes and customs that adhere and evolve over time (Edward 
Burnett Tylor); magical beliefs and taboos (James George Frazer); and dreams and 
neuroses (Sigmund Freud). Despite the invaluable contributions scholars such as these 
made to the general study of culture, not to mention the more focused study of religion, it 
is clear that the social scientific approach often reinforced particularism, which only 
marginally sought to compare religious traditions based on the cultivation of smaller and 
smaller areas of concern (e.g., translated texts and archaeological remains).43 The critical 
evaluation of differences began to wane in the systematic comparative study of religion. 
Against this growing parochialism and discipline specialization arose a third 
approach to the comparative enterprise known as universalism, which only further reified 
the lack of concern for difference in the comparative enterprise. “Universalists are those 
who, from antiquity, have stressed the essential unity of all religion, interpreting all 
traditions to represent so many valid but varying versions of common spiritual truths.”44 
In other words, universalism is predicated on the notion that ultimately there is more that 
binds religious practitioners than separates them. From the universalist perspective, there 
are certain religious sentiments, convictions, affinities, and concepts that are thought to 
be panhuman and transcultural, and thus imminently comparable. “Behind the facades of 
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local religious divergence [universalism] finds universal points of agreement.”45 The 
essential, defining traits of a religious person, “his or her religious apprehensions, 
emotional states, and motivations for religious activities” were deemed by the 
universalists to be the same everywhere religion was found.46 All that varied were 
differing cultural descriptions of an otherwise universal reality. At the core of the 
universalist approaches to comparison lies the idea that, despite cultural distinctions, all 
religions point to the same notion of ultimate reality. Thus, when universalists spoke or 
wrote of God, Allah, the Dao, or Buddha-nature they tended to conflate definitions and 
obfuscate contextual differences. Other classic examples of universalist categories that 
have been employed by comparative scholars in the classification, analysis, and 
interpretation of religious phenomena include ritual practices, sacred space, sacred 
people, mysticism, rules of behavior and morality, and salvation. Fitting early twentieth-
century examples of the universalist approach to comparison can be seen in Joseph 
Campbell’s study of universal patterns of narrative mythology (The Hero with a 
Thousand Faces, 1949), Carl Gustav Jung’s exploration of universal psychic archetypes 
(Memories, Dreams, Reflections, 1961), Mircea Eliade’s theory of hierophanies and dual 
modes of human experience (The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, 1961), 
and William Cantwell Smith’s conviction that there exists but one religious history and 
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By the latter half of the twentieth century, this universalist approach to 
comparison, with its overemphasis upon similarity and commonality and its near 
complete neglect of difference, became the most pervasive position with regard to 
comparing religions. In fact, this “Eliadian approach,” named after the highly influential 
historian of religions, Mircea Eliade, became nearly synonymous with comparison itself. 
“Eliadian comparativism” is a manner of seeing cross-cultural phenomena filtered 
through the lens of universalism.48 Put another way, this approach involves seeing what 
Eliade called the “transcendent ‘sacred’ refracted in [all] the ritual and mythic behavior[s] 
of a cross-cultural human archetype called Homo religiosus [i.e. humanity as a religious 
being].”49 Eliade worked from the assumption that there are “two modes of being in the 
world, two existential situations assumed by humankind in the course of history, the 
sacred and the profane.”50 From this point of view:  
Comparative studies in the field of religion under the influence of Eliade . 
. . are wedded to an essentialism and foundationalism which prevents them 
from seeing religions as patterns of human behaviour and assumes them 
rather to be representations of a transcendent reality known prior to the 
empirical examination and analysis of any specific religious behaviours.51 
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This narrowing of hermeneutical perspective was only exacerbated by a tendency to 
privilege certain Protestant Christian interpretations of the phenomena in question, while 
marginalizing others. Evidence of this tendency can be seen in the inclination, in 
comparative religious studies, to “define religion as a ‘belief system’ and to give priority 
to categories such as faith, belief, doctrine, and theology while underprivileging the roles 
of practice, ritual and law.”52 A concrete example can be seen in Cantwell Smith’s pursuit 
of the universal property of human life he calls faith.53 Universalism of this sort, in which 
hermeneutical priority is consciously or unconsciously given to Christian construals of 
comparative analysis, is also seen today in the disciplines of “theology of religions,” 
“interreligious dialogue,” and “comparative theology.” Leading scholars and their 
seminal works from these disciplines include John Hick’s A Christian Theology of 
Religions (1995), Paul Knitter’s No Other Name: A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes 
Toward the World Religions (1985), and John B. Cobb’s Beyond Dialogue: Toward a 
Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism (1998).54  
 It is undoubtedly this history of weak comparative methodology that Jonathan Z. 
Smith had in mind when he warned that comparative scholars “stand before a 
considerable embarrassment” and that the comparative enterprise has not yet lived up to 
its promise to responsibly further the academic study of religion. When one considers the 
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history of comparison—universalism, foundationalism, privileging Protestant Christian 
essentialist categories of comparison, emphasizing similarity over difference, confusing 
similarity with identity, blurring definitions, ignoring context in favor of 
generalizations—it is easy to see there is a problem. It is no wonder some have noted that 
while “the field of religious studies is witnessing considerable creative work in socio-
historical, cognitive, and hermeneutical analysis, it is less clear, with a few notable 
exceptions… how comparativist models have been advanced.”55 If we are to begin 
addressing Alles’s challenge to once more compare and to “compare seriously and 
vigorously” —if we are to answer Smith’s call for new comparative theories and 
methods, as well as Doniger’s rhetorical question regarding comparing divergent 
approaches to a common dilemma—then we must examine a concrete case study. 56 As 
suggested earlier, the history of comparatively analyzing Reformed Christianity and 
Japanese Shin Buddhism makes an excellent starting point. 
 The object of this analytical undertaking is twofold—to consider critically the 
state of the comparative enterprise, and to present a case study reflecting serious and 
vigorous comparison that demonstrates a means for successfully conducting cross-
cultural comparison in the future. In Chapter Two, I examine the often-troubled history of 
comparing the Reformed Christian tradition with Japanese Shin Buddhism. This 
examination is followed by an exploration of the vital tools required for improving upon 
the comparative endeavor and a reframing of the Reformed Christian / Shin Buddhist 
comparison around the question of how these divergent religious traditions have 
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responded to a common understanding of the human predicament. In Chapter Three, I 
present a “thick description”57 of the Shin Buddhist response to the human condition by 
examining the doctrine of akunin sh!ki, the Buddhist teachings and beliefs that most 
influenced its development, and the socio-contextual rationale for its establishment as an 
orthodox position within the Shin community. In Chapter Four, I similarly present a 
nuanced consideration of the Reformed Christian doctrine of limited atonement by 
investigating the theological and contextual influences upon its development. In Chapter 
Five, I then conduct a critical comparative analysis of these two doctrines by considering 
six points of similarity and difference, using a formula for a viable comparative 
methodology. Finally, in Chapter Six I reflect on the implications of applying this new 
methodology.!
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Chapter Two: From Poverty of Conception to “New Comparativism” 
!
There is one aspect of scholarship that has remained constant from the earliest Near 
Eastern scribes and omen interpreters to contemporary academicians: the thrill of 
encountering a coincidence.—Jonathan Z. Smith, Imagining Religion (1982)1 
!
!
In 1549, pioneering Jesuit Catholic missionary Francis Xavier landed in 
Kagoshima Bay at the southwestern tip of Ky"sh" island of Japan. He soon succumbed to 
the same overwhelming thrill of encountering a coincidence that has shaped cultural 
observers’ descriptions of the “other” since time immemorial. After interacting with 
Japanese religious practitioners, Xavier is reputed to have exclaimed that the “accursed 
Lutheran heresy” had already reached Japan!2 By Xavier’s initial reckoning, the Catholic 
church’s missionary enterprise in Asia had been preceded by their new rivals, the 
followers of the teachings of Martin Luther. It’s not especially surprising that when he 
encountered Buddhist ideas that bore a surface-like similarity to the first generation 
Protestant Reformer’s conceptions of faith, grace, and salvation, Xavier sought to make 
meaning out of the perceived “sameness” that presented itself. Confronted with a 
phenomenon that seemingly resembled something he had previously encountered, Xavier 
sought comparatively to order his world. Although just six years earlier Xavier had 
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engaged in interreligious learning in India for the purposes of furthering missionary 
efforts, this is the first recorded act of comparative theological reflection based upon 
perceived similarities between Japanese Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christian thought.  
 Twenty years later, in a letter sent from the town of Kuchinotsu, in Nagasaki 
Prefecture, one of Xavier’s successors, Francisco Cabral, shared his joy in having 
converted a local Buddhist priest to the Catholic faith. Cabral noted that he “had high 
hopes for this convert, whose former doctrine he described as resembling Luther’s.”3 
Jonathan Z. Smith unknowingly explained these and similar ill-informed intuitions when 
he noted: “Often, at some point along the way, as if unbidden, as a sort of déjà vu, the 
scholar [or in this case missionary] remembers that he has seen ‘it’ or ‘something like it’ 
before . . . This experience . . . must then be accorded significance and provided an 
explanation.”4 Xavier and Cabral’s positions are fitting historical examples of the sort of 
past comparisons Smith criticizes; they function more as enterprises of magic than as 
systematic projects of inquiry, “more impressionistic than methodical.”5 In other words, 
perceptions of affinity, like magic, morph into arguments of casual influence and identity. 
One can almost hear the thought processes of those early Catholic missionaries at work: 
Those Shin Buddhist teachings sure sound like Luther’s rants. It must be because 
Protestant Reformers have been here before us, and now those Buddhists share their 
delusions. This assumption is a textbook case of emphasizing similarity over difference, 
ignoring context, generalizing too quickly and too broadly, and confusing similarity with 
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identity—in other words assuming that because two phenomena seem similar they must 
be the same.  
Less than a decade after Cabral’s observation, Alessandro Valignano (1539-
1606), the Jesuit Visitor General for the Province of the East Indies, became one of the 
first people on record to concretely posit the existence of similarities between Japanese 
J!do Shinsh" Buddhism and Reformed Christianity. So convinced was Valignano of 
these perceived similarities that in a series of letters sent to the Jesuit Superior General of 
Rome, Valignano speculated that the central teachings of Shin Buddhism were inspired 
by the very same “evil force that brought the tragedy of Reformation to Europe”: 
[T]he very same doctrine [“Lutheranism”] has been bestowed by the devil 
upon the Japanese heathendom. Nothing is changed except the name of the 
person in whom they believe and trust, and the same effect being created 
among these heretics as obtains amidst these heathens: for these as much as 
the others are sunk in total carnality, divided in divers sects, and living 
therefore in great confusion of belief and in continuous wars.6 
  
The perceived similarity that seemed to trouble Valignano the most concerned the 
process by which a person experienced ontological transformation, better known in 
common Christian parlance as “salvation.” Viewed as one of the more perceptive 
Catholic missionaries of his day, Valignano quickly came to regard Shin and Lutheran 
teachings concerning salvation, or soteriology, as nearly identical. In his estimation, each 
maintained that salvation is by grace through faith alone (sola Gratia—sola Fide).7 By 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
6 Alessandro Valignano, Historia del Principio y Progresso de la Compania de Jesús en las Indias 
Orientales (1542-64), trans. George Elison (Rome: Institutum Historicum S. I., 1944), 160-61, in Deus 
Destroyed: The Image of Christianity in Early Modern Japan, George Elison (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1973), 43-44.  
 
7 Amstutz, Interpreting Amida, 45. Sola gratia (by grace alone) and sola fide (by faith alone) are two of the 
five fundamental teachings of the Protestant reformers and are the beliefs by which early Protestants 
25 
Valignano’s reckoning, the achievement of the highest goal of each religious tradition—
transforming the human condition from one of estrangement and depravity—was for 
Reformed Christians and Shin Buddhists contingent upon humanity’s total trust in an 
outside force, which is best characterized by loving grace. Any efforts or works by 
humanity play no role whatsoever. Specifically, Valignano wrote: 
[certain Buddhists say that e]ven though humans commit as many sins as 
they wish, if only they invoke [the Buddha’s] name saying Namu Amida 
but—which is to say, sanctissima Amida fotoque [hotoke]—with faith and 
hope in him and the merits of accomplishment . . . then by this they will be 
rendered immaculate and purged of all their sins by the virtue and merit of 
these fotoques, without any necessity to perform other penance or to involve 
themselves in other works, for thereby injury would be done to the penances 
and works which [the Buddhas] performed for the salvation of mankind. So 
much that they hold precisely the doctrine which the devil, father of both, 
taught to Luther.8 
 
It is important to remember that while a small minority of scholars argue that 
Christian teachings were known in Japan one thousand years before the efforts of Xavier 
and his fellow missionaries, the prevailing view is that Xavier’s arrival marked the 
official introduction of the Christian message to the Japanese archipelago.9 Lutheran 
teachings had not reached Japanese shores ahead of these groundbreaking Catholic 
missionaries. In fact, contemporary Western and Japanese scholarship maintains that 
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Protestant expressions of Christianity did not begin to make inroads in Japan for another 
three hundred years, until the middle part of the 1860s.10  
These historic moments of comparative confusion resulted in three significant 
developments. First, the establishment of Catholic seminaries in Japan was temporarily 
delayed, as Jesuits feared the teaching of Christian doctrines to Japanese clergy would be 
received from a “quasi-Lutheran” perspective.11 Second, later efforts to analyze these two 
traditions comparatively (J!do Shinsh" Buddhism and Reformed Christianity) became 
inextricably bound to Xavier and Valignano’s initial perceptions of Japanese Pure Land 
teachings. The taxonomy of comparative analysis with regard to these traditions was 
seemingly fixed quite early on, and later comparisons have largely focused on perceived 
notions of similar doctrines of soteriology and the role of key articulators of these 
positions, such as Martin Luther and Shinran Sh!nin (親鸞上人). This fixed taxonomy 
has resulted in a rash of comparative endeavors that are unnecessarily ahistorical and too 
hermeneutically oriented. Third, due to the comparative emphasis upon soteriological 
orientations, as well as weak methodological approaches to comparison itself, Western 
scholars have largely interpreted Shin Buddhism through pluralistic and universalist 
theologies of religion. The history of the comparison of Shin Buddhism and Reformed 
Christian traditions is a history of impoverished conception.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Kazuo Kasahara, ed., A History of Japanese Religion (Tokyo: Kosei, 2001), 511-13; Yasuo Furuya, ed., 
A History of Japanese Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1997), 8; A. Hamish Ion, The 
Cross and the Rising Sun: The British Protestant Missionary Movement in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, 
1865-1945 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1993); Otis Cary, A History of 
Christianity in Japan: Roman Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Protestant Missions (Rutland, VT: Tuttle, 
1976). The first known Protestant convert was a man named Yano Mototaka, who was baptized into the 
Dutch Reformed Church in November 1865.  
 
11 Amstutz, Interpreting Amida, 46. Admittedly, this Catholic institutional delay is not of large concern for 
the central thrust of this project.  
27 
Prior Comparisons of Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity  
Individuals as far ranging in history as St. Francis Xavier, Karl Barth, Alfred 
Bloom, Dennis Hirota, John Cobb Jr., and Gregory D. Alles have noted striking 
similarities in conceptual structure between Protestant expressions of the Christian 
tradition and Shin Buddhism. Barth fervently maintained that “Yodoism [i.e., Shin 
Buddhism] can certainly be compared without violence to the simple Christian 
‘Protestantism’ which countless souls have thought of as the true Protestantism ever since 
the 16th century.”12 Nearly forty years later, Hirota agreed, suggesting that these 
similarities might consequently “offer an opportunity for close comparison,” which in 
turn might highlight “the potential resources for contemporary religious thought offered 
by Japanese Pure Land Buddhism.”13 Cobb similarly suggested that some doctrines and 
theologies might be critically and fruitfully evaluated and reappraised as a result of a 
deeper understanding of other traditions’ insights.14 Alles notes even more concretely 
that, “Shinran and Luther are eminently comparable.”15 However, after fifty-five years 
and nearly thirty scholarly attempts at comparative analysis of various aspects of these 
two traditions, comparability has fallen short. Undue emphasis has been placed upon 
similarities, while little attention has been paid to the traditions’ significant differences. 
This imbalance should be regarded as “demeaning to the individualism of each, [and] a 
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reflection of the old racist, colonialist attitude that ‘all wogs look alike.’”16 The 
comparative analysis in this study distinguishes itself from these prior short-sighted 
endeavors by attending especially to that which differentiates the two traditions, as well 
as by concentrating on the virtually unexplored interpretive implications of the traditions’ 
divergent responses to the human condition. 
This project further sets itself apart in that it is one of the few manuscript-length 
treatments of this subject matter. Nearly all past scholastically comparative explorations 
of Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity have been brief expositions that merely 
scratch the surface of the potential for comparative insight. This dissertation mines the 
best of these prior comparisons, synthesizes their strengths, and applies a more 
comprehensive and rigorous comparative methodology.  
The modern systematic comparative study of Shin Buddhism and the Reformed 
Christian tradition largely began in 1956 when Karl Barth weighed in. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, Barth’s famous analysis was a textbook case study in comparative theology 
and apologetics in which he privileged Christian conceptions of salvation and concluded 
that Christianity was the “religion of truth,” while Shin Buddhism was a “heathen 
development, which might eventually catch up with the differences we teach.”17 That 
same year, Alfred Bloom, soon to be one of the foremost authorities of Shin studies in the 
English-speaking world, was finishing his doctoral degree at Harvard Divinity School. At 
the time, he posited that the “character and quality of human existence” might be a useful 
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ground for future comparative analysis of Christianity and Buddhism.18 Bloom did not 
pursue this particular line of comparative inquiry himself, but his statement set the stage 
for future investigations.  
Eleven years later, Douglas A. Fox noted, “Christian observers have often 
remarked on the extraordinary similarities of J!do Shin and Christian thought, especially 
in their respective concepts of salvation.”19 Nearly four centuries after Catholic 
missionary Alessandro Valignano wrote that Buddhist practitioners sought salvation in 
faith and hope, Fox made a similar incorrect claim in his work, stating, “It is sometimes 
suggested that Shinran (the founder of the J!do Shin sect of Buddhism) was a sort of 
Japanese Luther who shared with the German a dynamic conviction that salvation is to be 
achieved through faith alone.”20 Paul O. Ingram reified this conviction when he closely 
hewed to Fox’s observations when he posited, “It has been pointed out by many 
knowledgeable western and non-western observers of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism that 
there are striking doctrinal parallels between the soteriologies of Shinran Sh!nin, the 
founder of the J!do Shinsh" school of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism, and Martin 
Luther.”21 However, Ingram rightly sensed that the differences in doctrinal formulation, 
rather than the similarities, would best enable us to understand the development of each 
religious tradition. Through his article-length treatment Ingram provided a first-ever 
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attempt at examining what he perceived to be “the root cause[s] and essential nature of 
man’s [sic] estrangement”—sin and mapp! (末法 later days of the dharma)—for the 
respective traditions.22 Ingram’s small decision to concentrate upon root causes of 
existential estrangement serves as a vital building block project’s larger comparative 
analysis.  
Fritz Buri continued the trend of concentrating upon soteriology and the men who 
“show the way to salvation from the meaninglessness of existence [Paul, Shinran, and 
Luther],” but his brief study stands out from those of his predecessors by demonstrating 
concern for the historical context and situatedness of these three thinkers.23 His decision 
to examine phenomena in situ presaged a vital element of strong future comparative 
endeavors, and is a methodological approach I employ further in this chapter and later in 
Chapter Five.  
At the same time, Alan L. Kolp followed Barth’s line of thinking that “For the 
Western (and especially, Protestant) reader of Buddhism it is the Pure Land Tradition 
[i.e., Shin Buddhism] which seems to approximate most closely the religious tradition 
within Protestantism. Within the Pure Land Tradition itself as it developed in Japan, 
Shinran is the figure who most parallels Martin Luther in the West.”24 Kolp’s analysis of 
their thinking regarding salvation and liberation suggested that, “although Shinran and 
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23 Fritz Buri, “The Concept of Grace in Paul, Shinran, and Luther,” Eastern Buddhist, n.s., 9, no. 2 (1976): 
21.  
 
24 Alan L. Kolp, “Shinran and Martin Luther: Two Doctrines of Salvation by Faith Alone,” International 
Philosophical Quarterly 16, no. 4 (December 1976): 341. 
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Luther represent two divergent cultures . . . their teachings reveal a basic similarity.”25 
However, Kolp betrayed his dependence upon the universalism of Eliadian 
comparativism when he recommended that:  
the warrant for undertaking such a comparison lies in the assumption that 
man [sic] is homo religiosus and, therefore, even though the interpretation, 
articulation, and symbolization of the religious experience of each is 
dissimilar by reflecting each’s cultural and religious conditioning, still the 
basic experiential content is often similar. Such is the case, it seems, with 
Shinran and Luther.26  
 
Western scholars are not unique in their universalistic tendencies to blur 
definitions, impose Protestant categories upon a study, and confuse dialogue with 
comparison. In his 1980 dialogical treatment of Pure Land and Christian thought, 
Japanese scholar Doi Masatoshi sought to trace parallels he saw between the respective 
traditions’ dynamics of faith. In so doing, he conflated Shinran’s exposition of the 
doctrine of the threefold mind (三心 sanshin) with Barth’s interpretation of God’s 
revelation (as seen in Romans 1:17), as well as the central Christian concepts of faith, 
hope and love (expressed in 1 Corinthians 13).27  
In 1985, Gregory D. Alles offered a brief comparative analysis of Shinran and 






27 Doi Masatoshi, “Dynamics of Faith: A Dialogical Study of Pure Land Buddhism and Evangelical 
Christianity,” Japanese Religions 11, no. 2-3 (1980): 68. The elements of the doctrine of the threefold mind 
(三心 sanshin), derived from the eighteenth vow of the Mury!juky! (無量壽經 Larger Pure Land Sutra), 
are sincere mind (至心 shishin), true entrusting (信楽 shingyo), and aspiration for rebirth in the Pure Land (
欲生 yokusho). Romans 1:17 (NRSV) states, “For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith 
for faith; as it is written, "He who through faith is righteous shall live." 1 Corinthian 13:13 (NRSV) states, 
“And now faith, hope, and love abide, these three; and the greatest of these is love.” !
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shifting the methodological approach. He noted that, despite a longstanding awareness of 
striking similarities between the traditions, “comparability has not fulfilled its promise.”28 
While Alles did not specifically delineate the nature of that promise, he likely had the 
following benefits of cross-cultural comparison in mind: (1) understanding objects, 
theories, practices, and movements beyond the limited horizon of embedded cultural 
specificity, in other words, conceiving of all that transpires in human activity in more 
than a case-by-case manner; (2) expanding the taxonomical list of categories by which 
comparative analysis might be conducted, thereby countering the universalistic and 
comparative theological inclination to impose Protestant essentialist categories of 
meaning; and (3) examining religious traditions’ reflections upon common questions, in 
light of one another, thereby enabling “defamiliarization,” in the sense of “making the 
familiar seem strange in order to enhance our perception of the familiar.”29 By Alles’s 
reckoning, prior comparisons lacked systematic organization, comparative control, and 
concern for contextual influences, instead favoring “disjointed individual characteristics 
refracted across a narrow spectrum.”30 Examples of disjointed individual characteristics 
include an overemphasis upon faith, shinjin (信心 entrusting heart), and grace.  
The unique value of Alles’s article is found in the manner in which he posed his 
comparative question. Rather than adhering to the well-worn spectrum of analysis, Alles 
gave a clue as to how future healthy comparison should be conducted. He “slice[d] the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 Alles, “When Men Revile You and Persecute You,” 148.  
 
29 Smith, Imagining Religion, xiii. Italics in the original. Also see Bernard Faure, Double Exposure: Cutting 
Across Buddhist and Western Discourses, trans. Janet Lloyd, ed. Mieke Bal and Hent de Vreies (Stanford, 
CA: Stanford University Press, 2004, 6. 
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problem in a different way . . . horizontally, instead of vertically.”31 Instead of focusing 
on the classic categories of comparison, he cut across universalizing structures of 
Western discourse by exploring “how Shinran and Luther advised their collaborators to 
conduct themselves in religious conflict.”32 More specifically, Alles explored Shinran and 
Luther’s similar recommendations for persistence in the face of conflict, as well as their 
differing modes of active opposition and nonopposition. His introduction of a new 
analytical category opened up a whole new horizon for the future application of 
comparative religious methodology to the modern academic study of religion. It is in this 
same vein that I question how two religious traditions have responded to a common sense 
of the human predicament. Contemporary comparative scholar William E. Paden would 
agree with this methodological approach, as he has argued that concepts of cross-cultural 
analysis do not have to be classically religion-specific. Rather, Paden envisions the 
examination of “prototypes . . . [such as] authority, power, order, purity, genealogy, 
space, or temporality,” or processes and functions such as “dramatizing sociopolitical 
tensions.”33 
Unfortunately, Alles’s new approach was not widely adopted. For example, in a 
1987 journal article, Japanese scholar John Ishihara returned to the practice of examining 
previously identified striking parallels. While noting works by Barth, Ingram, and Buri in 
his introductory remarks, Ishihara admits that his efforts “break no new ground in the 
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32 Alles, “When Men Revile You and Persecute You,” 149. 
 
33 William E. Paden, “Prototypes: Western or Cross-Cultural?” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 
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sense of introducing something novel to the already established similarity between Luther 
and Shinran.”34 However, the one useful element of Ishihara’s work is his attempt to 
ground Luther and Shinran’s positions textually. Another critique regularly levied against 
Eliadian comparativism is its ahistoricity and lack of concern for textuality. Ishihara 
concretely compares Luther’s notion of being “simultaneously justified and a sinner,” as 
articulated in Luther’s lectures on Psalms (1513-1515), with Shinran’s understanding of 
the Shin Buddhist doctrine of the twofold aspect of the deep mind, as explained in his 
later writings found in the Shinsh$ Sh!gy! Zensho II.35 This novel decision to closely 
examine comparative phenomena as found in specific texts, rather than as disembodied 
ideas, is one that Alles also employed in The Iliad, The R"m"ya#a and The Work of 
Religion: Failed Persuasion and Religious Mystification (1994). Here Alles argues that a 
text “is not simply a repository of disembodied religious meaning. It is also an act, or 
rather a set of acts, among them, the composition of the text, the portrayal and retrieval of 
the text, the effects of the text on the religious community, and vice versa.”36 The 
comparative investigation of specific texts in which one considers comparable ideas as 
“events” in time counters the problem of Eliadian ahistoricity and is a vital dimension of 
the healthy new approach to comparison for which I advocate. 
Typical cross-cultural examinations of Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity 
rely on the use of the essentializing tools of comparative theology, theology of religions, 
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35 Ishihara, “Luther and Shinran,” 33. 
 
36 Alles, The Iliad, The R"m"ya#a and The Work of Religion: Failed Persuasion and Religious 
Mystification (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), 4. 
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and Eliadian comparativism. Numerous examples can be found in the scholarly work of 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, including Joseph Spae’s conflation of the Christian notion 
of sin with the Buddhist idea of karmic evil (罪業 zaig!), and the Christian notion of 
salvation with the Buddhist notion of coming undone from the cycles of rebirth (解脱 
gedatsu). Paul Ingram insisted on continuing to compare Luther and Shinran based on 
what Ingram perceived to be common expressions of faith, while Tokiyuki Nobuhara was 
committed to “theological . . . research into the parallelism between Shinran’s thought 
and Protestant Christianity as professed by Reformer Martin Luther.” John B. Cobb Jr. 
and Ry"sei Takeda engaged the Christian notion of faith through a Buddhist-Christian 
dialogue conference held at Boston University, while Colin Noble made the Barthian 
assertion that while Shin Buddhism may present a form of grace that on the surface 
resembles the Christian concept of grace, “the uniqueness of Christian grace lies not just 
in its function but in the nature of the one who offers it . . . The concept of compassionate 
‘other-power’ which has as its sole purpose the enlightenment of sentient beings for their 
own good, falls far short of Christian grace.”37 
Among constructive exceptions to these trends was Douglas A. Fox’s suggestion 
that in Shinran’s interpretation of merit-transference we have “an idea somewhat similar 
to the teaching of St. Anselm that Christ’s merit is made available to men [sic] and is 
abundantly sufficient to achieve their salvation.” Exploring the parallels between 
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Christian thinking and Shinran’s view of the human predicament, Gerhard Schepers 
noted that one of the main problems with prior comparisons of Shin and Christian 
thought is “the fact that this is often done without a careful analysis of the respective 
terms and the different cultural and religious backgrounds.” Galen Amstutz studied Shin 
Buddhism and Reformed Christianity as political movements, wherein “especially at 
issue is the power-dispersing shift towards a new level of de facto self-reliance in 
religious thought, via revolutionary teachings about the radically independent relations of 
the individual to a deity or an existential vision,” and Kenneth D. Lee hinted at the 




The Call for “New Comparativism” 
!
As practiced by scholarship, comparison has been chiefly an affair of the recollection of 
similarity . . . The issue of difference has been all but forgotten"#Jonathan Z. Smith$!
Imagining Religion!(1982)39!
 
A watershed moment in the history of the comparative endeavor occurred in 
1982, when Jonathan Z. Smith published his seminal essay, “In Comparison A Magic 
Dwells.”40 “In Comparison” opened a deep rift among scholars regarding the task, tools, 
and methodological approaches best employed in the distinct discipline known as the 
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comparative study of religion.41 On one side of the divide stand traditional and classical 
approaches to the comparative endeavor, which are often referred to as universalism or 
“Eliadian comparativism.” Until recently these approaches have been deemed nearly 
synonymous with the comparative endeavor itself, an unfortunate development as their 
weaknesses and inadequacies have caused some to consider comparativism to be the 
biggest problem in religious studies rather than its best solution. The charges levied 
against Eliadian comparativism include the suppression of contextual and cultural 
significance through the imposition of Eurocentric and essentialist categories, the 
advancement of unfalsifiable universalist hypotheses, the perpetuation of theological 
foundationalism, the marshalling of comparative data simply to illustrate an a priori 
thesis, the confusion of similarity with identity, and a leveling of religious 
differentiation.42 On the other side of the comparative rift resides “Smithian” or “New 
Comparativism.”43 This dissertation stands as a critical reflection upon the state of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
41 Hugh Urban argues, “The work of Jonathan Z. Smith stands out as perhaps the most intelligent and 
critical reflection to date on the question of comparison in the academic study of religions” (“Making A 
Place To Stand: Jonathan Z. Smith and the Politics and Poetics of Comparison,” Method & Theory in the 
Study of Religion 12, no. 1-3 [2000]: 341).  
 
42 Kimberley C. Patton and Benjamin C. Ray, eds., A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion in the 
Postmodern Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 1; Robert A. Segal, “In Defense of the 
Comparative Method,” Numen 48, no. 3 (2001): 348; Donald Wiebe, “Is the New Comparativism Really 
New?” Method & Theory in the Study of Religion 8, no. 1 (1996): 21. 
 
43 Neither the term “Smithian,” nor “New Comparativist” are commonly employed; nevertheless, I am 
choosing to intentionally use them as labels and devices for noting (1) the comparative scholars of religion 
who have embraced Jonathan Z. Smith’s 1982 call for an efficacious and “methodologically defensible” 
comparison of religious phenomena, as well as (2) the vital tools of Smith’s intellectually creative 
comparative approach. This dissertation joins a small but growing body of New Comparative work. David 
Gordon White would describe this form of comparativism as OTSO-JZS—standing “on the shoulders of 
Jonathan Z. Smith.” See David Gordon White, “The Scholar as Mythographer: Comparative Indo-European 
Myth and Postmodern Concerns,” in Patton and Ray, A Magic Still Dwells, 52-53. 
38 
comparative enterprise, as well as a case study reflecting a healthy, vigorous, engaged, 
and critical “Smithian New Comparativism” for the twenty-first century.44  
Smith argued in “In Comparison” that the modes of comparative analysis 
employed in the study of religion up until that point had “been found problematic.”45 He 
characterized prior comparisons as being emblematic of one of four primary approaches: 
(1) ethnographic comparisons, often based on an explorer’s chance interactions and 
intuitions, which Smith found to be too idiosyncratic and lacking any systematic analysis; 
(2) encyclopedic comparisons, which are contextless lists of cross-cultural material, also 
lacking rigorous analysis; (3) morphological comparisons, which tend to be hierarchical 
series of data placed into atemporal and ahistorical rubrics based upon a priori 
assumptions, or archetypes, of complexity, progression, aberrance, and so on; and (4) 
evolutionary comparisons, which provide the benefit of examining changes and 
developments over time, thereby establishing chronological priority, but which have 
rarely provided any richer insights with regard to comparative cultural material in the 
human sciences. The previously discussed theological, rational, and universalist modes of 
comparison use all four of these deficient approaches. Smith concluded that, on the 
whole, comparison was too concerned with similarities, too arbitrary, and largely devoid 
of meaningful analysis or interpretation. He concluded the essay by challenging scholars 
to develop new comparative theories and methods in an effort to salvage the discipline. In 
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effect, Smith had called for a bridge to be built across the comparative chasm, 
maintaining that the future of the study of religion depended upon it.  
 Eight years later, few scholars had heeded his warning, and Smith reiterated his 
exhortation with a greater sense of urgency. 
Indeed, it may be argued, comparison has come to be, for many in the 
field, the sign of unscientific procedure, abjured in the name of 
responsibility towards the concrete specificity of their objects of study. 
This crise de conscience makes all the more urgent the task of rethinking 
the comparative enterprise in modes appropriate to the academy’s self-
understanding as well as to its perception of the process and goals of 
disciplined inquiry.46 
 
By Smith’s calculation, comparativism was still largely defined by a fixation upon 
establishing the relative superiority of one tradition over another or genealogically 
establishing the relative dependence of one tradition upon another. That many scholars in 
the comparative field had not met the aforementioned challenge 
may be seen by noting the poverty of conception that usually characterizes 
their comparative endeavors, frequently due, as has already been 
suggested, to apologetic reasons. It is as if the only choices the 
comparativist has are to assert either identity or uniqueness, and that the 
only possibilities for utilizing comparisons are to make assertions 
regarding dependence.47  
 
Smith’s words certainly apply to the work of Eliadian comparativists of the 1980s who 
examined Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity, including Spae, Ingram, Nobuhara, 
Cobb, Takeda, and Noble. 
In an effort to jumpstart the field, Smith delineated three primary requirements for 
responsible future comparative efforts. A formula for “New Comparativism” was finally 
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being written, and scholars started paying attention. In The Iliad, The R"m"ya#a and The 
Work of Religion, Alles summarized Smith’s basic assertions and became one of the first 
scholars to take up his charge by beginning to employ critically the tools of “Smithian 
comparativism” to his own work.  
Smith’s first assertion is that comparison should not “aim either to demonstrate 
that one cultural artifact possesses unique, superlative status, or to postulate that several 
cultural artifacts are the same. Instead . . . comparison must develop a ‘discourse of 
difference.’”48 As Smith put it, “It is axiomatic that comparison is never a matter of 
identity. Comparison requires the acceptance of difference as the grounds of its being 
interesting, and a methodological manipulation of that difference to achieve some stated 
cognitive end.”49 In other words, any real progression, when using the comparative tool 
in the field of religious studies, requires attending as much or more to what makes 
religious phenomena different than to what makes them alike.  
Smith’s second assertion is that notions of “similarity and difference are not 
‘given.’ They are [rather] the result of mental operations. In this sense, all comparisons 
are properly analogical . . . [C]omparison, in its strongest form, brings differences 
together within the space of the scholar’s mind for the scholar’s own intellectual 
reasons.”50 The strength of the comparison depends on the nature of the question being 
asked. Matters of genealogy, priority, or borrowing may be interesting, but ultimately 
they are not useful in the comparative endeavor, as they tell the scholar little with regard 
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to critical inquiry that would advance the field. Responsible questions advance the 
academic study of religion, while irresponsible questions do not. Had the early Catholic 
missionaries in Japan used responsible questioning as a tool rather than assuming 
Lutheran borrowing or influence, they would have come to dramatically differently 
conclusions. 
Smith’s third assertion was that comparison should not attempt to “preserve either 
‘phenomenological whole entities’ or ‘local meanings.’ Instead, it [comparison] selects 
and utilizes specific elements from different contexts to elucidate a scholar’s theoretical 
concerns.”51 This assertion is an elaboration of Smith’s idea that comparison in religious 
studies should be about analyzing specific elements of religious traditions, not whole 
traditions, for the express purpose of addressing creative, scholastic, theoretical concerns 
and questions. This third rule for the production of comparisons is consistent with 
Smith’s earlier assertion that comparison is less a process of discovery than a procedure 
of invention.52 The question becomes “what matter of scholarly inquiry might a ‘New 
Comparativist’ pursue in an analogical manner?”  
The basic formula for a responsible comparative methodology had finally been 
established and can be summarized as follows: (1) develop a discourse of difference, (2) 
compare analogically, and (3) compare only the elements of a given tradition that address 
fruitful theoretical concerns. The comparative case study in this dissertation is a model 
for Smith’s threefold formula, as it is an analogically cross-cultural comparison of two 
paradigmatic, yet divergent responses to a common human dilemma.  
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Meet the New Comparativists 
 
A study is an advance if it is more incisive . . . than those that preceded it. 
—Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (1973)53 
 
A handful of “New Comparativists” have stepped forward in the years since 
Smith’s call for the use of new theories and methods in the comparative study of religion 
and his establishment of an initial formula for responsible comparative analysis. Scholars 
have taken the best of Smith’s model and applied it to their own research in incisive ways 
that have advanced their respective fields of inquiry, and in doing they have strengthened 
the general discipline of comparative religious studies and laid the groundwork for all 
future endeavors in the field. These scholars have maintained that any problems with the 
theories and tools of the past should not result in an abandonment of the discipline itself, 
as the benefits of cross-cultural comparison far outweigh the liabilities. They argue that 
the key for scholars is simply to compare seriously and vigorously using the best tools at 
our disposal.  
 In his 1996 article, “Elements of a New Comparativism,” William Paden, an 
expert in the study of cross-cultural patterns of religious behavior, argued that 
comparativism is:  
not just the study of religions, not just the classification of types, and not 
just a hermeneutic which reinvents the sacred for an otherwise 
desacralized age. Rather, it is the central and proper endeavor of religious 
studies as a field of inquiry and the core part of the process of forming, 
testing, and applying generalizations about religion at any level.54  
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This view of comparison led Paden to elaborate on Smith’s formula. In his assessment of 
the field of comparative religious studies, in A Magic Still Dwells: Comparative Religion 
in the Postmodern Age (2000), Paden, like Smith, contended that dynamic new cross-
cultural discoveries will be found in the manipulation of difference and that comparison 
should always be a two-way process, revealing both similarities and differences. 
“Comparativism misses its potential if it only collects parallels or only makes data 
illustrate an already conceived type.”55 Paden also noted the importance of controlling 
aspectual focus when conducting comparison. According to him, comparison should 
focus only on individual points of resemblance that have interpretive utility. Rather than 
examining religious traditions in toto, the comparative scholar should limit the 
framework of analysis to those elements that will further the comparative inquiry. This 
recommendation was an elaboration of cultural anthropologist Fitz John Porter Poole’s 
position, as expressed in his 1986 article, “Metaphors and Maps: Toward Comparison in 
the Anthropology of Religion.” There Poole stated, “Analytical control over the 
framework of comparison involves theoretically focused selection of significant aspects 
of the phenomena.”56 This aspectual control ensures that the conceptual variables under 
consideration promote explanations of the scholar’s central theoretical concerns—in 
Poole’s case, his work regarding women’s social power in Papua New Guinea.57 
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 Yet another important New Comparativist is Barbara A. Holdrege, whose 
contributions to Smithian comparativism are illuminated in her book Veda and Torah: 
Transcending the Textuality of Scripture (1995). In this comparative historical analysis of 
the function and authority of scripture in rabbinic Judaism and brahmanical Hinduism, 
Holdrege places great methodological importance on contextual analysis.58 She maintains 
that any responsible comparison must begin with a tradition-specific investigation of 
historical influences on a given phenomenon, the meaning of terms and symbols within 
respective traditions, and the social dynamics that shape each religious manifestation. 
A nuanced variation of Holdrege’s concern for textual embeddedness can be seen 
in Gavin Flood’s methodologically nimble comparative analysis of ascetic practice in 
Hinduism, Christianity, and Buddhism, titled The Ascetic Self: Subjectivity, Memory and 
Tradition (2004). Flood sees his scholarship standing at the confluence of 
phenomenology and hermeneutics. Specifically, he identifies two major tasks in the 
comparative endeavor: (1) first-level phenomenology, in which the world envisioned by a 
text is first illuminated, and then (2) connecting the text to the wider world. There is great 
value in interpreting the text’s expressions of social and cultural power in the real world. 
This confluence of sociological area-specific studies and comparative hermeneutics 
allows Flood to employ the best methodologies from these disciplines while avoiding 
their respective pitfalls. Flood posits that with his methodological approach the future of 
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successful comparison is a “kind of comparative religion that is postfoundational and 
postcritical, and that respects diverse and divergent views.”59 
In a 2004 article in the journal Method & Theory in the Study of Religion, Jewish 
studies scholar David Freidenreich argues that “comparison of religions offers a valuable 
means of bringing into question deeply rooted assumptions regarding what is ‘normative’ 
in any given tradition as well as offering possible explanations for problems encountered 
in the study of a single tradition.”60 He suggests that the best approach is to use 
comparison to refocus our view of a tradition, practice, or belief. Freidenreich is correct 
in the sense that comparative scholarship should be designed to illuminate concealed 
elements that might otherwise not be seen and to prevent the calcification of standard 
beliefs and monolithic thinking. Further, he recognizes that a shift in perspective can 
often enable both self and cross-cultural understanding. A good example of this shift can 
be seen in his article “Sharing Meals with Non-Christians in Canon Law Commentaries, 
ca. 1160-1260: A Study in Legal Development,” in which he examines Christian 
conceptions of Jews and Muslims through the lens of legal commentaries and laws 
concerning meal practices.61 
Another excellent example of using “other” traditions to refocus standard views is 
Bernard Faure’s Double Exposure: Cutting Across Buddhist and Western Discourses 
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(2004). Faure uses comparison to refocus and reinterpret otherwise normative positions in 
Western thought by providing a “Buddhist interpretation” of the Western radical polar 
abstractions of monotheism and atheism, faith and reason, immanence and transcendence, 
religion and philosophy, the material and the spiritual, and practice and theology. He 
argues that Buddhism has addressed some of the same questions found in Western 
thought but has produced different answers and pathways for proceeding. He further 
suggests that a shift in perspective, taking a Buddhist view when evaluating otherwise 
Western matters, leads to new insights. Similarly, J. J. Clarke’s Oriental Enlightenment: 
The Encounter Between Asian and Western Thought (1999), hermeneutically attempts to 
mediate “Western philosophical concepts through Eastern ideas rather than, as has 
traditionally been the case, the other way around.”62 
In her creative and visionary work The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in 
Myth (1998), expert scholar of Hinduism and mythology Wendy Doniger tells us that the 
successful comparative scholar must have “double vision.”63 One must have the ability to 
see similarity and difference in the particular and in the general. According to Doniger, 
good comparison uses both microscopic and telescopic views of a given phenomenon. 
The microscopic view enables the scholar to see the sort of great particularity and detail 
that tends to interest area specialists, whereas the telescopic view enables the scholar to 
see larger unifying themes at work, typically the concern of universalists. This dual 
vision can be understood as a variation on Flood’s confluence-like, bilateral 
methodology. As Doniger poetically puts the matter, “the microscopic and telescopic 
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together provide a parallax that allows us to see ourselves in motion against the stream of 
time.”64 This way of looking means attending to spatial and temporal contextuality when 
examining a given phenomena, while still being able to move to hermeneutical 
engagement.  
Recall that it was Doniger who gave the New Comparativists their best clue as to 
how to proceed with critical comparison when she asked, “Surely it is possible to bring 
into a single (if not necessarily harmonious) conversation the genuinely different 
approaches that several cultures have made to similar (if not the same) human 
problems.”65 One cannot overstate the impact Doniger has made on comparative 
scholarship through the methodological decision to conduct comparative questioning in 
this manner. This mode of inquiry is the key and the new standard for all future 
comparative work.  
Another New Comparativist who understands the need to dramatically revision 
methodological modes of inquiry is, of course, Gregory Alles. An expert on theories of 
religion, cross-cultural analysis, and the religions of South Asia, Alles first picked up 
Smith’s challenge to formulate new theories and methodologies in the service of a 
renewed comparative enterprise. It was Alles who maintained that if “multicultural 
studies are to mean anything besides atomized, specialized accounts of different peoples, 
places, and times juxtaposed at random, cultural scholars will need once more to 
compare, and compare seriously and vigorously.”66 
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As a critical comparativist he has done precisely that by developing his “cart and 
cargo” analogical methodology, which is examined later in this chapter. For now it can be 
understood as a device for exploring culturally divergent ways of addressing a common 
theme. Using this tool, Alles has variously compared how “two poems articulate and 
negotiate the threat of failed persuasion” in ancient India and Greece, as well as how two 
religious leaders (Shinran and Luther) “advised their collaborators to conduct themselves 
[during] religious conflict.”67 Alles seeks in both cases to identify “paradigmatic 
instances” of differentiated response to a common problem. Along with Doniger’s 
methodological developments, this recognition of paradigmatic instances is a second key 
to a revisioned comparative enterprise. 
The provocative opportunity that informs this dissertation is the speculation 
regarding what an application of the tools of New Comparativism might reveal if applied 
to a well-worn comparative case study. As suggested earlier in this chapter, the case 
study comparing Japanese Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity has been examined 
countless times but nearly always from the Eliadian side of the comparative chasm. By 
applying a New Comparativist methodology to the cross-cultural comparison of these 
two traditions, I offer to scholars of religion and culture an opportunity for reinvigorated 
interreligious learning and another model for healthy and responsible comparison. 
 
Reformed Christianity and J!do Shinsh"—Revisiting a Case Study Anew 
This is an area of scholarly inquiry, not unlike others within the human sciences, where 
progress is made not so much by the uncovering of new facts or documents as by 
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looking again with new perspectives on familiar materials.—Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery 
Divine (1990)68  
 
Like Smith in Drudgery Divine, I have chosen my case study not so much 
because of “its possible intrinsic interest, [but] rather, I have selected it because there is 
an unusually thick dossier of the history of the enterprise” of comparing these two 
traditions.69 Informal ethnographic comparisons of Shin Buddhism and Reformed 
Christianity first occurred over four hundred years ago when Catholic missionaries first 
arrived in Japan. Since the advent of the modern academic study of religion, there have 
been approximately thirty additional formal comparative examinations of elements of the 
two traditions. This literature provides the opportunity to ‘compare the comparisons’ and 
recognize the strengths and shortcomings of prior attempts. It also allows the application 
of the tools of New Comparativism in the pursuit of new perspectives.70  
Specifically, I am conducting a comparative examination of the Reformed 
Christian doctrine of limited atonement and the J!do Shinsh" Buddhist doctrine of akunin 
sh!ki, also known as akunin sh!ki setsu (悪人正機説), the theory that the evil person is 
the object of Amida Buddha’s liberating power. Appearing in texts known as the Canons 
of Dort and the Tannish! (歎異抄 A Record in Lament of Divergences), respectively, 
these two doctrines were developed as responses to the perceived propagation of false or 
erroneous teachings during the formative years of the Reformed Christian Church and the 
Shin Buddhist sangha %僧伽!s!gya&" 
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Through a more nuanced comparative analysis than past scholarship on this topic 
has presented, I argue that within the doctrines of limited atonement and akunin sh!ki, 
thematic similarities provide a compelling rationale for an in-depth exploration of the 
religious traditions’ responses to the human predicament. These thematic parallels 
include similar expressions and interpretations of:  
(1) the human condition as being unavoidably depraved and defiled;  
(2) the human predicament being best characterized as inherently impure due to 
“original” conditioning actions, namely, past karma (shukug!) and original sin;  
(3) the futility of the human effort to effectively change one’s own corrupted 
existence;  
(4) transformative responses to the human condition that originate outside the 
capacity of the individual, namely the “Other Power” (tariki) of and entrusting 
(shinjin) in Amida Buddha, on the one hand, and the predetermined election and 
grace of God on the other; and  
(5) the transactional quality of the processes of ontological transformation in 
response to each tradition’s understanding of the human condition, namely, 
Amida Buddha’s transference of merit (shishin ek!) to all sentient beings for their 
rebirth in the Pure Land, and the application of merit as seen in Anselm of 
Canterbury’s substitution or commercial theory of atonement.  
I further maintain that the doctrines of limited atonement and akunin sh!ki 
provide different interpretations as to the scope of transformative response to the human 
condition. I argue specifically that the Reformed Christian doctrine posits a limited 
response, whereby only the predetermined elect are granted salvific redemption, and that 
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the Shin Buddhist doctrine posits a universal response whereby all sentient beings, and 
most especially evil persons, are assured rebirth in Amida Buddha’s Pure Land. Through 
this bilateral approach to comparison, in which both similarities and differences are 
addressed, I accomplish four goals. First, I examine unexplored parallels in the process of 
transformational response, thereby providing more ground for future comparison. 
Second, by holding in tension alternative ways of addressing the question of who will be 
“saved” or transformed, given the depraved state of the human condition, my analysis 
reveals a more nuanced understanding of varied religious responses to a common 
ontological presupposition than prior scholarship has shown and also prevents one 
religious approach from being viewed as the ideal or standard. Third, this study sheds 
new light on foundational doctrines of Reformed Christianity and Shin Buddhism, 
thereby defamiliarizing doctrinal positions that may be taken for granted, as well as 
providing a new lens for future doctrinal interpretation. Finally, I present a model for 
healthy and vigorous Smithian comparative analysis.  
In terms of scope, this project analyzes the unique historical manifestations of 
each tradition’s doctrinal position as found in particular historical documents. The 
Canons of Dort were formulated at the Synod of Dort in 1618-1619, and the Tannish! (歎
異抄 A Record in Lament of Divergences) was written in the late thirteenth century. This 
comparative study also traces the influences that led to the development of each 
document.  
When considering the Reformed Christian tradition, I interpret the term 
“Reformed” as an adjective that suggests Protestant in the Calvinist tradition, with 
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European continental roots, and constituted around doctrine rather than polity.71 
Throughout this project, “Reformed” also reflects doctrinal developments that proceed 
the eighteenth century. 
Few Christian doctrines have seen such a breadth of interpretation as the doctrine 
of limited atonement.72 For the purposes of this comparative analysis, the doctrine of 
limited atonement should be understood as follows: While Christ’s death and atonement 
on the cross were sufficient to effectively redeem the sin of all humanity, in accordance 
with God’s will, Christ’s atonement was only efficacious in the salvation of the elect. 
Furthermore, in the consideration of the doctrine of limited atonement, the 
specific sectarian expression of Reformed Christian thought traced through this project is 
found in a particular doctrinal position that developed from a range of influences, 
including Augustine’s sense of the efficacy and particularism of God’s grace, as well as 
Anselm’s satisfaction theory of atonement articulated in Cur Deus Homo? (Why God-
man?) This position also evolved out of the sub- or supralapsarian position maintained by 
individuals such as Thomas Bradwardine (1290-1349), Gregory of Rimini (1330-1358), 
and Martin Bucer (1491-1551), which argues that “electio [election] and reprobatio 
[(reprobation) are] positive, coordinate decrees of God by which God chooses those who 
will be saved and those who will be damned, in other words, a fully double 
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predestination, or praedestinatio gemina [double predestination].”73 John Calvin’s 
conceptions of the particularism of the workings of grace and the transactionally 
substitutionary character of Christ’s death contributed to this line of thought, as did 
Theodore Beza’s writings on predestination, election, and specific atonement in works 
such as Quaestiones et Responsiones (Geneva, 1570), A Briefe Declaration of the Chief 
Poyntes of Christian Religion set forth in a Table (London, 1575), and Tractationes 
theologicae (Geneva, 1570-1582).74 The position found unique expression in the five 
“Heads of Doctrine” of the Canons of Dort, issued at the Synod of Dort in 1619, in 
response to the Remonstrance of the followers of Jacobus Arminius. (These became 
generally recognized as the five points of Calvinism and, later, as one of the doctrinal 
standards used by the Christian Reformed Church and the Reformed Church of America.)  
When examining the doctrinal position of limited atonement, or particular 
redemption, as presented in the Canons of Dort, I pay special attention to Anthony A. 
Hoekema’s 1968 translation from the original Latin into modern English.75 Given “the 
importance of the Canons as one of the doctrinal standards used by both the Christian 
Reformed Church and the Reformed Church of America,” Hoekema’s 1968 translation is 
a vast improvement over the English translations previously found in the Christian 
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Reformed Psalter Hymnal and Philip Schaff’s Creeds of Christendom, which are often 
paraphrases of the original Latin.76  
In interpreting the aforementioned influences upon the doctrine of limited 
atonement, I embrace the position articulated by Richard Muller, which posits significant 
continuity of thought among the Patristic and Medieval traditions, the Reformation era, 
and post-Reformation developments.77 Additionally, my study’s position regarding “a 
basic harmony between Calvin and later orthodox Calvinism”78 can also be seen in the 
contemporary work of Roger Nicole and John Owen.79  
The Shin doctrine of Akunin sh!ki setsu maintains that the evil person is the 
primary object of Amida Buddha’s Primal Vow to save all sentient beings. The vow is 
extended to all sentient beings because the human condition itself is understood to be 
defiled or evil in nature. In other words, it is Amida Buddha’s fervent aspiration that all 
sentient beings be liberated from their present state or condition by being reborn into his 
Pure Land, where they will ultimately achieve enlightenment. Within Shin thought, this 
teaching is often considered the culmination of all Mah#y#na Buddhist teachings. It is 
most famously articulated in Article Three of the Tannish!, which states since “even a 
good person attains birth in the Pure Land, how much more so the evil person.”80  
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When examining the doctrine of akunin sh!ki, I focus on the sectarian 
interpretation that argues that the Doctrine of Evil Persons as the Object of Salvation 
(akunin sh!ki setsu) was first found in the words and thoughts of H!nen (1133-1212), 
specifically in the work transcribed by his disciple Seikan-b! Genchi, titled Daigobon 
H!nen Sh!nin Denki (Biographical Record of the Master H!nen, Daigo Manuscript).81 
The significance of the doctrine found its fullest expression in Article Three of the 
Tannish!, which traditional Shin thought maintains was written by Yuien-b! to reflect 
the words of his master, Shinran Sh!nin (1173-1263).82 As it concerns akunin sh!ki setsu, 
I focus primarily on its expression as found in the Tannish!, using the translation A 
Record in Lament of Divergences: A Translation of the Tannish! (2005).83 
It has been said that the analytical comparison of religious traditions is “the 
examination, in a unified work, of sources from at least two distinct religious traditions 
addressing an aspect of religion common to the comparands.”84 The central aspect in 
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common that I address is a doctrinal response to a perceived deviation from orthodoxy. 
To do so, I employ Gregory Alles’s analogical cart methodology, along with the tools of 
the New Comparativists.  
 
Alles’s Analogical Cart 
Alles’s analogical cart methodology is a means for identifying different ways of 
addressing a common theme. The scholar’s task is to first isolate a scholarly, theoretical 
theme or concern. This concern functions as a comparative frame or cart, which holds the 
cargo of differing cultural responses to the theme in question. In The Iliad, The 
R"m"ya#a and the Work of Religion, Alles explores how threats of failed persuasion have 
been negotiated and articulated in the literature of divergent cultures. He works from the 
premise that the act of social persuasion held great promise for the establishment of social 
well-being, but he also recognizes that failure to persuade held the potential for great 
social calamity. This framework of concern—threat of failed persuasion—serves as 
Alles’s cart.  
According to his methodology, the scholar’s second task is to analogically 
identify two differentiated paradigmatic instances of response. These constitute the cargo. 
In his case study, Alles examines the response to the threat of failed persuasion found in 
two epics, the Greek Iliad and the Indian R"m"ya#a. He takes the important 
methodological step of treating those texts as “events” in time, seeing the Iliad and the 
R"m"ya#a as products of countless political and religious influences, rather than as 
ahistorical documents. This prioritizing of “events” over “ideas” enables Alles to engage 
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in a deeply contextualized comparison, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of universalism and 
essentialism.  
 
Applying the Tools of New Comparativism 
The “New Comparativist” methodology I am advocating is predicated upon a 
conviction that comparative inquiry should be in the service of some question of 
importance to the scholar of religion. Whereas for Alles the question concerned failed 
persuasion, the central question of this project involves examining how two paradigmatic 
and differentiated religious traditions have responded to a common understanding of the 
human predicament. This question functions as Alles’s cart, while simultaneously 
addressing Doniger’s interest as to whether different cultures have made similar 
responses to common human problems. 
The divergent cultural cargo in this methodological endeavor are the Reformed 
Christian doctrine of limited atonement and the Japanese Shin Buddhist doctrine of 
akunin sh!ki. In order to avoid the pitfalls of Eliadian comparativism, I prioritize the 
“events”—the Canons of Dort and the Tannish!—as responses to perceived deviations 
from preexistent “orthodox” positions.  
In addition to Alles’s analogical cart, this study employs Wendy Doniger’s 
comparative methodology of exploring micro- and macromyths. This methodology 
defines the micromyth as the neutral scholarly construction that lies beneath any one 
particular text and that allows for the comparison of cultural variants on a basic narrative. 
For this comparative inquiry, the basic narrative, or macromyth, in question suggests that 
the human condition is best characterized as defiled or depraved. This statement then 
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serves as the hub to which various religious responses are connected like spokes. The 
particular responses of interest to this project, while superficially similar in many ways, 
will be revealed as being quite different in scope, namely, limited and universal. The 
subsequent interpretation and analysis of these differences constitute the macromyth.  
Yet another tool of New Comparativism employed in this comparative analysis is 
Barbara Holdrege’s methodology of comparative historical analysis. This approach 
involves three principal phases. First, I perform separate, tradition-specific, 
contextualized historical analyses of how the Canons of Dort and the Tannish! are 
understood within their own traditions; that is, I explore the historical events that led to 
the establishment of these respective doctrinal standards, and I examine the doctrines’ 
loci within the broader Protestant Christian and Mah#y#na Buddhist traditions. Next, my 
comparative analysis delineates structural similarities and highlights significant 
differences, such as similar expressions and interpretations of the nature of the human 
condition, causes of that ontological status, responses to the human predicament, and 
mechanisms or processes of response, as well as divergent scopes of response. Last, I 
interpret what these similarities and differences convey regarding religious responses to 
perceptions of the human condition as being depraved. 
Finally, this study employs William Paden’s methodology of controlling the 
aspectual focus of the comparison. Rather than attempting to compare these two 
traditions or even two of their doctrines in toto, the scope of analysis here is limited to the 
aforementioned six points of concern for comparative analysis. My presentation of 
contradictory impressions of the efficacious scope of redemptive action will thereby 
provide interpretative utility. The additional methodological implication of this 
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presentation is the attempt to defamiliarize doctrinal positions that may be taken for 
granted and to question deeply rooted assumptions regarding what is normative in a given 
tradition.  
Implicit within the approaches taken within this dissertation lies Smith’s 
methodological concern that comparative endeavors should develop a “discourse of 
difference.”85 Therefore, this analysis does not stop at the implication of sameness or 
suggest a cultural artifact’s superiority.86 The appearance of similarity between Reformed 
Christian and Shin Buddhist interpretations of the human condition, the reasons for this 
condition, the responses to this condition, and the mechanism of response all constitute 
what Doniger calls “a useful base from which to ask about difference.”87 From this base, 
this dissertation is able to follow Smith’s basic assumption that comparison selects and 
utilizes specific elements from different contexts in order to elucidate the scholar’s 
theoretical concern—in this case, what can be learned from divergent scopes of 
transformational response to a common ontological presupposition.  
Also implicit within this dissertation’s multifaceted methodological approach is 
David Freidenreich’s insistence that “comparison without analysis does little to advance 
the study of religion.”88 After giving contextualized, deep description of each doctrinal 
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statement and its place within its respective tradition, I offer hypotheses as to what these 
statements collectively say about the nature of the human predicament. 
 
Rationale for Methodology 
 
According to Smith the primary skill of scholars of religion is their “relentlessly 
self-conscious” and strategic ability to clearly articulate why they have chosen to 
examine particular phenomena. Smith maintains that, as no expression of human 
experience possesses intrinsic interest, the examination of cultural datum “is of value 
only insofar as it can serve as exempli gratia of some fundamental issue in the 
imagination of religion.”89  
Like Alles, I am not ultimately trying to identify patterns (e.g., grace or faith) 
common to the two texts in question; rather, I am exploring differentials by which the 
two texts articulate divergent responses of scope to a conceptually analogous ontological 
presupposition. This approach heeds the counsel of Marsha A. Hewitt, who maintains 
that any “new comparativism” must avoid unduly privileging unifying patterns over local 
particularity. She states that a “dialectical methodology [of this sort] in the comparative 
study of religion allows for conceiving a relationship between universality and 
particularity that maintains them in a tensive relation rather than abolishing one element 
in favour of the other.”90  
Consequently, the significance of this dissertation rests in its ability to fill a gap in 
the existing scholarship by (1) examining the unexplored parallels between the 
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transactionally substitutionary theory of Christ’s atonement and the Shin interpretation of 
the process of merit-transference (shishin ek!), (2) comparing the predeterminative 
dimension of Amida Buddha’s Primal Vow and the supralapsarianism found within the 
doctrine of limited atonement, and (3) attending to the bilateral function of comparison, 
specifically in the interpretive analysis of the doctrines of limited atonement and akunin 
sh!ki’s differing scopes of response to the depraved quality of the human condition. 
Wendy Doniger maintains that a good comparative scholar “builds an argument 
like an Irish wall: a good Irish wall needs no mortar, for if the stones are selected 
carefully and arranged so that they fit together tightly, they will hold one another up and 
the wall will stand. So too, if a scholar selects her texts carefully and places them in a 
sequence that tells the story she wants to tell, she will need relatively little theory to 
explain why they belong together and what sort of argument they imply together.”91 In 
other words, good comparisons are dependent upon the positing of critical analogically 
developed questions that further the academic study of religion and cross-cultural 
engagement. Doniger’s statement also implies that if the analogical cart is well built and 
the cargo reflects paradigmatic instances of differentiation, then the comparison will need 
little explanation. Eliadian comparativists built shaky walls that easily crumbled, but with 
their Smithian training, New Comparativists are prepared to become master stonemasons.
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Chapter Three: Akunin Sh!ki Setsu 
We must describe what we are comparing before we compare.—Jonathan Z. Smith, 
Imagining Religion (1982)' 
 
In the ongoing endeavor to provide the basis for the comparative analysis that 
serves as the heart of this dissertation, this chapter describes the historical effort within 
the nascent Shin Buddhist community to address growing doubts and confusion arising 
amongst followers of the teachings of Shinran Sh!nin (親鸞上人) in the years soon after 
Shinran’s death.2 These first generation followers of Shinran’s religious tenets were 
living in the heart of Japanese feudal power, the Kanto region, during the Kamakura 
period of Japanese history (1185-1333). As “Shinran left no instructions on the formation 
of a sectarian order after his death [however]… his followers were forced to shape the 
Shinsh" as best they could from his teachings.”3 The effort to correct misunderstandings 
of Shinran’s teachings, a central concern for both this chapter and this project as a whole, 
first appeared in codified form in a text known as the Tannish! (歎異抄 A Record in 
Lament of Divergences). This chapter examines how and why the Tannish! was written, 
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describes the influences upon the central doctrine found within the Tannish! (悪人正機
説 akunin shoki setsu), and explores the meaning and scope of this doctrine of liberation. 
The Tannish! was constructed out of sectarian necessity. Shinran’s religious 
views were quite different from the perspectives of more mainstream Japanese Buddhist 
leaders of the day, and with no direct source for guidance after his death, 
misunderstandings easily arose among his followers. As modern scholars of Shinran’s 
teachings have observed, “though Shinran was traditional in his outward forms, his 
thought was in reality, drastically revolutionary.”4 One example as to how Shinran’s 
thoughts ran counter to contemporaneous normative Buddhist positions had to do with his 
view of monastic celibacy. Shinran extended the Mah#y#na notion that it was possible to 
“attain the transcendent while living in the mundane world” to its fullest expression, as he 
intentionally disregarded the centuries-old Buddhist distinction between monastic life and 
lay life when he married the nun Eshinni (惠信尼).5  
Another significant difference between Shinran’s religious views and more 
traditional Buddhist teachings involved his thoughts regarding how a person might be 
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俗) theory of ‘neither monk nor layman’. A useful look at the historical differentiation between lay and 
monastic orientations in Chinese and Japanese Pure Land traditions can be found in Allan A. Andrews’ 
“Lay and Monastic Forms of Pure Land Devotionalism: Typology and History,” Numen 40 (1993): 16-37, 
whereas a good examination of the contemporary implications of Shinran’s hiso hizoku theory can be found 
in Richard M. Jaffe’s Neither Monk nor Layman: Clerical Marriage in Modern Japanese Buddhism (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2001).  
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liberated from the endless cycle of rebirth, known as sams#ra (六道 rokud!). Shinran’s 
teachings were “predicated on the idea that Amida Buddha has provided human beings 
with a path to enlightenment (菩提 bodai) or Nirv#na (滅度 metsudo) . . . without the 
rigorous religious practices demanded in other forms of Buddhism.”6 In lieu of the 
traditional cultivation of wisdom and the disciplined practice of meditation (i.e., the path 
of sanctification, 聖道門 sh!d!-mon), Shinran promoted the Pure Land path (浄土門 
j!do-mon), which advocates “a simple form of religious devotion aimed not at immediate 
enlightenment in the present lifetime but at birth in Amida’s Pure Land during one’s next 
life.”7 According to Shinran’s Pure Land thought, Amida Buddha (Skt. Amit#bha - the 
Buddha of Infinite Light and Life), had in his boundless wisdom and compassion 
perceived the “problems of existence of those who are suffering in Sams#ra from evil 
karma, and [thus] provides a means of emancipation.”8 That emancipation is said to take 
the form of rebirth, upon one’s death, in a land of utmost peace and bliss (Skt. Suhk"v"ti), 
the Pure Land of Amida (浄土 J!do). Shinran maintained that the conditions found in 
this Pure Land are so perfect, so devoid of corruption or defilement that anyone born 
there will more easily attain nirv#na than they ever would from the human realm of 
sams#ra.  
The religious devotion required for birth in Amida’s Pure Land, known as shinjin 
(信心), is most commonly explained as ‘faith’ or ‘piety’, but is better understood as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!




8 Hisao Inagaki, The Three Pure Land Sutras: A Study and Translation, 3rd ed. (Kyoto, Japan: Nagata 
Bunshodo, 2000), 3. 
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“awakening to Amida’s compassion [which is] constantly working on a person.”9 In other 
words, shinjin suggests the cultivation of an ‘entrusting heart’ that is open to and 
prepared for the compassionate work of Amida, which is continually endeavoring to 
shine light on the human condition and reveal the true nature of existence itself.10 The 
“central religious experience of Shin Buddhism, [shinjin] . . . literally means man’s [sic] 
‘true, real, and sincere heart and mind’ (makoto no kokoro), which is given by Amida 
Buddha” as the unrestricted gift of wisdom and liberation.11  
The most unique elements of Shinran’s thought and the facets of most concern for 
both this chapter and this dissertation’s overall analysis are Shinran’s view of the human 
condition and his sense of the unlimited scope of liberation that is inevitable due to the 
compassionate efforts of Amida Buddha. These tenets of Shinran’s teachings will be 
explored in much greater depth through the aforementioned analysis of the Tannish! and 
akunin shoki setsu.  
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9 Hisao Inagaki, ed., A Record in Lament of Divergences: A Translation of the Tannish!, 2nd ed. (Kyoto: 
Hongwanji Press, 2005), ix. Examples of prior scholarship that defines and explains shinjin as “faith” or 
“piety” include, but is not limited to: Paul S. Chung, “Martin Luther and Shinran: The Presence of Christ in 
Justification and Salvation in a Buddhist-Christian Context,” Asian Journal of Theology 18 (October 2004): 
295-309; Ingram, “Faith as Knowledge,” 23-35; John B. Cobb, “Can A Buddhist Be a Christian, Too?” 
Japanese Religions 11, no. 2-3 (September 1980): 35-55; Kolp, “Shinran and Martin Luther,” 341-357. A 
useful examination of the term “faith” and its relationship to Pure Buddhist teachings appeared in the 
presentation of two papers at a plenary session of the Fourth International Buddhist-Christian Dialog 
Conference held at Boston University on July 30 – August 3, 1992. The papers were titled “Faith” by John 
B. Cobb, Jr. and “The Pure Land Buddhist Notion of Faith” by Ryusei Takeda. 
 
10 In translating shinjin as “entrusting heart,” rather than “faith,” I align my interpretation with the position 
taken by Hisao Inagaki and the editorial board of A Record in Lament of Divergences: A Translation of the 
Tannish!, 2nd ed. (Kyoto: Hongwanji Press, 2005), vii-x, as well as Dennis Hirota, Michio Tokunaga, and 
Ryushin Uryuzu, the translators of The Collected Works of Shinran, 2 vols. (Kyoto: J!do Shinsh" 
Hongwanji-ha, 1997). The decision to translate shinjin as “entrusting heart” also better enables the 
comparative analysis that follows to avoid a classic mistake of comparative studies – the conflating of 
meaning found in the ideas and terminology of two religious traditions, or the reduction of an idea found in 
one tradition to the parameters outlined by a second tradition. 
 
11 Dennis Hirota, ed. The Collected Works of Shinran Vol. 2 (Kyoto: J!do Shinsh" Hongwanji-ha, 1997), 
206. 
66 
The distinctive nature of Shinran’s teachings coupled with the lack of an obvious 
ideological successor inevitably led to faulty interpretations of his thought by numerous 
Shin practitioners in the years following his death. Due to this rising proliferation of 
errant teachings that started to replace Shinran’s core message, a clarifying response was 
developed around 1280. The response to a perceived increase in deviations from the “true 
faith” of Shinran, which this chapter concentrates upon, was intended to ensure the 
correct transmission of Shinran’s teachings, thereby preserving his ideas from distortion 
and corruption, and to effectively establish orthodox Shin thought.12  
Of the historical clarifying responses made to those early followers’ 
misconceptions, this chapter pays particular attention to the early Shinsh"’s articulation 
of an orthodox statement regarding the identity of the true object of Amida Buddha’s vow 
of liberation or Primal Vow (本願 hongan). Put another way, this orthodox declaration 
by the early Shin community centered upon the question as to who would ultimately be 
liberated from sams#ra. As the Shin community rapidly began to grow in the decades 
after Shinran’s death, some followers challenged the traditional teachings by espousing 
that certain actions would prohibit a person from being released from sams#ra (i.e., 
assured birth in the Pure Land). It was argued that individuals who did not read and study 
the sutras and commentaries would not be released, nor would those who became 
argumentative with other followers or were stingy with donations to the sangha (僧伽 
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12 Shinran’s “true faith,” his conception of the development of the Pure Land path, and his view of 
liberation are most clearly delineated in his Hymn of True Shinjin and the Nembutsu (正信偈 Sh!shinge). 
This work can be found in the 102nd section of the chapter on practice (行gy!) in Shinran’s seminal work 
Collection of Passages Revealing the True Teaching, Practice, and Realization of the Pure Land Way (教
行信証 Ky!gy!shinsh!); Sh!shinge, in The Collected Works of Shinran (Kyoto: J!do Shinsh" Hongwanji-
ha, 1997), 69-74; and Alfred Bloom, Shoshinge: The Heart of Shin Buddhism, trans. Rev. T. Nagatani and 
Ruth Tabrah (Honolulu, Hawaii: Buddhist Study Center Press, 1986), 101-108. 
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s!gya). The clarifying response developed in the late thirteenth century was meant to 
demonstrate that Shinran’s teachings argued for a radically universal conception of 
ontological transformation rather than expressing prohibitions and limits to liberation. 
“Specifically, it contained the seeds of an egalitarian worldview by placing people on 
equal footing with each other within Amida’s vow to save all [sentient beings].”13 
Shinran maintained that Amida would never forsake an individual due to her station in 
Japanese society or even her actions towards others. In other words, birth in the Pure 
Land is meant for her and for everyone. No one would ever be forsaken by Amida (摂取
不捨 sesshu fusha), regardless of one’s thoughts, actions, or life circumstances. As 
Shinran put the matter in his Sh!shinge (正信偈 Hymn of True Shinjin and the 
Nembutsu): 
When the one thought-moment of joy arises, nirvana is attained without 
severing blind passions; When ignorant and wise, even grave offenders 
and slanders of the dharma, all alike turn about and enter shinjin, they are 
like waters that, on entering the ocean, become one in taste with it . . . 
 
When foolish beings of delusion and defilement awaken shinjin, they 
realize that birth-and-death is itself nirvana; without fail they reach the 
land of immeasurable light and universally guide sentient beings to 
enlightenment . . . 
 
With kind concern he teaches the three characteristics of entrusting and 
nonentrusting, compassionately guiding all identically, whether they live 
when the dharma survives as but form, when in its last stage, or when it 
has become extinct. Though persons have committed evil all their lives, 
when they encounter the Primal Vow, they will reach the world of peace 
and realize the perfect fruit of enlightenment.14  
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13 James C. Dobbins, Letters of the Nun Eshinni: Images of Pure Land Buddhism in Medieval Japan 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2004), 65. 
 
14 J!do Shinsh" Hongwanji-ha, Sh!shinge (正信偈 Hymn of True Shinjin and the Nembutsu), in The 
Collected Works of Shinran (Kyoto: J!do Shinsh" Hongwanji-ha, 1997), 70-72. 
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As Alfred Bloom explains, Shinran’s declaration of equality in Amida’s salvation 
is remarkable as Shinran highlights “Amida’s intention to bring about the salvation of all 
beings, none to be excluded…. Salvation is essentially indivisible, and compassion would 
not be true compassion if even one were to be excluded.”15 Shinran believed that the 
liberation of sentient beings was a universal process and experience through the Pure 
Land path. No person could be excluded or make himself exempt. This dissertation builds 
upon on the idea that this teaching is unique within the larger trajectory of Pure Land 
thought, as well as the pan-Mah#y#na world, and as such it serves as an important 
element in any successful comparison of Pure Land Buddhism with other non-Pure Land 
religious traditions. Consequently, the matter of universal scope of ontological 
transformation found within Shinran’s teachings is of central importance to this 
dissertation’s comparative analysis with the Reformed Christian doctrine of limited 
atonement. To understand the magnitude of this teaching though, it is important to first 
briefly understand its context.   
Historically Pure Land Buddhist practitioners have revered a collection of texts 
above all other Buddhist sutras – the three Pure Land s"tras.16 Of these sutras, the 
“Larger Pure Land S"tra” (無量壽經 Mury!juky!), is by far the most important to the 
Pure Land movement as it “contains the forty-eight vows made by Amida in his quest to 
achieve Buddhahood, to establish his Pure Land, and to save all sentient beings. Among 
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15 Bloom, Shoshinge, 39-40. 
 
16 The Three Pure Land s"tras include the Larger S"tra of Immeasurable Life (無量寿経 Mury!juky!), the 
Smaller S"tra of Immeasurable Life (阿弥陀経 Amidaky!), and the S"tra on Contemplation of the Buddha 
of Infinite Life (観無量寿経 Kanmury!juky!).  
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the forty-eight, the eighteenth vow is the crucial one on which Pure Land soteriology 
rests.”17 Often referred to as the Primal Vow or the principal vow (hongan), it states:  
If, when I attain Buddhahood, sentient beings in the lands of the ten 
quarters who sincerely and joyfully entrust themselves to me, desire to be 
born in my land, and call my Name even ten times, should not be born 
there, may I not attain perfect Enlightenment.18 
 
This eighteenth vow, considered by Pure Land Buddhists to be the most important 
teaching, is viewed as the definitive statement of the Buddha’s compassion and wisdom, 
which results in universal liberation or salvation.19 It is the “soteriological norm” for Pure 
Land thought, as it is the “Buddha-dharma of all . . . [the] virtual guarantee of the eternal 
salvation of all sentient beings.”20 In other words, it is the central position regarding 
ontological transformation for Pure Land practitioners. !
Given the magnitude of its place in Pure Land thought throughout history, it is 
critical to examine how the Shinsh" came to interpret Amida’s Primal Vow. An 
important point for this comparative project is to note that Shin interpretations of the 
hongan were coupled with Shinran’s teachings regarding the nature of the human 
predicament to form a unique statement concerning who will be ‘saved’ or liberated by 
Amida’s compassion. As previously described, this unique statement of ontological 
transformation, or liberation, involves a radically universal scope as Amida’s salvific 
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17 Dobbins, J!do Shinsh$, 3. 
 
18 Inagaki, The Three Pure Land Sutras, 243. 
 
19 Takeda Ry"sei, “Mutual Transformation of Pure Land Buddhism and Christianity: Methodology and 
Possibilities in the Light of Shinran’s Doctrine,” trans. Jan Van Bragt, in Living in Amida’s Universal Vow: 
Essays in Shin Buddhism, ed. Alfred Bloom (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2004), 280.  
 
20 Allan A. Andrews, “Pure Land Buddhist Hermeneutics: Honen’s Interpretation of Nembutsu,” in Living 
in Amida’s Universal Vow: Essays in Shin Buddhism, ed. Alfred Bloom (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 
2004), 233. 
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activity is directed at everyone. Many scholars have suggested that these developments 
ultimately culminated in the prominent Shin Buddhist doctrine (説 setsu) known as 
akunin sh!ki (悪人正機).21 This doctrine of akunin sh!ki, which illustrates Shinran’s 
ideas about a universal scope of ontological transformation, will be directly compared 
with the Reformed Christian doctrine of atonement and its more limited scope of 
ontological transformation in Chapter Five of this dissertation.  
Although akunin sh!ki setsu will be examined and explained in much greater 
detail throughout the chapter, for now it should be understood as follows: All ordinary, 
foolish sentient beings (凡夫 bonbu), despite being filled with an abundance of blind 
passions, ignorance and defilements (煩悩 bonn!), are the objects of Amida’s saving 
power. Further, as evidenced by the fact that they currently reside or exist in the cycle of 
rebirth, all sentient beings are deemed to be karmically bound or possessed with residual 
karma (宿業 shukug!). Put differently, consistent with the law of karmic causation, an 
individual’s current existence in sams#ra is the direct result of a particular past action. As 
the human realm is a state defined by the three poisons — blind passion, defilement and 
ignorance — Shinran argued that any and every action is an ‘evil’ action and 
consequently all humans should be understood as ‘evil people’ (悪人 akunin). As Shinran 
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21 J!kai Asai, “Exclusion and Salvation in Honen’s Thought: Salvation of Those Who Commit the Five 
Grave Offenses or Slander the Right Dharma,” Pacific World Third Series 3 (Fall 2001): 125. Examples of 
other scholars who have commented on the uniqueness of Shinran’s theory of liberation include Ry!sh! 
Yata, "Shinran's Theory That the Evil Persons Are the Right Object of Amida's Salvation," in The Japanese 
Buddhism Academic Society Annual Report 65 (2000): 53-66; Fujimoto Kiyohiko, “A Study of H!nen ’s 
Doctrine of Evil Persons as the Object of Salvation” (paper presented at the “International Symposium on 
the Life, Thought, and Legacy of H!nen -b! Genku.” Jodo Shu Research Institute. Co-sponsored by the 
Buddhist Studies Program of the University of Hawai’i and the Hawai’i Council of Jodo Missions. 
Honolulu. April 12, 1996); and Taira Masayuki, “Gedatsu J!kei to akunin sh!ki setsu,” in Nihon ch$sei no 
shakai to Bukky! (Tokyo: Hanawa Shob!, 1992): 266-279. 
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put the matter, “There is never [any act]… that is not evil that we commit and [the 
working out of] past karma.”22 Shinran’s intentional use of the term ‘evil’ (悪 aku) when 
describing all sentient beings is both a unique development in Buddhist thought and a 
vital component of the clarifying response to early followers misconceptions. Recall that 
some followers of the early Shinsh" argued it was important to establish a list of the 
specific actions that should be deemed ‘evil’ and thus obstacles to rebirth in the Pure 
Land. Shinran maintained instead that as all actions occur within the realm of sams#ra, all 
actions are in fact evil. Any differentiation between good actions and bad actions, or 
actions that result in rebirth in Amida’s Pure Land and those that prohibit rebirth, is 
useless. As evil people, karmically bound individuals are recipients of Amida’s salvific 
compassion, and since everyone in the human realm is ‘evil,’ according to Shinran’s 
thought everyone can and will be liberated. In summary, since individuals are the result 
of past karma, all sentient beings are evil and are beneficiaries of Amida’s salvific 
activity as it is meant for all sentient beings.  
This matter concerning the true object of Amida’s compassion and accompanying 
salvific activity, as expressed in his Primal Vow, is of central importance to this 
comparative analysis as it directly addresses the comparative matter of scope of 
liberation.23 Specifically, this chapter demonstrates that in response to a perceived fallen 
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22 This is an adaptation of Tannish! 13 found in Ueda Yoshifumi, “Freedom and Necessity in Shinran’s 
Concept of Karma,” trans. Dennis Hirota, in Living in Amida’s Universal Vow: Essays in Shin Buddhism ed. 
Alfred Bloom (Bloomington, IN: World Wisdom, 2004), 105. 
 
23 The notion of “salvation” or “salvific activity” is commonly found in Judeo-Christian traditions, while 
Buddhist thinkers and practitioners tend to speak and write of liberation, transformation, release, or rebirth. 
However, when writing for Western audiences contemporary Buddhist thinkers and scholars are often 
choosing to employ salvific language as a synonym for the aforementioned ideas. For example: Sh!jun, 
“Shinran’s Indebtedness To T’an-luan,” 220; John Ross Carter, “Identity in Relation: The Buddha and the 
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or corrupted human condition, unlike the limited scope of salvation expressed in the 
Canons of Dort, the Tannish! demonstrates a universal scope of liberation in response to 
a similar ontological position.  
Finally, the specific historic event that addressed misconceptions and repudiated 
deviations from Shinran’s teachings, preventing the fracturing of the young Shin 
community, and which most clearly articulates the doctrine of akunin sh!ki, was the 
creation of a brief religious tract known as the Tannish! (歎異抄 A Record in Lament of 
Divergences). Considered to be one of the world’s great religious and literary 
developments, the Tannish!’s “historical value lies in the vivid picture it paints of the 
Shinsh" in this embryonic stage. The work also presents a powerful spiritual message 
which has made the Tannish! one of the Shinsh"’s most popular religious texts in the 
twentieth century.”24 Additionally, the Tannish! is the most widely read religious text 
amongst contemporary Shinsh" practitioners and can be thought of as a virtual summary 
of Shin thought and practice.25 
The Tannish! consists of two major parts that are of particular interest to this 
project: 1) ten sayings attributed to Shinran; and 2) critiques by the author of the 
Tannish! of eight misunderstandings of Shinran’s teachings that were beginning to 
spread among his disciples. In the following pages, I will explain the Tannish!’s position 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Availability of Salvific Truth,” Pacific World Third Series 5, (Fall 2003), 35; Dobbins, J!do Shinsh$, 6; 
Taitetsu Unno, River of Fire, River of Water: An Introduction to the Pure Land Tradition of Shin Buddhism 
(New York: Doubleday, 1998), 181; Bloom, Shoshinge, 39-40; Ueda, “The Mahayana Structure of 
Shinran’s Thought: Part I,” 60. 
 
24 Dobbins, J!do Shinsh$, 69. 
 
25 Dobbins, Letters of the Nun Eshinni, 118; Band! Sh!jun and Harold Stewart, introduction to “Tannish!: 
Passages Deploring Deviations of Faith,” 57; Takeichi Takahashi, Shinranism in Mahayana Buddhism and 
the Modern World (Los Angeles: Kessinger Publishing, 1932), 159. 
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on the six matters that will later be employed in my comparative analysis, which are the 
same as those covered in Chapter Two. The six matters are: (1) the nature of the human 
condition or predicament;26 (2) the past conditioning action that leads to this human 
condition; (3) the futility of any human efforts to effectively change this human 
condition; (4) the ontologically transformative response to the human condition that 
originates from ‘outside’ of any human efforts; (5) the transactional quality of this 
process of ontological transformation; and (6) the scope of the transformative response. 
At the conclusion of this chapter the reader will have a clear understanding of: (1) 
which “dharmalogical” influences most significantly contributed to the creation of akunin 
sh!ki setsu;27 (2) why this doctrinal statement was articulated in this manner within the 
Tannish!; and (3) what akunin sh!ki means according to the Tannish!. An understanding 
of the six aforementioned positions found within the Tannish! (ranging from the nature 
of the human condition to the scope of transformation to said human condition), as well 
as the three aforementioned questions (concerning the development of the Tannish! and 
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26 When attempting to understand the human condition, Buddhist traditions have generally understood the 
nature of human existence to be a defiled one. This is due to the fact that all inhabitants of the realm of 
Saha (娑婆道 shabad!) are said to exist in the realm of delusion, and thus they are still subject to the three 
poisons of greed, anger, and ignorance. Beyond the realm of desire, delusion and form exists the realm of 
formlessness, sometimes referred to as nirv#na. It is within this realm that awakened beings (i.e., Buddhas) 
are said to exist. f 
 
27 I use the term “dharmalogical” to refer to Buddhist ideas, principles, and teachings in much the same way 
the term “theological” is employed in Christian thought. For examples of prior scholastic uses of the term 
“dharmalogical” see: John S. Strong, “The Transforming Gift: An Analysis of Devotional Acts of Offering 
in Buddhist Avadana Literature,” History of Religions 18 (1979): 221-237; Hirota, ed., Toward a 
Contemporary Understanding, 1; John S. Strong, “Images of Asoka: Some Indian and Sri Lankan Legends 
and their Development,” in King Asoka and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies, ed. Anuradha 
Seneviratna, (Kandy, Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1994), 159. For a broader understanding of 
what has also been referred to as “Buddhist theological” thinking see: Roger Jackson and John Makransky, 
ed., Buddhist Theology: Critical Reflections by Contemporary Buddhist Scholars (New York: Routledge, 
2000). 
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its view of rebirth in the Pure Land and liberation) will provide the foundation for the 
comparative analysis that occurs in Chapter Five. 
 
Dharmalogical Influences on Akunin Sh!ki Setsu 
Early Dharmalogical Developments 
The articulation of Shinran’s unique conception of the evil person as the principal 
object of Amida Buddha’s salvific activity, as expressed in the Tannish!, is shaped by 
numerous influences. To explain the construction of akunin sh!ki setsu, this section 
briefly examines five developments that preceded the rise of the Shinsh" and 
immeasurably shaped the Tannish!: traditional Buddhism’s understanding of sams#ra, 
karma and liberation; Pure Land thought regarding Buddha-lands; Amida Buddha and his 
Primal Vow; H!nen’s contention that the evil person (akunin) is the true object of 
Amida’s hongan; and Shinran’s view of karma and the human condition. 
 
Sams"ra, karma and liberation. The notion that existence is best understood as a 
continuous cycle of birth-death-and-rebirth with no beginning and no end is an ancient 
one. Appearing in the Upani$ads, this conception of existence has been around since 
nearly 800 BCE and is foundational to a majority of the religions of South Asia.28 
Sams#ra or the sams#ric cycle, (a Sanskrit word that literally means “flowing on” or 
“journeying”), according to Buddhist interpretations, is the idea that individuals 
transmigrate from one realm of existence to another based upon their past actions and/or 
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28 Examples of some of the earliest references to the cycle of rebirth can be found in the Brhadaranyaka 
Upani%ad III 2:13 and the Mundaka Upani%ad III 2:2. See The Principal Upani%ads, ed. S. Radhakrishnan, 
(Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 1992). 
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moral conduct. This transmigratory cycle is thought to last forever, or at least until an 
individual can find a form of release or liberation. Admittedly, in the Buddhist 
conception, this continuous cycle of rebirth “is not the transmigration of a self or soul but 
the continuation of a process, a flux of becoming in which successive lives are linked 
together by a causal transmission of influence rather than by substantial identity.”29 As 
Buddhists do not believe in an abiding entity or substance that transmigrates (i.e., an 
eternal self or soul) they tend to more regularly speak of this phenomenon as rebirth. 
This is why when we explain rebirth, we make use of examples which do 
not require the transmigration of an essence or a substance. For example, 
when a sprout is born from a seed, there is no substance that transmigrates. 
The seed and the sprout are not identical. Similarly, when we light one 
candle from another candle, no substance travels from one to the other, 
and yet the first is the cause of the second. When one billiard ball strikes 
another, there is a continuity, the energy and direction of the first ball is 
imparted to the second. It is the cause of the second billiard ball moving in 
a particular direction and at a particular speed. When we step twice into a 
river, it is not the same river and yet there is continuity, the continuity of 
cause and effect. So there is rebirth, but not transmigration. There is moral 
responsibility, but not an independent, permanent self. There is the 
continuity of cause and effect, but not permanence.30  
 
Integral to a Buddhist understanding of rebirth is the corollary doctrine of karma. 
A Sanskrit term, derived from the root word kri that literally means ‘action’ or ‘doing,’ 
karma eventually emerges as the universal law of cause and effect that regulates the 
aforementioned cycle of rebirth. Karma is not a principle built on matters of reward or 
punishment as more commonly found in Christian doctrines of sin and salvation. Rather 
it is a natural causational law of the cosmos. Karma is commonly understood to teach the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Bhikkhu Ñanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi, trans. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New 
Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1995), 45. 
 
30 BuddhaNet, “Fundamentals of Buddhism: Rebirth,” available at www.buddhanet.net/funbud10.html. 
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concept that “one reaps the fruits of one’s own acts. Through good acts one obtains 
favorable life-conditions, through evil acts one undergoes pain.”31 In Buddhist thought 
karma refers to all deliberately willed or intended actions, whether they are for good or 
bad purposes. These deliberately willed actions lead to the generation of karmic merit 
(punya) or karmic fruit (phala).32 This karmic merit, or the consequential results of one’s 
actions, subsequently shapes the nature and quality of one’s rebirth. That is, intentionality 
leads to action (karma), which leads to karmic merit, which leads to rebirth in one of the 
six realms of sams#ra.33 “When we die, we go from one state of existence to another 
according to the karmic value [i.e., merit] of our conduct while alive.”34 Thus, according 
to the principle of causal transmission, an individual’s wholesome intention leads to 
wholesome action, which produces positive karmic fruits thereby shaping one’s future 
rebirth into a more positive realm. Similarly, unwholesome intention leads to 
unwholesome action, which produces negative karmic merit thereby causing one’s future 
rebirth to be a more negative one. Put another way, karma, as a general Buddhist term, 
“denotes both good and bad acts. According to the law of karmic causation, past acts, 
whether good or evil, become causes manifesting their effects in the present, and 
likewise, present acts become causes of results that will appear in the future. Good causes 
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31 Ueda, “Freedom and Necessity,” 108. 
 
32 Phala, meaning result or effect, is best understood as the “experienced effect or karmic maturation of 
prior deeds.” Daniel Keown, Dictionary of Buddhism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 215. 
 
33 General Buddhist cosmology refers to the six realms of rebirth as: 1) devas (天神 tenjin), humans (人 
nin), asura (阿修羅 ashura), the realm of animals (畜生道chikush!d!), the realm of hungry ghosts (餓鬼道 
gakid!), and hell realms (地獄 jigoku).
 
34 Suzuki Daisetz, “On Transmigration,” Eastern Buddhist n. s. 17, no. 2 (Spring 1984): 1. 
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necessarily result in good and evil in evil: this necessity between cause and result is the 
essential characteristic of karma.”35  
Interpretations of the workings of karmic causality vary across Buddhist schools 
of thought. For our purpose, karma should be understood as dharmalogical background 
for a clearer understanding as to how the Shinsh" doctrine of akunin sh!ki interprets all 
of an individual’s past karma (宿業 shukug!) as evil. While Shinran’s specific views on 
karma and the human condition will be discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section 
of this chapter, it suffices for now to understand that Shinran regarded karmic influence 
from “the stance of the person who has awakened, through insight into the fundamental 
nature of human existence, to the impossibility of transcendence” through the traditional 
threefold path (三學 sangaku) of morality, meditation, and the cultivation of wisdom.36 
Specifically, Shinran regarded karma as that which has lost its causational ability to 
generate sams#ric results due to the aforementioned reinterpretation of all past karma as 
evil. Recall that Shinran regards all acts as fundamentally evil. Thus, according to 
Shinran’s thought, as there is no longer a dualistic understanding of some acts as being 
‘good’ and others being regarded as ‘bad,’ any and all acts result in rebirth in the Pure 
Land. This stands in stark contrast to the traditional view of karmic causation, whereby 
any and all acts continue to drive the wheel of sams#ra. While Shinran was influenced by 
long-established Buddhist views of liberation, his reinterpretation of karma provided a 
foundation for a unique formulation of ontological transformation.  
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Traditionally the Mah#y#na Buddha-Dharma, known more commonly as 
Mah#y#na Buddhism, has maintained that the goal of the Buddhist path is enlightenment 
or awakening (悟 satori).37 The Buddhist practitioner endeavors to awaken to her 
buddha-nature (仏性 bussh!), the perfection and completeness of emptiness (Skt. 
%"nyat#, Jp. 空 k$), the true nature of all things. This awakening has sometimes been 
referred to as realizing or attaining buddhahood (成仏 j!butsu), in other words, becoming 
a being who is awake to the oneness of her own nature and the nature of ultimate reality. 
“This is the idea that buddhahood is somehow inherent or innate to all sentient beings as 
a pure and enlightened core underlying the deluded mind.”38 The seminal Chan/Zen text, 
the Platform Sutra of the Six Patriarch (六祖壇經), provides a metaphor comparing a 
person’s Buddha-nature to the sun and the moon, which are always shining although 
occasionally hidden by clouds. 
Thus, we know all dharmas are present in our nature. But our nature itself 
remains pure. The sun and the moon are always shining. It is only due to 
cloud cover that there is light above but darkness below and we can't see 
the sun or moon or stars. Then suddenly the wind of wisdom comes along 
and blows the clouds and drives the fog away…39   
 
In other words, an individual’s true nature, his Buddha-nature, is always present but may 
be obscured by the construction of false dualities or impurities. According to Shinran a 
perfect example of false duality is the arbitrary distinction between good acts and evil 
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37 Unno, River of Fire, River of Water, 63. 
 
38 Luis O. Gomez, “The Whole Universe as a S"tra,” in Buddhism in Practice, ed. Donald S. Lopez, Jr. 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 107. 
 
39 Hui-neng, The Platform Sutra: The Zen Teaching of Hui-neng, trans. Red Pine (Emeryville, CA: 
Counterpoint, 2006), 154. 
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acts. In traditional Therav#da Buddhist thought “good and evil are defined by whether 
actions bring joy or suffering.”40 Put differently, good and evil are typically understood in 
light of karmic consequence or recompense (業報 g!h!). At a rudimentary level, a basic 
goal of the Buddhist practitioner is to engage in more good acts than bad since doing so 
will directly influence the cycle of rebirth in a more positive manner. As &akyamuni 
Buddha explained to his disciples, as remembered in verse 183 of the Dhammapada, “To 
avoid all evil, to cultivate good, and to cleanse one’s mind – this is the teaching of the 
Buddhas.”41 According to M#dhyamaka-influenced Mah#y#na thought, at the level of 
Ultimate Truth the key for the practitioner is to transcend all dualities, including notions 
of good and evil, so he might experience the oneness of the absolute and the relative. As 
N#g#rjuna (龍樹 Ry"ju; ca. 150-250 CE), regarded as founder of the M#dhyamaka 
school of thought and the first patriarch of Shin Buddhism, stated in his &unyatasaptati 
(Seventy Verses on Emptiness): 
Duration, origination, destruction, existence, non-existence, inferiority, 
mediocrity and superiority were taught by the Buddha in accord with 
conventional usage, not by the power of the real. (verse 1) 
 
Since the intrinsic being of all entities does not exist in the cause and 
conditions, either together or separately, or in any way, therefore they are 
empty. (verse 3) 
 
Neither the happiness and suffering which depend upon an object in a 
dream, nor that object are existent. Similarly, neither that which originates 
dependently, nor that upon which it depends are existent. (verse 14) 
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40 Nabeshima, “The Emancipation of Evil Beings: Shinran’s Reflections on Human Nature,” 3. 
 
41 Acharya Buddharakkhita, trans., The Dhammapada: The Buddha’s Path of Wisdom (Kandy, Sri Lanka: 
Buddhist Publication Society, 1985), 51. 
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Having comprehended apparent conditionality, the net of false views is 
swept aside. (Consequently), abandoning attachment, delusion and anger, 
without stain, one surely reaches Nirv#na. (verse 73)42 
  
Using the imagery of the Platform Sutra to further our interpretation, N#g#rjuna’s 
thinking suggests that when the clouds of defilement are washed away one’s Buddha-
nature manifests. In other words, attaining buddhahood “does not mean that a man [sic] 
acquires some super-human quality from outside, but that he simply resumes or recovers 
the original quality inherent in him, e.g., Buddhahood, which had become beclouded by 
defilement [Skt. kle%a, Jp. 煩悩 bonn!].”43 When the radically non-dualistic thinking of 
N#g#rjuna is linked with Shinran’s aforementioned conception of karma, it is easy to see 
that Shinran was simply taking M#dhyamaka thought to its logical conclusion. For 
Shinran all acts are evil since there is no objective difference between good and evil at 
the level of Ultimate Reality. Consequently, all people are evil and, as a result, are the 
objects of Amida’s salvific activity.  
Before examining “buddha-lands” and “pure lands,” a brief word on the oft-
invoked ‘defilements’ is warranted. Bonn! (i.e., defilements or afflicting passions), 
defined as all things that cloud or dull the mind, allow unwholesome actions to occur, 
which generate negative karmic merit and act to further bind an individual to the cycle of 
rebirth. Examples of these samsarically-binding defilements include desire, pride, 
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Emptiness: The Wisdom of Nagarjuna, Peter Della Santina (Singapore: Buddhist Reasearch Society, 2002), 
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43 Sh!jun Bando, “Soteriology in Shin Buddhism and Its Modern Significance,” Japanese Religions 6, no. 
1 (1969): 24. 
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craving, doubt, false views, and hatred. Much of Buddhism has maintained that bonn! 
can be eliminated through insight and regular contemplative practice, which liberates the 
individual from the never-ending rounds of rebirth. However, remember that the Pure 
Land path differs from other expressions of Mah#y#na Buddhism as the j!do-mon 
advocates a discipline of religious devotion as opposed to one of contemplative practice. 
Pure Land thought has historically maintained that the Path of the Sages, (i.e., the Holy 
Path or the Path of Sanctification; sh!d!-mon), is simply too demanding for ordinary 
people to follow. As T’an-luan (曇鸞 Donran, 476-542), the third patriarch of Shin 
Buddhism, addressed the matter in his Commentary on Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the 
Pure Land, 
Reverently contemplating the Commentary on the Ten Bodhisattva Stages 
of Bodhisattva N#g#rjuna, I find it stated that there are two paths by which 
bodhisattvas seek the stage of nonretrogression – the path of difficult 
practice and the path of easy practice. 
 
With the path of difficult practice, it is seeking nonretrogression in this 
world of five defilements at a time when there is no Buddha that is 
difficult . . . The path of difficult practice may be compared in its hardship 
to journeying overland on foot.44 
 
T’an-luan correctly understood N#g#rjuna’s explanation about the two paths to 
the stage of nonretrogression (不退転 futaiten), that precipice of awakening in which one 
finds it impossible to return to the cycle of rebirth. The two paths are the way of arduous 
religious practices (難行 nangy!), and the way of easy devotional practices (易行 igy!). 
Over time the latter path became the basis of the Pure Land path. Since the early sixth 
century, followers of the Pure Land path have understood the religious practices required 
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by a life of meditation and the cultivation of wisdom to be too rigorous of an undertaking 
for an ordinary man or woman. Instead Pure Land practitioners have engaged in the 
simple devotional practice known as nembutsu recitation (念仏 Ch. nien-fo).  
Originally the term “Nembutsu” simply meant the mindful contemplation of, or 
meditation upon, the image of Amida Buddha. Over time the term was used more broadly 
to cover many different elements of shinjin and makoto no kokoro, such as cultivating an 
entrusting and sincere heart, uttering and hearing the name of Amida Buddha in a state of 
joyful devotion, and possessing the desire to be born in Amida’s Pure Land. The practice 
itself involves the recitation of the phrase Namu-Amida-Butsu (i.e., “I take refuge in the 
Buddha Amida”), which is a declaration of trust in Amida’s Primal Vow, in which Amida 
promises that when he becomes an enlightened being anyone who calls his name will 
attain rebirth in his Pure Land. Shinran’s unique interpretation of this practice is based 
upon his view that the nembutsu is not a ‘self-powered’ (自力 jiriki) activity, but rather is 
a gracious ‘other-powered’ (他力 tariki) gift that is the result of the aforementioned vow. 
As contemporary Shin scholar, Bando Shojun notes, Shinran “thereby implies that the 
name ‘Amida’ in itself is an upaya (skillful means), through which we are enabled to 
know suchness.”45 In other words, the recitation of the name Amida, through the 
nembutsu, is a skillful mean by which the nature of ultimate reality is apprehended, 
buddhahood is realized, and ontological transformation occurs.  
Enlightenment or awakening then implies the realization that there is no longer a 
self upon which the law of karma can operate. The practitioner, seeing her true nature as 
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one of emptiness, eliminates or removes all bonn!, transcends all dualistic notions such 
as good and evil, becomes “liberated from worldly judgments and self-centered 
calculations,” ceases the generation of karmic merit, and finally finds liberation.46 While 
the concept of self-reliance to attain liberation from sams#ra was a hallmark for Buddhist 
practitioners for centuries, Shin Buddhists began to question their ability to achieve this 
goal on their own.   
 
Buddha lands or pure lands.  When the Buddhist tradition emerged in India, the 
general belief was that Siddhartha Gautama, otherwise known as &#kyamuni Buddha, 
was the only Buddha to have ever been in existence. However, according to later 
Mah#y#na Buddhist teachings, &#kyamuni eventually revealed that countless buddhas 
had appeared throughout time, and that each buddha had been enlightened to the same 
ultimate truth, the same Dharma.47 Some of the more significant and well-known buddhas 
are Maitreya Buddha (彌勒 Miroku), Ak$obhya Buddha (阿  Ashuku), Vairocana 
Buddha (大日Dainichi), and, as described earlier in this chapter, Amida Buddha (Skt. 
Amit#bha, Buddha of Immeasurable Light, or Amit#yus, Buddha of Immeasurable Life). 
Each buddha operated in his own unique world-system (Skt. cakr"vala) within the 
greater Buddhist cosmos. These independent world-systems, known as Buddha-fields 
(Skt. Buddha-k%etra), are the realms of influence and activity of each buddha and serve as 
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47 Some examples of Buddhist s"tras that refer to the “Buddhas of the ten directions,” (i.e., the countless 
buddhas living and teaching in realms other than the Saha realm of &#kyamuni, at each of the eight points 
of the compass, plus the zenith and the nadir) include: the Ak%obhyavy$ha, the Bhaisajyaguru-s$tra, the 
Astas"hasrik"-prajn"p"ramit"-s$tra, and the Sukh"vat'vy$ha. 
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the domains within which each buddha works to guide sentient beings to liberation. 
Mah#y#nist thought maintains that just as there are an infinite number buddhas 
throughout the vast expanse of the cosmos, so too are there an infinite number of 
Buddha-fields.  
Not all Buddha-fields are equivalent though. Fields “vary in their degree of 
perfection and are divided into two basic categories, pure and impure. The world we 
inhabit now is an instance of an impure Buddha-field since beings here are still subject to 
the basic vices of greed, hatred, and delusion.”48 Greed, hatred, and delusion are the 
unwholesome mental states collectively referred to as the three roots of evil, or the Three 
Poisons. Ultimately it is these mental states of consciousness that prevent sentient beings 
from attaining liberation from sams#ra. Pure Lands, on the other hand, are unspoiled 
realms in which beings are no longer subject to the Three Poisons. Thus, they are realms 
uniquely suited for a person to attain liberation, or enlightenment.   
The term “Pure Land” (浄土 j!do / Ch. jingtu), first used in China, originally 
suggested the notion of “purifying the land,” as in “leading all sentient beings inhabiting 
these [impure] lands into the pure way, in other words, the way of nirv#na.”49 The 
aforementioned Pure Land s"tras seem to describe these fields of buddha-activity as 
actual physical locations, which are seemingly different from nirv#na. Numerous 
Mah#y#na s"tras refer to these Pure Lands as realms of bliss (Skt. sukha, as opposed to 
duhkha, “suffering” or “unsatisfactory”), in which there exists only joy and happiness. 
They are variously described as heavenly realms replete with rows of jeweled trees 
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85 
flanking sweetly scented rivers, upon which flow sweet-smelling flowers; heavenly 
music that emanates from rushing waters and the breeze blowing through the trees; 
ornamental railings surrounding jeweled ponds and lakes; towers and palaces adorned 
with priceless jewels; delicate scents wafting through the air as beautiful flowers fall 
from the sky throughout the day; countless birds, which proclaim the Dharma as they 
sing with heavenly voices; and a radiant light that floods the whole land, which emanates 
from the attendant Buddha. All objects found in a pure land are made of gold, silver, 
crystal, and lapis lazuli.50 “The Pure Land is thus full of glorious objects which are 
exceedingly pleasant to the senses, but they are not meant to gratify one’s sensuous 
desires.”51 Rather all ‘things’ or phenomena found in a Pure Land serve as expressions of 
the true Dharma, an expression of enlightenment. The important thing to remember 
though, is that the “essential feature of a Pure Land is… not its physical attributes, lovely 
as they may be, but the opportunity to live in the presence of a Buddha.”52 Being in the 
presence of a Buddha, without any distractions or defilements, ensures that a sentient 
being will in time be able to attain enlightenment.  
Some contemporary scholars have further classified these Pure Lands into three 
categories: Common Pure Lands, Buddhist Pure Lands, and Mah#y#na Pure Lands.53 
Common Pure Lands are any heavenly realm referred to in non-Buddhist traditions, such 
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as Shangri-La, as taught in some Indian Tantric schools, and Fenglai, as taught in some 
expressions of Chinese Daoism. Buddhist Pure Lands are any heavenly realms that are 
taught by all sectarian expressions of Buddhism; generally the heavenly realms of the 
Saha world, of which the most well known example is Tu$ita Heaven. Finally, Mah#y#na 
Pure Lands are those taught in Mah#y#nist traditions, but which are not generally 
accepted by Theravadin traditions, and are found outside the Saha realm, which serve as 
the centers of activity for the innumerable buddhas of the cosmos. The best-known 
examples of these include the Eastern Paradise of Ak$obhya Buddha, the Crystal Paradise 
of Bhaisajyaguru Buddha, and of course the Western Paradise (Skt. Sukh"vat', Jp. 極楽 
Gokuraku) of Amida Buddha.54  
Gokuraku, or the “Land of Bliss” is the Pure Land created by Amida Buddha 
“through the power of his merit as a utopia where beings who invoke his name with faith 
and devotion may be reborn. Once there, they may dwell in bliss and may reach nirv#na 
easily.”55 The Mury!juky! and Amidaky! both maintained that Amida’s Pure Land is 
located 100,000 kotis of Buddha-lands away from the Saha realm to the west.56 
 
Amida Buddha & his primal vow.  While I have mentioned the Buddha known as 
Amida in prior pages, it will be helpful to the reader to further describe both Amida and 
his Primal Vow. Pure Land thought maintains that upon meeting Loke%varar#ja Buddha, 
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Amida, who was still living in Saha as Bhik(u!Dharmak#ra!(法蔵比丘 H!z!-biku), made 
a series of vows – including the seminal hongan, performed countless meritorious actions 
and eventually attained perfect Enlightenment, thereby becoming the Buddha of Infinite 
Light (Amit#bha) and Infinite Life (Amit#yus).57 At this point he fulfilled his promise, 
articulated in the Primal Vow, to create a pure land, which embodied all the best of the 
myriad buddha-lands of the cosmos, and into which all sentient beings can be reborn.58 
As Kyoto School philosopher Miki Kiyoshi (1897-1945) explained, “The Primal Vow is 
a loving aspiration for the salvation of sentient beings that is always apprehending 
historical reality.”59 In other words, for Pure Land practitioners, Amida is a Buddha, his 
Pure Land exists and, consequently, liberation is guaranteed for all. According to Pure 
Land thought, birth in the Pure Land (往生 !j!) is solely the result of Amida’s salvific 
activity. 
 
H!nen’s contention that the evil person is the true object of Amida’s hongan.  While 
akunin shoki setsu has become widely known through the work of Shinran and the 
articulation of his teachings as found in the Tannish!, I agree with the position taken by 
Kakehashi Jitsuen, Director of the Institute of Shin-shu Theology at Nishi-honganji in 
Kyoto, as expressed in his April 1993, paper titled “The Originator of the Doctrine of 
Evil Persons as the Object of Salvation (akunin shoki setsu) is H!nen [Shinran’s 
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mentor].”60 Kakehashi definitively established a position that had, for some time, “been 
running through the bottom of the Japanese Pure Land Buddhist researcher’s academic 
consciousness like a water vein.”61 Contrary to earlier thoughts on the matter, the 
academic consensus is that H!nen, rather than Shinran, is the conceptual progenitor of 
akunin shoki setsu.62 This theory maintains that “the notion that the ‘evil person is the 
true object of the Vow’ was already present in H!nen’s thought prior to Shinran’s 
elucidation of that idea.”63 While research suggests H!nen never penned those exact 
words, it is apparent from the teachings attributed to him that he had a thoroughly 
envisioned sense of the human condition as being “evil” due to humanity’s ignorance and 
delusion. It is also apparent that H!nen conceived of evil and foolish beings as the true 
beneficiaries of Amida’s Primal Vow. Evidence of both positions can be found in the 
Sanjin ry!ken oyobi goh!go (Clarification and instructions [related to] the three minds). 
A key passage of the text further explains: 
Even a good person attains birth in the Pure Land. So it goes without 
saying that an evil person will . . . That being so, bodhisattvas and wise 
sages aspire for birth, and these good beings attain birth by taking refuge 
in this vow. How much more so will foolish beings of sin and evil entrust 
themselves to this Other Power! They should understand that they are evil, 
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and not dwell in false views. It is said that ‘both foolish, ordinary beings 
and sages together’ are able to attain this thought.64 
 
The Sanjin ry!ken oyobi goh!go is the third part of a manuscript known as the 
“Biographical Record of the Master H!nen,” (法然上人伝記) otherwise known as the 
Daigo manuscript, or Daigobon for short. (醍醐本), as it was discovered at Daigo-ji 
temple in Kyoto in 1917.65 While its authorship has been debated, the prevailing view is 
that the Daigobon was compiled by one of H!nen’s leading disciples, Seikan-b! Genchi 
or his immediate disciples.66  
  The important point for this discussion is to that the aforementioned expression 
regarding “foolish beings of sin and evil” is nearly identical to the famous passage found 
in Chapter Three of the Tannish! regarding the true object of Amida’s Vow. Recall that 
this passage is of central concern to this dissertation’s overarching argument. 
Furthermore, as Tsuboi Shun’ei and J!kai Asai point out this passage represents an 
internally consistent Buddhist instruction that emphasizes the salvation of the evil person 
especially. As H!nen goes on to say: 
We are taught that the evil person is an individual person, and that this 
being will attain birth. This is the teaching of our Pure Land School. Our 
school takes the evil person as the model, one that includes the good 
person as well. The Path of Sages takes the good person as its model, 
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which includes the evil person … All beings are included in this dharma. 
The Eighteenth Vow speaks of ‘sentient beings of the ten quarters.’ [This 
means that,] throughout the ten quarters, no sentient beings are excluded, 
and that ‘[beings of] the ten quarters are all included within my vow.67 
 
To clarify, H!nen conceived of the evil person as anyone who, due to the over-
whelming nature of their ignorance and delusion, was unable to fruitfully follow the 
threefold practice otherwise known as the three learnings (三學 sangaku): morality (戒 
kai), meditation (三昧 sanmai), and wisdom. Classically speaking the three learnings 
were understood to be the key for any Buddhist following the Noble Eightfold Path, and 
were thought to be the means by which liberation from the cycles of rebirth would occur.  
In conclusion, with regard to the matter of H!nen’s view of the evil person, 
Amida’s Vow, and the scope of salvation, there is great evidence suggesting H!nen’s 
orally transmitted thoughts served as a foundation for Shinran’s later position. While it is 
true that some scholars hold onto the notion that the Sanjin ry!ken oyobi goh!go was a 
later redaction to the Daigobon, I maintaining that Shinran’s indebtedness to H!nen 
extends even to his conception of the true object of Amida’s Primal Vow (i.e., the entire 
existence of humanity, both good and evil).  
   
Shinran’s view of karma and the human condition.  Shinran’s teachings served as 
the axis around which the Shinsh" developed. However, some of his teachings were seen 
as unusual when compared to more traditional Buddhist tenets, thus engendering 
misunderstanding and criticism. For example, unlike his teacher H!nen (法然 1133-
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1212), who permitted and encouraged reverence for Gautama Buddha, Shinran 
maintained that only Amida Buddha should be revered.  Despite his commitment to 
exclusive nembutsu (専修念仏 senju nembutsu), recitation of Amida Buddha’s name, 
H!nen still made room for the possibility of meritorious works affecting a person’s 
liberation from sams#ra, while Shinran absolutely denied them. And while H!nen argued 
that calling on the name of Amida had saving efficacy, Shinran argued that calling 
Amida’s name was simply an expression of gratitude for a salvific event that had already 
occurred.68 Shinran maintained that the cause for birth in Amida’s Pure Land was simply 
the possession of an entrusting position (信心 shinjin) — or I as prefer to call it, an 
entrusting heart — in Amida’s salvific power.  
However, even these departures from H!nen’s more conventional Pure Land 
beliefs pale in comparison to Shinran’s most significant and arguably radical position, 
namely his idealization of the evil person as the prime candidate for salvation in Amida’s 
Pure Land. This stance was especially subject to misunderstanding and misrepresentation 
from outsiders, which often led to harsh critiques from non-Shin Buddhist practitioners 
and additional pressure and tension within the Shin community. In particular more 
established sectarian expressions of Japanese Buddhism, such as the Tendai and Shingon 
sects, employed the time-honored conceptual framework of debates regarding orthodoxy 
and heresy to attack Shinran’s ideas and claim that his teachings were outside the sphere 
of classically accepted Buddhist teachings.69  
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As previously discussed in this chapter, “In Shinran’s concept of karma, all that 
we do, think, or feel is instigated by past action; in other words, all that we are in the 
present has been determined by the past . . . Whatever we may seek to do in the present, 
our future is determined, and there is no room whatever for any change or improvement 
through our present activity.”70 When compared with the more traditional Buddhist view 
of karma, Shinran had a unique understanding and interpretation. Throughout his writings 
and teachings he staunchly maintained that the all-pervasive and binding quality of karma 
rendered transcendence or enlightenment (understood within a Pure Land context to 
mean birth in the Pure Land of Amida Buddha) to be impossible if one simply relied 
upon one’s own efforts. Examples of this position can be found in the Matt!sh! (末灯鈔 
Lamp for the Later Ages) when Shinran writes, “In no way is birth accomplished through 
the calculating of foolish beings; neither can it be the object of the calculating of the 
eminently wise,”71 as well as in Shinran’s J!do wasan 99 (浄土和讃 Hymns of the Pure 
Land),  
When we say “Namu-amida-butsu,” 
The benefits we gain in the present are boundless; 
The karmic evil of our transmigration in birth-and-death disappears, 
And determinate karma and untimely death are eliminated.72  
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As Ueda Yoshifumi described the matter, “While in Mah#y#na thought in general 
the concept of karma is taken up from the stance of the transcendent, as an aspect of 
existence in the world of the enlightened being, in Shinran’s thought – in his concepts of 
karmic evil (zaig!, tsumi) and past karma (shukug!) – it expresses rather the stance of the 
person, through insight into the fundamental nature of human existence, to the 
impossibility of transcendence.”73 Shinran understood that all humans are “originally and 
profoundly possessed of evil nature. [This is because] Fundamentally, human beings are 
self-centered and harm other living beings.”74 Examples of Shinran’s thinking on this 
matter can be found in the Ky!gy!shinsh! (教行信証 Collection of Passages Revealing 
the True Teaching, Practice, and Realization of the Pure Land Way). 
I find that all beings, an ocean of multitudes, have since the beginningless 
past down to his day, this very moment, been evil and defiled, completely 
lacking the mind of purity.75 
 
For Shinran a good person is anyone who does good deeds, or who attempts to 
accumulate positive karmic merit, through their own efforts or self-power (自力 jiriki). 
This ‘good’ person trusts in himself and his own power rather than trusting in the Dharma 
or the power of a Buddha to liberate him. For Shinran an evil person is anyone who 
realizes the depth of her delusions and thus places her complete trust in the Other Power (
他力 tariki), the workings of the Primal Vow of Amida Buddha. In other words, 
according to Shinran’s thinking as expressed in Chapter Three of the Tannish!, the 
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human condition is by definition evil, and evil people are “ordinary beings who entrust in 
the power of Amida Buddha’s Primal Vow without doubt.”76 Recall that for Shinran 
‘evil’ persons are variously those who are possessed of blind passions, the three poisons 
(greed, anger, ignorance), and evil offenses; and those who entrust in Amida’s Primal 
Vow—in other words, everyone. As the “sign and symbol of his [own] involvement with 
the [evil] passions, Shinran adopted the term Gutoku [愚禿] as his surname. This term 
has the meaning of ‘foolish, bald-headed old man,’ and it signified the debased condition 
of Shinran’s life.”77 Thus Shinran also regarded himself as both a karmically defiled 
individual and a recipient of Amida’s unrestricted gift of shinjin. 
Finally, it is important to note that given Shinran’s view of the human condition 
as unavoidably defiled and depraved, as well as his radically non-dualistic conception of 
all actions as being evil, Shinran deemed any human efforts to positively affect the 
sentient condition as hopeless and futile. “According to Shinran, in the world there is 
karma (cause and effect) and nothing else prevails. Man [sic] in the age of mapp! is 
totally subject to the workings of karma, and because man in this age can only live by 
passions and neurotic desires over which he has no control, Shinran did not regard man as 
ultimately responsible for his moral and spiritual depravity.”78 By Shinran’s thinking 
humanity was living in the last days of the dharma (末法 mapp!), a period in which the 
teachings of the buddhas were so faintly heard and so easily misinterpreted that sentient 
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beings were especially prey to the Three Poisons and the delusional thought that they 
could affect their own ontological transformation by self-effort (jiriki).  
!
Contextual Rationale for Development of Doctrine 
As indicated earlier, the Tannish! was written in response to what appeared to be 
a “deteriorating situation among nembutsu practicers in the Kanto area in the years 
following Shinran’s death.”)* This deteriorating situation included the introduction of 
divergent beliefs and practices among the early nembutsu, or Shin, community. The 
author of the Tannish! gives the following explanation in his prologue when he writes: 
As I humbly reflect on the past [when the late Master was alive] and the 
present in my foolish mind, I cannot but lament the divergences from the 
heart of true entrusting that he conveyed by speaking to us directly, and I 
fear there are doubts and confusions in the way followers receive and 
transmit the teaching… Let there be not the slightest distortion of the 
teachings of Other Power with words of an understanding based only on 
personal views. Here, then, I set down in small part the words spoken by 
the late Shinran Sh!nin that remain deep in my mind, solely to disperse 
the doubts of fellow practicers.80 
   
As Inagaki notes, “Several nembutsu groups had been formed around Shinran in the 
Kanto area where he nurtured a close circle of disciples for about twenty years from his 
early forties. Some of them continued to keep in contact with him even after he moved to 
Kyoto. In the years immediately after his passing, the disciples might have been able to 
keep the communities in line with Shinran’s teachings. But as these direct disciples grew 
fewer and strange ideas began to crop up among the nembutsu groups, the people had no 
one to turn to for guidance to resolve their doubts. In order to ensure the correct 
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transmission of the nembutsu teaching, the aged compiler Yuien made the decision to 
take up his brush and set down what he could recall of what Shinran had so carefully 
taught everyone.”+' In other words, in order to keep the young Shin s!gya!(sangha) 
intact, while remaining faithful to the original, orthodox, teachings of Shinran, a central 
statement of belief was written.   
The Tannish! was written “in an attempt to preserve Shinran’s ideas from 
distortion and to rectify a number of misconceptions circulating among his followers.”+,  
Specifically, according to the Tannish!, these misconceptions (i.e. deviations from or 
distortions of Shinran’s teachings) were: 
(1) Some believers are confusing people’s minds by dividing Amida’s wonder 
into two categories (the wondrous vow, 誓願不思議 seigan fushigi; and the 
wondrous name, 名号不思議 my!g! fushigi) without giving any good reason to 
do so. 
(2) Those who do not read or study the sutras are not assured birth in the Pure 
Land. 
(3) A person will not achieve birth in the Pure Land if she flaunts the principal 
vow (本願ぼこりhongan bokori) thinking there is no reason to fear evil because 
of the wonder of Amida’s principal vow. 
(4) A person should have complete faith that profound karmic evil leading to 
eight billion kalpas of rebirth is eliminated with a single nembutsu.  
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(5) With this body overwhelmed by evil inclinations (煩悩具足 bonn! gusoku) a 
person already achieves enlightenment. 
(6) When believers with faith spontaneously (自然に jinen ni) fall into anger, or 
commit and evil deed, or become argumentative with companions and fellow 
believers, they must without fail undergo conversion again (廻心 eshin). 
(7) Those who only achieve rebirth on the edges of the Pure Land will eventually 
fall back into the hell realms. 
(8) A person will ultimately become a greater or lesser Buddha based upon the 
size of one’s donation to the Sangha. 
All told there are three primary reasons for there having been wrong views (邪見 jaken) 
or heretical views (異安心 ianjin) of Shinran’s teachings.83 These reasons are (1) the 
elusiveness of Shinran’s teachings; (2) the illiteracy of the population that embraced 
Shinran’s teachings; and (3) the influx of adherents to the Shinsh" from other religious 
traditions.+- First, Shinran thought his teachings were simple enough for the ordinary 
individual to follow yet they were subtly profound enough that people were confused 
easily.  His teachings varied just enough from more mainstream Buddhist teachings that 
“deviations arose because some diluted his provocative message and others exaggerated 
it.”+. As alluded to earlier, examples of his more challenging teachings included positing 
the impossibility of attaining awakening by one’s own efforts; the utter conviction that 
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human nature is by definition evil; and the attendant belief that everyone, even the 
outcaste, the poor, the lost and the confused are the intended objects of Amida Buddha’s 
infinite compassion. 
Second, Shinran’s teachings were especially attractive to the lower classes of 
society. While generally not being educated enough to grasp the nuances of Shinran’s 
thought, lower class individuals such as farmers and craftsmen were initially drawn to the 
ease of nembutsu practice as a means for addressing their this-worldly affairs. 
“Aristocrats in Kyoto generally followed the traditional interpretations of the orthodox 
Buddhist schools, treating the nembutsu as an ancillary practice to other religious 
observances… [Whereas] Lowborn townsmen and peasants in the countryside often 
turned to it as a deterrent against misfortune or as a deliverance from the religious 
consequences of evil deeds.”+/ This development is best understood as a perfect example 
of what Buddhist scholar Melford E. Spiro calls apotropaic Buddhism—that aspect of 
Buddhism most concerned with humanity’s “worldly welfare: the curing of illness, 
protection from demons, the prevention of droughts, and so on.”+)   
Third, it was greatly feared that any “emulation of mainstream Buddhism” on the 
part of the nascent Pure Land community would have a “corrosive effect.”++ It was 
thought that if the influences from other Buddhist sects were too great the heart of 
Shinran’s message would be watered-down or lost. An important example of this is the 
centrality of Shinran’s vision regarding the transformative Other-Power of Amida and his 
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Vow. Thus, the Tannish! was written in such a way that the confusion from within and 
the corrosiveness from without would not distort what was otherwise a radical way of 
conceiving of the human experience and the means for escaping it. 
The Tannish! is a tightly structured document that is organized systematically in 
order to respond to misunderstandings and questions. Specifically the first half of the 
Tannish! is a collection of ten of Shinran’s most important teachings. The second half is 
then a critique of eight misinterpretations of Shinran’s lessons.  “The eight items listed in 
the Tannish!’s second half provide a graphic image of early religious trends in the 
Shinsh", especially as it evolved around the d!j!.”+* In this way, the Tannish! not only 
gives us a clear sense of the earliest doctrinal-like debates occurring in the Shin s!gya, 
but it also provides us with a snap-shot of the religious landscape from the document 
arose.!    
 
Akunin Sh!ki Setsu According to the Tannish! 
The section that follows is a first of its kind when it comes to detailed 
examinations of the Tannish!, as no scholar to date has critically interpreted the text 
through the following six lens: (1) the nature of the human condition or predicament; (2) 
the past conditioning action that leads to this human condition; (3) the futility of any 
human efforts to affectively change this human condition; (4) the ontologically 
transformative response to the human condition that originates from “outside” of any 
human efforts; 5) the transactional quality of this process of ontological transformation; 
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and (6) the scope of the transformative response.*0 An analysis of what the Tannish! 
posits with regard to each of these thematic categories will provide a uniquely nuanced 
interpretation of the text, as well as enable the reader to better grasp the comparative 
analysis that occurs in Chapter Five. 
Throughout this dissertation I have defined akunin sh!ki as “all ordinary beings, 
filled with residual karma, are by definition evil people and as such are the objects of 
Amida’s saving power.” This saving power is the compassion of Amida Buddha “who 
embraces and never abandons those who become aware of their own evil and suffer from 
it.”*' What follows is a brief look at what this doctrine of akunin sh!ki ultimately means 
according to the Tannish!. 
 
Nature of the Human Predicament 
Pure Land traditions have been especially interested in the question of the nature 
of the human condition.  In fact, “questions such as “What is a ‘human being’? and ‘How 
is the definition of ‘human being’ related to the Pure Land teaching?’ have been central 
to the tradition’s historical development.”*, Mainstream Mah#y#na Buddhist teachings 
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often point to the inherent Buddha-nature (仏性 bussh!) of all sentient beings. This 
implies that the self-nature of all sentient beings is a nondual reality, akin to that of an 
awakened being (i.e., a buddha).  Put another way, according to Mah#y#na thought all 
beings inherently possess the potential to become a buddha and the task is for one to 
uncover or realize this reality. However, despite the assertion of a person’s inherent 
Buddha-nature, Shin thought maintains that the human condition is filled with 
defilements (bonn!), which impede awakening. On the surface this may appear to be a 
paradox, as logic would dictate that the state of “awakenness” or satori (悟), that state of 
“intuitive apprehension of the [true] nature of reality that transcends conceptual thought,” 
is not commensurate with defilement.*1 However, here is where Shinran’s thinking is so 
unique. Shinran argued that the human condition is best characterized as being karmically 
bound due to the generation of karmic merit during previous rebirths. This past karma 
(shukug!) blinds humanity to its true nature consequently binding humanity to the cycle 
of transmigration.  These defilements fill us with attachments and delusion. Thus, it can 
be said, “if this delusion is something we all have, then perhaps in the truest sense of the 
word, bonno or delusion is what our ‘human nature’ is.”*-   
Shinran further defined bonn! as evil passions or blind passions.  In section three 
of the Tannish! Yuein-b! recounts the words of his late master when he writes:  
It is impossible for us, who are possessed of blind passions to free 
ourselves from birth-and-death through any practice whatsoever.  Grieving 
over this, Amida made the Vow, the essential intent of which is the evil 
person’s attainment of Buddhahood.  Hence, evil persons who entrust 
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themselves to Other Power are precisely the ones who possess the true 
cause of birth.95  
 
In section nine Yuein-b! elaborates on this matter when he writes: 
What suppresses the heart that should rejoice and keeps one from rejoicing 
is the action of blind passions.  Nevertheless, the Buddha, knowing this 
beforehand, called us ‘foolish beings possessed of blind passions’… 
Further having no thought of wanting to go to the Pure Land quickly, we 
think forlornly that we may die even when we become slightly ill; this also 
is the action of blind passions. It is hard for us to abandon this home of 
pain, where we have been transmigrating for innumerable kalpas down to 
the present, and we feel no longing for the Pure Land of Peace, where we 
have yet to be born. Truly, how powerful our blind passions are!96  
 
The key to understanding the view of the human condition, as represented in Tannish!, is 
to remember the description of Shinran’s view of karma. Shinran had elaborated on the 
general Buddhist notion that says anything going against the Buddha-Dharma is an ego-
based, attachment-driven action, and thus not of ultimate reality, by calling these things 
evil. Given that every non-enlightened human action is at some level ego-based and 
attachment-driven (i.e. the result of blind passions) then according to Shinran every 
human action is evil and the human condition itself is evil. All of this culminates, of 
course, in the most significant and well-known phrase of the Tannish!, which seemingly 
sums up Shinran’s and the Tannish!’s view of the human condition, “Even the good 
person is born in the Pure Land, so without question is the person who is evil.”*) 
 
Past Conditioning Actions that Lead to the Human Predicament 
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In section thirteen of the Tannish!, Yuein-b! responses to the third major 
misconception regarding Shinran’s teachings. The misconception states, “People who are 
unafraid of committing evil because of the inconceivable working of the Primal Vow are 
in fact impudently presuming upon the Vow and therefore will not attain birth.”*+ In 
other words, the misconception was that a person would not achieve birth in the Pure 
Land if she flaunted the principal vow due to her misunderstanding of evil acts and evil 
karma. While this statement is patently not the case, given the clarification of all human 
activity as being evil and all evil people being the object of Amida’s salvific compassion 
shown in the most recent section of this dissertation, the important point to understand 
now is how the defiled human condition is entirely due to past conditioning actions (i.e. 
past karma, shukug!). Yuein-b! writes: 
This statement is of one who doubts the Primal Vow and fails to 
understand the influence of good and evil karma of past lives. 
Good thoughts arise in us through the prompting of good karma from the 
past, and evil acts are conceived and committed through the working of 
evil karma.  The late Master said. ‘Know that every evil act done – even as 
slight as a particle on the tip of a strand of rabbit’s fur or sheep’s wool – 
has its cause in past karma.99 
 
At first glance the emphasis in this statement seems to clearly show that any evil act in 
the present life is entirely due to the influence of past karma. “The Tannish! argues that 
much of the evil in people’s lives is the karmic fruition of past acts (shukug!).”'00 
However, we would be wise to remember that Shinran has argued that the duality of good 
and evil is simply a relative concept. In the ocean of the Vow good and evil are equal.  
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Good acts, as seen from the relative human perspective, are never really good when seen 
from the perspective of the Buddha. As Shinran writes in the Shoshinge:  
The great dharma teachers of ancient India, China and Japan 
Make clear Sakyamuni’s emphasis 
That when compared with Amida Buddha’s pure activity, 
All we sentient beings are calculating and defiled. 
Sakyamuni’s teachings disclose to us 
The universal enlightenment made possible 
Through Amida’s Vow.101     
 
Put differently, and as alluded to in the previous section regarding the human condition, 
any action by a sentient being is by definition ego-based, calculating, attachment-based, 
and defiled. In other words, all actions are due to shukug! and are evil. The “karma from 
our past that rules our lives is always evil.”'0, Shinran confirms this when he states in 
Article Thirteen, “we sentient beings cannot arbitrarily do evil, or perform good deeds.  
He says that even the evil or bad that we do is due to our karma.”'01 But what exactly is 
“evil?” 
According to Shinran, evil are actions that disrupt harmonious order—actions 
based on ego-attachments are evil. The earliest forms of mainstream Buddhism posited 
specifically “the ten evil acts.”  These are: (1) killing living beings; (2) stealing; (3) 
committing adultery; (4) telling lies; (5) uttering harsh words; (6) uttering words that 
cause enmity between two or more persons; (7) engaging in idle talk; (8) greed; (9) 
anger; and (10) ignorance.  To this list Pure Land Buddhist thought adds which it 
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considers to be “the five grave offenses,”—some of the most evil acts one could commit.  
These are: (1) killing one’s father; (2) killing one’s mother; (3) killing an arhat, or 
disciple of the Buddha); (4) causing the Buddha’s body to bleed; and (5) causing disunity 
in the Buddhist order.  
Furthermore “Shinran recognized evil as a prevalent phenomenon in the age of 
mapp!, and he acknowledged its presence in his own life.  Much of this he saw as the 
eruption of evil inclinations (bonn!) or as the karmic fruition of acts perpetuated in past 
lives (shukug!).  Hence, [according to Shinran’s thought] when a person commits a 
wrongdoing, it is often a manifestation of karmic proclivities built up over many 
lifetimes.”'0- All told, Shinran maintained that all human activity is thoroughly evil 
because of the negative karmic influence and past actions. 
 
Futility of the Human Effort to Change the Human Predicament 
Shinran taught that “only when people realize that they are unable to free 
themselves of the woes of this world through their own efforts do they come to rely on 
Amida’s power totally.”'0. Shinran maintained fervently that the only way to attain birth 
in Amida’s Pure Land was for a person to let go of the delusional belief that his actions 
had any impact on this process. By Shinran’s calculation, karmic evil and blind delusions 
are so overwhelming that every action we commit is by definition evil in nature. An 
example of this complete denial of the freedom of human will can be found in section 
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thirteen of the Tannish!, as Shinran “attributes absolute control over the conduct of our 
lives to karmic causation.”'0/ 
Good thoughts arise in us through the prompting of good karma from the 
past, and evil acts are conceived and committed through the working of 
evil karma.  The late Master said, “Know that every evil act done – even 
as slight as a particle on the tip of a strand of rabbit’s fur or sheep’s wool – 
has its cause in past karma.”107 
 
Even those acts we might otherwise consider to be good, such as making offerings to the 
s!gya or engaging in strenuous acts of piety or meditation, are useless. “Morality was of 
limited effect, as were ritual actions; nothing, it seemed, could eradicate the deep-seated 
imperfection of being human.”'0+ 
Furthermore, “Shinran’s model of time [also] denies any sort of free will, since 
everything we do and have done is swamped in an abyss of unfathomable evil karma.”'0* 
According to Shinran’s concept of karma, “we lack the potential to do anything that is not 
evil.  [Consequently] if whatever we do – even acts we consider to be good and virtuous 
– is in fact evil, then whatever our subjective thoughts, in reality we have no moral 
freedom of choice.”''0 Our only “freedom” as a human is intimately connected to our 
past karma. The key is for a person to realize completely and clearly that he is a 
karmically bound person (i.e., an evil person), and to then to live his life entirely in the 
awareness that he cannot live any way other than as an evil person. “In short, teachers of 
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lay Pure Land piety saw the human condition as virtually hopeless without intervention 
by the Buddha, while those of monastic orientation insisted on strenuous self-effort even 
in the final stages of dharma.”''' According to the Tannish! it is futile to think that any 
human action could affect the state of the human condition.       
 
Ontologically Transformative Response that Originates Outside Any Human Effort 
According to Shinran’s teachings, birth in the Pure Land, or —using the bridge 
concept from this study—ontological transformation, is the result of actions and efforts of 
a source that stands outside the human condition entirely. In Shin thought this source of 
ontologically transformative power is known as “other-power” (他力 tariki), or Amida 
Buddha and his Primal Vow. As examined previously in this chapter, birth in Amida’s 
Pure Land is the direct result of Amida’s Primal Vow. The Vow states, “If, when I attain 
Buddhahood, sentient beings in the land of the ten quarters who sincerely and joyfully 
entrust themselves to me, desire to be born in my land, and call my Name even ten times, 
should not be born there, may I not attain perfect Enlightenment.”112 Taking a 
hermeneutical step that was distinct from his teacher H!nen, Shinran regarded even the 
ability to recite the Nembutsu as an expression of Other-Power. Whereas other Buddhist 
sects of his time regarded the recitation of the Nembutsu as yet another “good” act 
conducted through self-effort, Shinran saw the nembutsu as an act of gratitude arising 
from the Other–Power of Amida and his Vow. Shinran maintained that “faith, like 
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Nembutsu, is not a product of human exertion but rather the creation of Amida 
unilaterally bestowed on sentient beings.”''1  
 
 
Transactional Quality of the Process of Ontological Transformation 
Building upon the work of his teacher, H!nen, Shinran maintained that Amida’s 
articulation of the Primal Vow generated an unlimited storehouse of karmic merit, which 
he in turn transfers to all sentient beings in two phases. The two phases—first expressed 
by Chinese monk Donran (476-542), considered by Shin practitioners as the Third 
Patriarch of the tradition—are “going forth” (!s!-ek!) and “returning” (gens!-ek!). As 
Hisao Inagaki explains in The Three Pure Land Sutras: A Study and Translation (2000), 
the phrase “going forth” is in reference to Amida’s transfer of merit from his great karmic 
storehouse in order for people to “attain birth in the Pure Land together with all sentient 
beings by endowing them with one’s merits. The phrase of ‘returning’ is to re-enter the 
worlds of Sams#ra to lead sentient beings to the Buddhist Path.”114 Thus, Shinran has 
interpreted Amida’s merit-transference as a transactional-like process of ontological 
transformation. Amida gives humanity shinjin for the purpose of facilitating our birth in 
the Pure Land and in return humanity perpetuates the process of liberating all sentient 
beings by returning to the realms of sams#ra to assist with the liberation of others. As 
Yuein-b! recounts Shinran’s teachings in the fifth section of the Tannish!: 
As for me, Shinran, I have never said the Nembutsu even once for the 
repose of my departed father and mother, For all sentient beings, without 
exception, have been our parents and brothers and sisters in the course of 
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countless lives in many states of existence. On attaining Buddhahood after 
this present life, we can save every one of them. Were saying the 
Nembutsu indeed a good act in which I strove through my own powers, 
then I might direct the merit thus gained toward saving my mother and 
father. But that is not the case. If, however, simply abandoning self-power, 
we quickly attain enlightenment in the Pure Land, we will be able to save, 
by means of supernatural powers, first those with whom we have close 
karmic relations, whatever karmic suffering they may have sunk to in the 
six realms through the four modes of birth.115   
 
Mainstream Mah#y#na thought (and some Therav#da traditions as well), on the other 
hand, maintains that it is possible to direct or transfer merit through self-power (jiriki). 
This merit is accrued through the performance of good acts. In the fifth section of the 
Tannish! Shinran has instead positioned merit transference as a transactional activity in 
which Amida directs virtue and merit towards us. Humanity plays no role in the 
transaction, as long ago Amida Buddha acquired the karmic merit necessary to “solve” 
the dilemma of human existence. As human calculations are always evil and thus lacking, 
it is only Amida’s merit transference that can affect the ontological transformation 
necessary for birth in the Pure Land. Even the central human act of reciting the nembutsu 
should be understood as simply a response of gratitude for Amida’s soteriological action. 
As Shinran explains in section fourteen of the Tannish!, “Thus the nembutsu that we say 
throughout a lifetime . . . should be recognized as entirely the expression of our gratitude 
for the benevolence and our thankfulness for the virtuous working of the Tathagata’s 
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Scope of Transformative Response 
Consistent with the pan-Mah#y#na position on the matter, Shin thought maintains 
that liberation from the cycles of rebirth involves transcending the duality of good and 
evil, thereby enabling liberation from the binding passions, delusions, and judgments of 
sams#ric existence. Shin thought, as influenced by Shinran’s teaching, distinguishes itself 
from other Mah#y#na teachings, however, in that it is predicated on a radical non-
dualistic conception of karma. In other words, all karma is evil and by extension all 
sentient beings are evil. This results in the knowledge that “the Primal Vow of Amida 
makes no distinction between people young and old, good and evil; only the entrusting 
heart, shinjin, is essential.”117 Put differently, there is no discrimination with regard to 
whom Amida extends loving-compassion and similarly there is no discrimination with 
regard to who shall be born in the Pure Land. In Shin thought it is accepted that there is 
an ontological equality among all sentient beings due to their shukug!, and consequently 
ontological transformation, or birth in the Pure Land, is meant universally. As presented 
in section three of the Tannish!: 
It is impossible for us, who are possessed of blind passions, to free 
ourselves from birth-and-death through any practice whatever. Grieving 
over this, Amida made the Vow, the essential intent of which is the evil 
person’s attainment of Buddhahood. Hence, evil persons who entrust 
themselves to Other Power are precisely the ones who possess the true 
cause of birth. Accordingly [Shinran] said, ‘Even the good person is born 
in the Pure Land, so without question is the person who is evil.’118  
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As the evil person is the true object of Amida’s Primal Vow (akunin sh!ki setsu), and all 
people are deemed evil persons, ontological transformation is for everyone. James 
Dobbins interprets the Tannish! to be asserting that there is nothing, either good or evil 
that can impede the work of Amida’s liberating Vow. “The 18th Vow of Nien-fo-Faith is 
the most concrete expression of Amit#bha’s [i.e., Amida’s] wish to save all beings in 
delusion and suffering. The Vow of universal salvation, as the 18th Vow may be called, 
having been fulfilled, the most effective way of salvation has become available to us.”119 
In other words, ontological transformation in Shin Buddhism is a universal experience.  
The analytical categories employed in this chapter will also serve as the scaffolding for 
the thick description of Reformed Christianity and the Doctrine of Limited Atonement 












Chapter Four: The Doctrine of Limited Atonement 
!
Few Christian doctrines have seen such a breadth of interpretation as the doctrine 
of atonement. In particular, some of the greatest doctrinal debates have focused on the 
exact extent of the atonement.1 In the early seventeenth century, the early Dutch 
Reformed Christian church attempted to respond to what it perceived as the propagation 
of false or erroneous teachings by a small but growing number of university professors 
and Reformed church pastors in and around Amsterdam. This ecclesial response 
established more fixed and orthodox positions on several contested theological matters 
within the young Dutch Reformed Church. The formal repudiation of this perceived 
heresy and the subsequent effort to establish orthodoxy took place at the Synod of Dort 
(also known as Dordrecht or Dordt) in South Holland between November 1618 and May 
1619. The synod’s conclusions appear in a document formally ratified on May 6, 1619, 
by Calvinist representatives of Great Britain, Switzerland, and the United Provinces of 
Holland who were present. This document, referred to as the Canons of Dort, has become 
one of the central doctrinal standards for the Christian Reformed Church and the 
Reformed Church of America. Today, countless Christians regard it as a virtual summary 
of the major tenets of Calvinism.2 
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Through an exploration of the Canons’ five heads of doctrine, I explain the 
Canons’ position on six matters discussed in the comparative analysis in Chapter Five.3 
The six matters are (1) the nature of the human condition or predicament,4 (2) the 
“original” conditioning action that leads to this human condition, (3) the futility of any 
human efforts to change this human condition, (4) the ontologically transformative 
response to the human condition that originates from “outside” of any human efforts, (5) 
the transactional quality of this process of ontological transformation, and (6) the scope 
of the transformative response. The Canons reaffirm what has become known as the 
Calvinist Doctrine of Limited Atonement. Although I examine and explicate this doctrine 
in greater detail throughout the chapter, it can be summarized as follows: While Christ’s 
death and atonement on the cross were sufficient to redeem the sin of all humanity, in 
accordance with God’s will, Christ’s atonement was only efficacious in the salvation of 
some individuals. In other words, “Christ’s coming was not to provide salvation for all 
mankind [sic], but to render certain the salvation of the elect.”5 The Canons’ statement of 
this absolute decree of election for some but not all individuals (i.e., God’s 
predeterminative selection of a limited number of people for eternal life) serves as a key 
point in the forthcoming comparative analysis in Chapter Five, as it demonstrates an 
orthodox declaration of the limited extent or scope of transformative response to the 
human condition. 
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Numerous theological influences shaped the unique articulation of the Doctrine of 
Limited Atonement found in the Canons of Dort. In order to establish a foundation for 
understanding the doctrine’s construction, this chapter briefly examines the theological 
developments that preceded the Synod of Dort and inestimably shaped the nature of the 
Canons, including the early Christian church’s multivalent conception of salvation, 
redemption, and atonement; Augustine of Hippo’s doctrine of original sin; Augustine’s 
view on the efficacy and particularism of God’s grace; Anselm of Canterbury’s 
commercial or “merit” theory of atonement; Peter Lombard’s distinction between the 
sufficiency of Christ’s death and the efficacy of Christ’s death; John Calvin’s conceptions 
of the particularism of the working of grace and the transactionally substitutionary 
character of Christ’s death and atonement; and Theodore Beza’s writings on 
predestination, election, and specific atonement.  
It also is useful to recall that the term “Reformed” will be interpreted throughout 
this work as Calvinist as opposed to Lutheran (with the differentiation being marked not 
by the traditional division according to understandings of sacramental presence during 
the Eucharist but rather according to divergent views regarding predestination), and 
continental (as in Dutch, German, French, and Swiss) as opposed to English or Scottish 
Presbyterian in origin. The word “Reformed” also suggests Protestant churches whose 
designation is based upon doctrine as opposed to Protestant churches based more upon 
polity (as in Presbyterianism).6  
In the traditional Protestant denominational division surrounding sacramental 
presence, there are two views concerning the presence of Christ within the Eucharistic 
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meal.  Luther maintained that while the elements bread and wine do not literally change 
into the presence of Christ, Christ is actually present within the Eucharist, but it is only 
faith that can make the sacrament of benefit to the Christian.7 Luther’s position is one of 
the consubstantiation of the Lord’s Supper, as opposed to the Roman Catholic view of 
transubstantiation, in which the bread and wine literally change into Christ’s body and 
blood through the act of priestly consecration. In this way, “Christ is truly and 
substantially present in the elements themselves.”8 On the other hand, Calvin maintained 
that Christ is not literally present within the elements but rather is present spiritually 
when the elements are consumed. In this way, Calvinists believe that the Eucharistic meal 
provides “spiritual nourishment and brings one closer to the presence of Christ.”9  
It is vital to understand the basis for the divergent views regarding predestination, 
which is the most important distinction in this chapter’s account of the Dutch Reformed 
Church. Lutheran orthodoxy defines “predestination” as God’s choice, prior to any 
foreknowledge of what a person will or will not do during his or her lifetime, of who 
among humanity will enjoy eternal beatitude and salvation. The early Lutheran position 
further understood predestination as a conditioned decree of God (decretum 
conditionatum) that God ordained in light of human faith. However, lest it be thought that 
faith impelled God’s decree, Luther sought to preserve the Gospels’ sense of God’s 
expansive grace (gratia universalis) as the key to salvation.10 He did so by maintaining 
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that faith and belief are provided as gifts by God, in such a way that faith and 
predestination are coordinated, thereby ensuring that all who have faith are among the 
predestined elect. Ultimately more relevant to the view expressed in the Canons of Dort, 
the Calvinist position maintains that predestination is an absolute decree of God 
(decretum absolutum) whereby “all rational creatures, angels and men, have been 
appointed to their ends, either to eternal life or to eternal death [and that it is solely up to 
God] to manifest his mercy and justice in the salvation of some and the damnation of 
other of his creatures.”11 The consummate difference between the early Lutheran and 
Calvinist positions is that Calvin saw that the ends (finis) were fixed (i.e., salvation or 
damnation), as well as the means (via) to these ends. Put another way, election should be 
considered completely apart from the faith or efforts of humanity. As Calvin writes: 
In conformity, therefore, to the clear doctrine of the Scripture, we assert, 
that by an eternal and immutable counsel, God has once for all 
determined, both whom he would admit to salvation, and whom he would 
condemn to destruction. We affirm that this counsel, as far as concerns the 
elect, is founded on his gratuitous mercy, totally irrespective of human 
merit; but that to those whom he devotes to condemnation, the gate of life 
is closed by a just and irreprehensible, but incomprehensible judgment.12  
 
This chapter explains which theological influences most significantly contributed 
to the creation of the Doctrine of Limited Atonement, why this doctrinal statement was 
articulated in this manner within the Canons of Dort, and what limited atonement means 
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according to the Canons. An understanding of these three questions, as well as of the six 
positions found within the Canons’ heads of doctrine (ranging from the nature of the 
human condition to the scope of transformative response to said human condition), is a 
necessary foundation for following the comparative analysis in Chapter Five.  
 
Theological Influences on the Doctrine of Limited Atonement 
Early Theological Developments 
Notions such as salvation, redemption, atonement, and sin all ultimately inform 
the articulation of the Doctrine of Limited Atonement in the Canons of Dort. To 
understand the Canon’s position on the extent of the atonement, it is necessary to 
consider briefly the winding history of the early Christian church’s view on a variety of 
theological matters.  
For centuries Christian theologians have suggested, based on 2 Corinthians 5.19, 
that the heart of the Christian message is the proclamation of God reconciling humanity 
back unto Godself through the mediation of Jesus Christ.13 This promise and hope of 
reconciliation or “at-one-ment” with God is often understood by Christians as being the 
very meaning of salvation itself. While the church has never produced a unified doctrine 
of salvation, it has certainly been consistent in arguing that the cornerstone of salvation is 
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the saving work of Jesus Christ.14 The position that salvation is in some manner mediated 
through the work and death of a particular first-century Galilean man, considered by his 
contemporaneous followers as well as later Christians to be the Christ (from the Greek 
word Christos, meaning “anointed one” or “Messiah,” which is a translation of the 
Hebrew Mashiakh), is the key element that most distinguishes the Christian tradition 
from other religions. “The most important notion, common to preaching piety, and 
dogmatics, is that ‘Christ died for us.’ This is the sine qua non of every doctrine of 
atonement.”15 The interpretation of this mediated saving work is known as soteriology, 
derived from the Greek word soter ('()*+), meaning “savior” or “deliverer,” whereas the 
work itself has become known as atonement. As this chapter is most concerned with a 
unique historical articulation of the extent of the impact of this work (i.e., atonement), it 
is useful to first describe exactly what theologians and scholars within the broader 
historical Christian tradition have meant by the terms salvation and atonement.  
 
Salvation and redemption. Many scholars have argued that the highest goal or 
ideal of any religion is ontological transformation, often conceived in terms of salvation 
or liberation.16 However, across religious traditions this ideal and the methods for its 
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fulfillment have been understood in quite diverse and often conflicting manners. 
Salvation may be variously understood as being  
this-worldly or other-worldly; it may be individual or social; it may be 
attained once and for all, or it may be conceived of as a process of growth; 
it may be dominantly an escape, salvation from something, sin, fear, 
danger, death, or it may be conceived of as chiefly positive, saved to or for 
something; it may be conditioned or it may be absolute and eternal. 
Salvation may be won by self-effort or by the aid of a savior. It may be 
attained through works, something one does, asceticism, performance of 
ceremonies, moral effort, self surrender; it may be won through faith in a 
savior, sometimes vicariously, or it may be won through some kind of 
saving knowledge.17 
 
In the most basic Christian sense of salvation, this highest goal or ideal has 
focused upon repairing or redeeming what is perceived to be a broken relationship 
between God and humanity. This broken relationship can be thought of as “a basic split 
in the structure of human existence. The self reflects a division within the self, between 
the side that exists here and now with all its needs and lacks and the other side that will 
and should exist in a state of fullness and satisfaction, [in other words in full relationship 
with God].”18 A brief look at the meanings of the words “redemption” and “salvation” 
will help elaborate on this Christian sense of salvation as a reparation.  
Redemption, derived from the Latin word redimere, means to buy back, to 
repurchase, to free from what distresses or harms, or to free from captivity by payment of 
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ransom. There is a transactional quality to this word. Salvation, derived from the Latin 
salvatio means “deliverance,” specifically, deliverance from the powers and effects of 
sin. Furthermore, it implies making one safe, which comes from the Latin word salvus, 
which is akin to healthy, solid, whole, entire, and free from harm or threat.19 In other 
words, there is a healing and protecting quality to salvation. These metaphors for 
redemption, which arise from Paul’s language, especially as found in Romans 3.21-25, 
allowed many Christians to understand salvation as an act of repairing or redeeming, and, 
therefore, salvation serves as a transactional process of deliverance from harm and a 
restoration of wholeness. As indicated earlier, the actual mediated work that leads to 
salvation has become known as “atonement.”  
 
Atonement. Within the broad Christian tradition, there has existed for centuries a 
belief that, in the days following creation, relations between God and humanity were 
right, proper, or harmonious but that at some point this relationship fell out of alignment. 
From this impression there developed an ongoing perception of a disorder, dis-harmony, 
or dis-ease about the state of the human condition. This disordered condition or 
predicament requires repair or redemption—in other words, a realignment or “re-at-one-
ment.” This message of redeeming the relationship between God and humanity has stood 
at the center of the biblical message.  
This nearly universal Christian understanding of the nature of the human 
condition (i.e., disordered and out of right relationship with God, or existentially 
estranged) is addressed in Chapter Five’s comparative analysis. In particular, the 
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comparative analysis focuses on how the Canons of Dort employed this interpretation of 
the human condition.  
The word “atonement” literally means setting at one; bringing into accord or 
harmony; reconciling or restoring relations. In other words, this at-one-ment has the 
power to reconcile the disordered human condition. Put another way, atonement “is 
concerned with the issue of how in general, despite fault on one side, reconciliation is 
achievable between the two or more parties involved.”20 In this case, the two parties 
involved are, of course, humanity and God. Whereas salvation can be broadly conceived 
as the effort to restore wholeness to what is broken, the idea of atonement “has a 
narrower focus. It insists that salvation depends upon the restoring of a relationship 
between human beings and God, who are estranged from one another.”21 So, how and 
when was the relationship between God and humanity disrupted or broken, and what is 
the fault or threat that requires amelioration? The Western Christian position, drawing 
from the Hebrew Bible for scriptural authority, maintains that soon after God created 
humanity, their ordered and harmonious relationship was broken because humanity 
decided to reject God.22 Any understanding of salvation is thus intimately linked to an 
understanding of the story of creation and the state of God’s earliest relationship with that 
creation.  
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Sin. From the earliest days of Christian thought, Christian theologians have 
maintained that humanity is out of this “right relationship with God” due to sin—
specifically, the sin of the first human, Adam, commonly referred to as “original sin.” 
Over time, sin has become commonly understood as “an act or attitude by which the 
reality of God is denied or violated.”23 In other words, sin has often been understood as 
an offense against God, a prideful choice of self over God. “Sin alienates from God, 
divides the sinner from God’s community, disorders the life of the sinner, and in that 
measure disorders creation itself.”24 Thus, sin is the harm or threat that prohibits a right 
ordering of relations between God and humanity, which in turn results in the corruption 
or defilement of the human condition. 
This alienation from God through sin and the subsequent corruption of the human 
condition is not simply confined to Adam. Many believe that within the human condition 
there exists a proclivity to or tendency to sin, sometimes thought of as an inherited 
hereditary depravity. Where does this proclivity to stand against God in a corrupted state 
originate, though? This tendency toward moral corruption or depravity is most often 
credited to Adam’s sin, his subsequent fall from God’s grace, his expulsion from the 
Garden of Eden, and, most significantly, the transmission of this depraved and defiled 
condition to all of his descendents.25 This concept, known today as the Christian Doctrine 
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of Imputation, implies that sin, guilt before God, and a corrupted state or human 
condition are imputed or transmitted from generation to generation.  
Specifically, a view of imputation sometimes referred to as the “Solidarity View” 
argues that a unique relationship exists between Adam and his descendants.26 One way of 
interpreting the effects of this relationship is called “Seminalism,” a position that 
maintains that the “union between Adam and his posterity is biological and genetic such 
that Adam embodied all human beings in a single collective entity and thus all people are 
co-sinners with Adam.”27 All people are thought to have inherited from Adam guilt, 
natural corruption, and a total inability to change their standing or status with God (a 
concept explored later in this chapter). 
A second way of interpreting the effects of the relationship between Adam and his 
descendants, under the Solidarity View of imputation, is called Federalism. This position 
maintains that the “union between Adam and his posterity is due to the fact that God 
appointed him as the representative head of the human race. What Adam did is charged to 
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his posterity. [Thus] Adam’s first sin was imputed to every person. All people were tried 
in Adam our representative and declared guilty.”28  
Augustine of Hippo perpetuated Seminalism in The Enchiridion. Within this work 
is one of the first unique theological developments that would eventually shape the 
Canons of Dort’s articulation of the extent of the atonement, namely, Augustine’s views 
on the inherited depraved state of the human condition, which have become known as 
Augustine’s Doctrine of Original Sin. Before examining Augustine’s writings on this 
matter, it is important to address the church’s earliest efforts to expound upon the process 
of restoring the human predicament to one of right relations.  
 
Views of atonement during the patristic age. Within the broad Christian tradition, 
what distinguishes the particularity of atonement from the generality of salvation is the 
mediating role of Jesus Christ. During the first five centuries of the Christian era (i.e., the 
Patristic age), the various Christian thinkers and theologians referred to as the apostolic 
fathers worked diligently to describe this mediating role of Jesus Christ, and several 
themes emerged. For example, the apostolic fathers “in general affirmed the centrality of 
Christ in the salvation process, [and] regarded the cross as pivotal and its message as 
essential,” but none of their theories were ever formally or fully developed. 29 In fact, 
“[f]inding a theory to explain how Christ’s life, death, and resurrection can bring about 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 House, Charts of Christian Theology and Doctrine, 87. 
 
29 Fudge, “Concepts of Salvation,” 226. 
125 
human redemption has long been one of the more intractable tasks faced by the 
theologian.”30 
For the first couple of centuries following the death of Jesus of Nazareth, many 
people wrestled with the question of his work and death. Some, like the Gnostics, saw 
Jesus primarily as a teacher who worked to save humankind by reminding people of 
things they had forgotten, illuminating their true nature, and teaching them how to live. 
They thought that salvation flowed “from the knowledge (gnosis) of God that brings 
eternal life.”31 But for many Christians, this position did not explain why Jesus was 
forced to suffer and die on a cross. Irenaeus, an early Christian thinker and bishop of 
Lyons in southern France during the late second century, “sought the basis for a fuller 
account of Christ’s saving work in Paul’s references to Christ as the second Adam. 
[Irenaeus concluded that] when Adam, out of pride and disobedience, sinned, something 
went wrong with humanity. Christ [then] put things right. He undid what Adam had done 
by living a human life of humility and obedience, even to death.”32 In other words, 
Christ’s humility and obedience to God reversed the hubris and disobedience of Adam. 
According to Irenaeus, “while Christ was manifested as human he summed up in himself 
the totality of human history, rectifying the damage caused through the Fall, infused 
grace into the human race, replacing the sin of Adam with the gift of God . . . [Thus the] 
incarnation has the purpose of undoing the consequences of the Fall [i.e., the disruption 
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of the harmonious relationship between God and humanity].”33 Implicit within these 
statements is an early Christian assumption about the unity of humanity, which suggests 
that Adam’s actions affected all of his descendents. These assumptions would eventually 
coalesce in Augustine’s aforementioned Solidarity View of imputation, later known as 
Seminalism.  
Thoughts like those of Irenaeus, as well as of early theologians such as Origen 
(185-254?), provided the dominant imagery for the Christian church for nearly nine 
hundred years to follow. During the church’s earliest years, this first real theory of 
atonement became known as the Theory of Recapitulation, suggesting that Christ 
repeated all the life stages of Adam in reverse, thereby turning humanity’s path from 
disobedience back to obedience. “It is the whole life of Christ, the incarnation itself, that 
brings salvation as the restoration of what humanity was originally intended to be.”34 
Thus, it was thought that the prior “right relationship” with God was reestablished. Of 
course, the need to right the relationship begs questions about what exactly went wrong 
with humanity in the first place and how Christ was able to make things right. 
In response to these questions, the patristic position emphasized the powers of 
evil. The thinkers of the time believed that the human spiritual condition could best be 
understood as one of enslavement to the powers of evil (as personified in Satan or the 
devil). As a result, the Christ’s work and death were understood in a more nuanced 
manner than simply as undoing or rectifying a damaged relationship. Specifically, his 
work and death, which ultimately freed humanity from enslavement, were understood 
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either as the triumph over the powers of evil or the payment of a ransom to Satan in order 
release of humanity from bondage. This bondage was largely conceived of as captivity to 
Satan’s temptations and the inevitability of future sin.  
According to the first view, Adam “yielded to Satan’s trickery and obeyed him 
rather than God [when Adam ate the forbidden fruit from the prohibited tree in the 
middle of the garden], thereby putting humanity under Satan’s lordship.” In accordance 
with legalistic terms of the day, Satan had a just and legitimate claim to humanity 
because of Adam’s action. However, “Christ then freed us by defeating Satan. According 
to some accounts he even used trickery to defeat trickery.”35 It was thought that Christ 
defeated evil and freed humanity from bondage by tricking Satan into thinking that when 
pursuing Christ he was pursuing a sinful human. “Origen speaks of Jesus handing over 
his soul to Satan in exchange for the souls of humanity, which the devil claimed to own 
because humans are sinful. When Satan accepted this exchange, he found that the soul of 
Jesus could not be held because Jesus was sinless, and the sinless soul of Christ caused 
Satan agonizing torture.”36 Satan had thereby overreached in his attempt to claim Jesus, 
and Satan’s claim was nullified.  
According to the second view, Adam’s disobedience to God damaged humanity’s 
relationship with God. Once again, Adam’s disobedience occurred when he ate fruit from 
a prohibited tree in the Garden of Eden, but this time the disobedience came with a price 
tag. 37 This “disobedience has distorted our relationship with God and left us owing God a 
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penalty for the injury we have done his honor [as well as leaving humanity enslaved to 
Satan]. Christ’s suffering and death represent a sacrifice on our behalf, a payment for our 
sin.”38 Once again the legalistic sensibilities of the day shaped this notion of a debt being 
owed and compensation being required. This position on atonement was largely 
championed by Origen and in time became known as the Ransom Theory of Atonement. 
According to this view, Christ’s death was a sacrifice or ransom paid to the devil in order 
to purchase the claim upon humanity, thereby ensuring God’s victory over evil. The view 
posits that Christ’s life was equal to or greater in value than all of humanity, so by freely 
offering himself up to death through the crucifixion, all debts were paid and God’s honor 
was restored. This theory carries within it “the assertion of the belief in the victory of life 
over death and good over evil, accomplished in the death and resurrection of Christ.”39 
Ultimately, when examining the early church’s theories of Christ’s mediating role 
in salvation we find that Irenaeus’s Theory of Recapitulation and Origen’s Ransom 
Theory had the deepest and longest-lasting influence upon the Western Church, and the 
Reformed Church in particular. Certainly, we ought not discount the importance of 
Western Christian apologist Tertullian’s (160-220) concept of salvation as satisfaction, in 
which penitent sinners offer tears, self-punishment, fasting, almsgiving, and so on, in an 
effort to further secure God’s forgiveness, nor Eastern theologian Athanasius of 
Alexandria’s (296?–373) description of salvation as deification, in which believers seek 
union with Christ’s divine nature through baptism and a life of obedience to God. 
However, for the purposes of this dissertation, Irenaeus and Origen’s theories, which 
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represent the early church’s dominant positions on salvation and atonement, suffice in 
our exploration of the influence of early theological positions on the Doctrine of Limited 
Atonement as found in the Canons of Dort. Understanding how the Canons came to 
interpret the “original” conditioning action that led to a sense of the human condition as 
being defiled, as well as the futility of the human effort to change the depraved condition, 
requires a brief examination of Augustine of Hippo’s Doctrine of Original Sin. 
 
Augustine’s Doctrine of Original Sin  
Augustine of Hippo’s (354-430) views on countless matters (including creation, 
free will, original sin, and predestination) significantly influenced theologians of the 
Protestant Reformation, such as John Calvin and Theodore Beza, who in turn helped 
shaped the Canons of Dort. Augustine is credited with establishing what is commonly 
referred to as the Doctrine of Original Sin, derived from the Latin term peccatum 
originis, meaning “sin of the origin,” and his writings on sin and grace have 
immeasurably shaped the Christian church’s perception of these matters. However, it is 
useful to acknowledge that several theologians paved the way for Augustine to fully 
develop an early theory into broadly accepted doctrine. It was the apostle Paul, in his 
letter to the Romans, who originally introduced the notion that Adam’s sin had 
ramifications for all of humanity. “When he taught that as in Adam all men have sinned, 
so in Christ they are saved, he not only suggested an interpretation of the Genesis story of 
the fall of the first parents which no Jewish exegete had made before (as far as we know), 
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but he also furnished Christian theology a major theme of thought.”40 This theme was 
adopted and expanded upon by early theologians. For example, Tertullian, the 
aforementioned North African Christian, first coined the term “original sin” around the 
year 200 CE when he proposed that sin was passed into the soul of each person through 
human procreation.41 Cyprian (200-258), bishop of Carthage in North Africa, furthered 
this thinking when he wrote that even infants who have not actually committed sins 
require baptism, as they have inherited the guilt of Adam.42 In several of his 
commentaries, Ambrose (340-397), the bishop of Milan, concurred when he taught that 
“through the sin of the first man, Adam, all Adam’s descendents come into the world 
tainted with sin.”43 Influenced by Ambrose, Augustine took these ideas regarding the 
inherited depraved state of the human condition and coupled them with his Neoplatonic 
conception of the presence of evil in the world to formulate his foundational Doctrine of 
Original Sin.44  
For Augustine, any understanding of salvation and atonement had to begin with 
an understanding of original sin and its dramatic effects upon the human condition. By 
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Augustine’s reckoning, the first human, Adam, was created with freedom of will and the 
power to choose between doing good and forsaking good. In other words, Adam was 
given the power to choose not to sin (posse non peccare). This gift was in many ways 
humanity’s “highest quality, a gift from God intended for [humanity’s] own good, and 
[its] chief peril.”45 Adam used his “divinely given capacity for rational free choice” when 
he made the conscious decision to put his will before the will of God, resulting in the first 
sin.46 For Augustine, this rejection of God implied a denial of Adam’s absolute 
dependence upon God, resulting in a change in Adam’s proper ontological condition 
(posse peccare) and a decline in his standing with God (i.e., a degradation of the prior 
good and harmonious relationship between God and humanity). This original sin 
introduced evil, and Adam was fallen into a condition or state of sin. In his 1983 book, A 
History of Christian Theology, William C. Placher delineates the adoption of Augustinian 
ideas. “Western theologians [in general] thought in terms of states. With Adam’s initial 
sin, humanity had fallen into a state of sin. Christ redeems us, bringing us into a state of 
grace.”47 In other words, Adam’s choice of self over God resulted in the defilement or 
depravity of Adam’s ontological standing, and the mediated saving work of Christ was 
thought to affect an ontological transformation (i.e., salvation) of the defiled sinner.  
It has been suggested that for Augustine “the fall of man [sic] was one of the most 
important events in all of world history. Why? Because, when Adam chose to sin against 
God of his own free will, he experienced the just condemnation of God. He experienced 
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this condemnation not only on himself but also on his offspring. Adam’s actions created a 
chasm between God and man that could only be bridged by the grace of God; no action 
of man could bridge that chasm.”48 Augustine maintained that Adam’s fall into sin was 
monumental, because all of humanity was now inevitably bound to “choose self instead 
of God,” assuring that humanity would repeatedly sin like Adam for all of eternity, and to 
similarly exist in a defiled state. 49 Humanity was effectively a heap of damnation, loss, 
and utter destruction, a massa damnata. As Augustine put it, “that one sin, admitted into 
a place where such perfect happiness reigned, was of so heinous a character, that in one 
man the whole human race was originally, and as one may say, radically, condemned.”50 
This corporate condemnation of humanity to the boundedness of sin was linked to the 
imputation of Adam’s sin to all of his descendents through the act of procreation, a theory 
that found its expression in Augustine’s aforementioned Seminalism position. In The 
Enchiridion Augustine writes:  
After his [Adam’s] sin he became an exile from this place and bound also 
his progeny, which by his sin he had damaged within himself as though at 
its root, by the penalty of death and condemnation. As a result, any 
offspring born of him and the wife through whom he had sinned, who had 
been condemned together with him, born through the concupiscence of the 
flesh which was their punishment, carrying within it a disobedience 
similar to that which they had showed, would contract original sin.51 
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As Augustine further reflected upon this imputed sinfulness and depravity, and 
the breadth of the chasm which exists between God and humanity, he realized that there 
was little that a person could do to close the gap and reconcile the fractured relationship. 
The ultimate ramification of the fall of Adam was that the degradation and depravity 
caused by that first sin was so complete that, whereas humanity was initially able to not 
sin (posse non peccare), humanity was now unable to refrain from sinning (non posse 
non peccare). According to theologian Bruce Demarest, “Sinners can neither will the 
good nor perform any meritorious work to earn God’s favor.”52 Free will certainly 
continued to exist, but humanity had now lost the desire to choose God and to do good. 
The stain of sin was such that humanity was essentially only free to continue sinning by 
choosing self-centered concerns over the concerns of God. “This falling away from 
man’s [sic] God-given status into a lower level of being, so Augustine believed, is not 
one from which man can recover by his own effort . . . Man cannot raise himself by his 
own boot-straps.”53 Self-effort and good works would not affect one’s salvation. 
Determination and human will could not reestablish a state of righteousness. Even heart-
felt contrition and obedience unto God would not result in ontological transformation. 
“No one could achieve perfection through obedience to the Law of God by means of free 
will alone.”54 As Augustine stated in The Enchiridion, “What good can one who is ruined 
do, except insofar as he is set free from his ruin? Can he perhaps do good by the free 
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choice of his own will? This too must not be thought, for it was by evil use of his power 
of free choice that man ruined both that power and himself.”55  
 
Grace. Given Augustine’s view of humanity’s complete powerlessness to affect 
its own ontological transformation, it makes sense that he proclaimed that freedom from 
sin, and subsequent salvation, was only possible with some help from an outside source. 
Augustine thought that God alone had the exclusive power to cause salvation or, 
conversely, to ensure destruction. If relying only upon its own abilities and powers, 
humanity would never seek God, since original sin had erased this desire. Augustine 
maintained that instead of allowing this reality to continue unabated, God offered a 
transformative response to the human predicament in the form of divine help. This 
“divine help without which man cannot choose God and live for him [sic] Augustine 
called grace.”56 In its most basic sense, grace implies divine favor or assistance. 
However, in early Christian theological circles, “divine grace had been understood not 
simply as the kindness and favor of God, shown especially in salvation, but also in an 
objective sense as something bestowed upon men [sic].”57 The gift of grace was revealed. 
Irrespective of human merit or deservedness, God freely provided humanity with a way 
to overcome its inability to save itself. In the face of humanity’s complete powerlessness 
and inevitable damnation, God provided the gift of the means for salvation.  
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Augustine, and many Protestant Reformers who followed his thinking, including 
those who directly influenced the language found in the Canons of Dort, largely 
differentiated between what he and they perceived to be two forms of grace—common 
grace and special grace. Common grace suggests “God’s undeserved goodness to every 
person in the form of his [sic] general care. It includes the provision of basic human 
needs, the restraint of evil, the delay of judgment, and the maintenance of the civil 
order.”58 This description is simply an elaboration of the basic sense of grace described 
earlier. It essentially denotes God’s favorable and agreeable disposition toward all of 
humanity, whereby God facilitates and ensures the possibility of a full and ordered 
human life for all people. “Special grace, on the other hand represents the exercise of 
God’s saving power toward sinners.”59 Special grace involves God actively changing the 
desire and willingness of individuals to move from self-centeredness to God-
centeredness. It is a changing of the individual’s heart, and a strengthening and renewal 
where only weakness and depravity previously existed. Grace repairs the will and 
restores it to a state of health. This “effectual grace” thereby enables the process of 
ontological transformation to begin. Whereas common grace is largely a disposition on 
the part of God, special grace is a particular form of action on the part of God to 
compensate for humanity’s inability to act on its own behalf. Special grace is the power 
of God at work where the power of humanity has failed. For Augustine, then, grace is 
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health.”60 Grace is the healing, redemptive power of God in action or “needed remedy for 
something in the human situation,  . . . the agent of a restored relation.”61  
 
The manner of God’s grace. Before moving to a more in-depth exploration of 
Augustine’s view on the particularity of God’s grace, it is useful to underscore the 
manner by which God’s divine help (grace) was extended. As stated earlier, Augustine 
saw God’s help (i.e., God’s grace) as being made available through the mediated saving 
work of Jesus the Christ. While Augustine viewed God as the heavenly physician, he 
understood Jesus the Christ to be the tool or the cause affecting the cure. Augustine 
believed that salvation from sin required a mediator and that there was only one mediator 
capable of affecting salvation, Jesus the Christ. Because Augustine understood Jesus to 
be the Word of God become incarnate,62 that universally condemning first sin could not 
“be undone and washed away except by the one mediator between God and humanity, the 
man Christ Jesus.”63 In other words, it took God in the flesh to affect humanity’s 
salvation. 
Building positively upon the earlier theological themes of sacrifice and ransom, 
Augustine addressed the matter as to how salvation was actually accomplished through 
two narratives, which he derived from Romans 3. First, because of sin God required a 
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sacrifice in order to heal the corrupted nature that humanity had inherited from Adam. 
The death of Jesus, as God incarnate, was the only sacrifice that would suffice. Thus, as 
an act of grace from God, Jesus functioned as a transactional substitution for the massa 
damnata, by intentionally obeying the will of God, standing in for humanity through his 
death, and desiring the reconciliation of humanity back unto God. 
 Begotten and conceived, then, without any indulgence of carnal lust, and 
therefore bringing with Him no original sin, and by the grace of God 
joined and united in a wonderful and unspeakable way in one person with 
the Word, the Only-begotten of the Father, a son by nature, not by grace, 
and therefore having no sin of His own; nevertheless, on account of the 
likeness of sinful flesh in which He came, He was called sin, that He 
might be sacrificed to wash away sin. For under the Old Covenant, 
sacrifices for sins were called sins.64 
  
The second theme is largely an embellishment of Origen’s earlier Ransom Theory 
of Atonement, whereby humans are redeemed from the power of Satan by the ransom of 
the blood of Jesus. It was thought that Jesus’ blood was transactionally offered for 
humanity’s sins. In Book 13 of De Trinitate, Augustine writes,  
In this redemption the blood of Christ was as it were the price given for us 
(but the devil upon receiving it was not enriched but bound), in order that 
we might be loosed from his chains, and that he might not involve in the 
nets of sin and so draw with himself to the ruin of the second and eternal 
death, anyone of those whom Christ, free from debt, had redeemed by 
pouring out His own blood without being obliged to do so . . . 65 
 
The consequence of God’s twofold saving actions through Christ was that humanity was 
irresistibly drawn to Christ, and through Christ to God, and that faith was created in the 
hearts of believers. While the notion of faith is examined later in more detail, for now 
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faith in Christ should be understood as the giving of oneself over to the saving power of 
God. It is heartfelt trusting in the ontologically transformative power of God that can and 
will restore humanity’s standing before God back to its pre-fall status, a state of righteous 
alignment and harmony with God. 
 
Efficacy and Particularism of God’s Grace. Augustine was so thoroughly convinced that 
the universal implications of original sin condemned all of humanity to damnation justly 
that he would have seen no fault or injustice had God gone through with punishing every 
individual, confining them to eternal perdition. In his work On the Predestination of the 
Saints, when addressing why the gift of faith is not given to all, Augustine writes, “from 
one all have gone into a condemnation, which undoubtedly is most righteous; so that 
even if none were delivered therefrom, there would be no just cause for finding fault with 
God.”66 Despite this perspective, or perhaps in light of it, Augustine maintained that out 
of infinite love and compassion for humanity, God had predetermined a certain number 
of people out of the mass of perdition (massa perditionis) to receive God’s grace. God 
reserved salvation for only a certain number of sinners, which is what is meant by the 
particularism of God’s grace. To understand this theological position, it is useful to recall 
Augustine’s differentiation between common grace and special grace. Whereas common 
grace is generally oriented toward all people, special grace is meant for a select number 
of people. 
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Augustine believed that God, as a response to the inevitable fall of Adam, 
predetermined who would receive grace and the attendant salvation, and who would 
not.67 “God predestined those he [sic] foreknew would exercise faith in Christ,”68 and this 
faith was entirely the result of God’s enabling efforts. Augustine’s view was a response 
to the Pelagians, who argued that humanity was completely free and self-sufficient, free 
to accept the gift of Christ or reject it, and able to attain eternal salvation without the 
divine grace of God (i.e., through personal effort). Augustine maintained that the 
predestining act of granting grace was not simply a matter of foreknowledge of who 
would respond to Christ but that in fact grace was the very ground or cause for 
responding to Christ, and thus the foundation of salvation. Prior to Augustine, most 
Christian theologians aligned with the former position, but Augustine found this notion 
untenable, as it implied that grace could be merited or earned, thereby deemphasizing 
God’s sovereignty. Augustine instead argued, “predestination is infallibly effective of 
itself, anterior to and unconditioned by any foreknowledge of man’s [sic] actions. The 
plan to save some men is based on an utterly benevolent or gratuitous divine choice.”69 
He based much of his thinking on predestination on his readings of Romans 8:29-30, 
which states “For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be confirmed to the 
image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn within a larger family. And those 
whom he called he also justified; and those whom he justified he also glorified,” and 
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Romans 9:11-12 (the apostle Paul’s interpretation of the Jacob and Esau story), which 
reads “Even before they had been born or had done anything good or bad [so that God’s 
purpose of election might continue, not by works but by his call] she was told, ‘The elder 
shall serve the younger.’”70  
For Augustine, to be predeterminatively selected to be among God’s chosen ones, 
the elect, relied completely on God’s pleasure and was the greatest gift possible, as it 
ensured eternal salvation. Those not among the elect are simply passed over and left in 
their ontological condition of depravity and defilement. This position makes it clear that 
Augustine was a single-predestinarian, and that he “understood predestination in an 
infralapsarian sense.”71 While God may have foreordained a select number of people to 
salvation, God did not similarly foreordain others to damnation. Rather, God passively 
left those not chosen in their preexistent state of sin. According to Augustine’s 
understanding, God would never actively condemn someone to damnation but simply 
does not count all individuals among the elect.72 When attempting to answer why 
Augustine took this position, some scholars have interpreted his writings in 
Predestination of the Saints as suggesting that “the bishop speculated that God 
predestined to salvation persons equal in number to the fallen angels, thus ensuring that 
the inhabitants of the heavenly city would be at least as great as in the beginning.”73  
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Through his arguments with the Pelagians, Augustine became “the first great 
defender of the efficacy and particularism of God’s grace.”74 While he did not discuss the 
extent or scope of atonement at great length in his writings, he nearly formulated a 
doctrine of limited atonement some twelve hundred years before the Synod of Dort’s 
doctrinal statements on the matter. An example of Augustine’s thoughts regarding what 
he perceived to be the limited nature of God’s grace can be found in Chapter XI of On the 
Predestination of the Saints where he writes:  
‘Many hear the word of truth; but some believe, while others contradict. 
Therefore, the former will to believe; the latter do not will.’ Who does not 
know this? Who can deny this? But since in some the will is prepared by 
the Lord, in others it is not prepared, we must assuredly be able to 
distinguish what comes from God’s mercy, and what from His judgment . 
. . Here is mercy and judgment—mercy towards the election which has 
obtained the righteousness of God, but judgment to the rest which have 
been blinded. And yet the former, because they willed, believed; the latter, 
because they did not will believed not. Therefore mercy and judgment 
were manifested in the very wills themselves. Certainly such an election is 
of grace, not at all of merits.75  
 
Another example can found in Chapter XVI of On the Predestination of the Saints where 
Augustine writes, “Faith, then, as well in its beginning as in its completion, is God’s gift; 
and let no one have any doubt whatever, unless he desires to resist the plainest sacred 
writings, that this gift is given to some, while to some it is not given.”76 In other words, 
while God is generously predisposed towards all people, an efficient form of grace (i.e., 
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one that enables people to adhere to God’s desires) is only given to those whom God has 
predeterminately selected. This is what is meant by the efficacy of God’s grace.  
 
Anselm’s Commercial or “Merit” Theory of Atonement 
Despite the great variety of Christian positions on the matter, there existed no 
systematic account of atonement, limited or unlimited, until Anselm of Canterbury 
(1034-1109) wrote Cur Deus Homo (1097-98). Anselm based his thinking in Cur Deus 
Homo (Why God-Man) upon a commonly accepted medieval system of penance in which 
sin is equated with a debt and recompense is required. He postulated that through the 
disobedience of Adam, God’s honor was offended. “Through disobedience persons rob 
God of his [sic] honor and violate the integrity of his kingdom.”77 In particular, Anselm 
argued that Adam sinned by failing to render unto God complete obedience. This offense 
required that some sort of satisfaction be given, but, as the offense was considered 
infinite in nature, no human being could provide adequate reparation. Thus God provided 
Jesus Christ, considered by the Christian church to be both divine and human (i.e., the 
God-man), whose death on the cross thereby effectively redeemed God’s honor. “By the 
incarnation, Jesus Christ, fully God and fully man, and only he, could make the needed 
satisfaction and enable God to forgive man without doing violence to the moral balance 
of the universe.”78 This work by Anselm was the first systematic effort to delineate the 
necessity of both the incarnation and Christ’s crucifixion, and its central theory became 
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known as the Satisfaction Theory of Atonement, one of the most commonly referenced 
ways of understanding the mediated saving work of Christ. 
However, in recent years some scholars have begun to suggest that within Cur 
Deus Homo there are two ways of interpreting the mediated saving work of Christ. 
Theologian Richard Cross posits that Anselm “develops a two-pronged approach to his 
analysis of the redemptive value of Christ’s death [i.e., atonement].”79 Cross 
acknowledges that the first half of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo clearly explicates the 
dominant and more famous side of the theory, the Satisfaction Theory. But he goes on to 
argue that the second half of Anselm’s work develops a lesser, yet independent side of 
the theory, which he labels the merit theory of atonement. 
According to the merit theory, Christ’s death merits certain rewards for human 
beings. “On this scheme, Christ’s death is a supererogatorily good act [i.e., exceeding 
what is needed] that merits a reward from God. The reward is whatever Christ asks for . . 
. [and] Christ asks that God forgive the sins of those who repent and apologize to God.”80 
I contend that this is, in effect, a transference of Christ’s merits, or meritorious reward, 
from Christ to the lot of depraved sinners. Richard Swinburne also comments on this 
theory when he suggests that “works of supererogation give to the agent [in this case 
Jesus the Christ] ‘merit.’ In other words, the supererogatory agent stacks us merit for 
himself.”81 Christ’s supererogatory good act accrued ample merit to compensate for 
humanity’s debt, which was then credited to humanity’s bill.  
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Both Swinburne and Cross suggest that God indirectly places Godself under an 
obligation to reward highly meritorious actions. “According to Swinburne, 
supererogatory actions place their recipient under an obligation to gratitude; and 
supererogatory actions of sufficient magnitude place their recipient under an obligation to 
more than merely gratitude (64-66). Both of these sorts of supererogatory action are 
labeled by Swinburne ‘meritorious’ (70). Christ’s death thus seems to place God under an 
obligation to reward it in some way. Of course, the nature of this reward is appropriately 
determined by God.”82 Ultimately this dynamic is, according to Anselm, exactly what 
happens in the case of Christ’s sacrificial death. “It is necessary that the Father should 
compensate the Son . . . On whom is it more appropriate for [Christ] to bestow the reward 
and recompense for his death than those who salvation . . . he has made himself a man, 




Peter Lombard’s (1095-1160) influence upon the articulation of a doctrine of 
limited atonement in the Canons of Dort, while small when compared with that of 
Augustine, is vital nonetheless. Unfortunately, Western scholars often miss Lombard’s 
important role because few of his writings have been translated into English.84 This 
oversight is especially disappointing given that Lombard “had a major intellectual 
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influence from the thirteenth to the sixteenth century.”85 His best-known work Libri 
Quattuor Sententiarum (more commonly known as the Sentences or the Book of 
Sentences) became the standard compendium of theology for students and teachers until 
Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae supplanted it during the Reformation. While 
Lombard’s Sentences was not an especially original work, it was the most systematic and 
complete summary of Catholic theology in its day. In fact, except for the Bible itself, 
more commentaries have been written on the Sentences than on any other Christian 
religious text. The list of theological luminaries who read and wrote about the Sentences 
includes Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, William of Ockham, and Martin Luther.  
Lombard’s effect on the Canons’ declaration of the atonement’s limitation in 
scope is important to recount, as he was the first theologian to draw a stark distinction 
between the sufficiency and efficacy of Christ’s death. The common understanding today 
is that while Christ’s death and atonement on the cross were sufficient to redeem 
effectively the sin of all humanity, in accordance with God’s will, Christ’s atonement 
was only efficacious in the salvation of some individuals. In many ways the articulation 
of this distinction laid the foundation for a more concrete doctrine of limited atonement, 
which states that salvation is only for a limited number of people. Augustine, from whom 
Lombard drew deeply for the Sentences, never quite arrived at a fully articulated doctrine 
on limited atonement, as seen when he writes: 
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Listen: “Jesus answered them, I tell you, and ye believe not: the works that 
I do in my Father’s name, they bear witness of me: but ye believe not; 
because ye are not of my sheep.” Ye have already learned above who the 
sheep are: be ye sheep. They are sheep through believing, sheep in 
following the Shepherd, sheep in not despising their Redeemer, sheep in 
entering by the door, sheep in the enjoyment of eternal life. What did He 
mean, then, in saying to them, “Ye are not of my sheep?” That he saw 
them predestined to everlasting destruction, not won to eternal life by the 
price of His own blood.86  
 
According to Augustine, only some people are to be considered the followers of Christ. 
The atoning actions of his sacrifice were meant specifically for them, and these chosen 
individuals will receive eternal salvation. But other individuals are not to be considered 
Christ’s followers, and because of God’s predeterminative limited election, they remain 
confined to perdition. 
Lombard was the first theologian to put the matter so clearly and bluntly. In the 
Sentences, Lombard proclaims: 
Christus ergo est sacerdos, idemque et hostia pretium nostrae 
reconciliationis; qui se in ara curcis non diablo, sed Trinitati obtulit pro 
omnibus, quantum ad pretii sufficientiam; sed pro electis tantum quantum 
ad efficaciam, quia praedestinatis tantum salutem effecit.87 
 
This observation “remained the fundamental distinction on the question of the death of 
Christ throughout the Middle Ages and into the Reformation period . . . and this 
distinction made between the sufficiency of the sacrifice made for all and the efficacy of 
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the sacrifice made for the elect remained a touchstone for the Reformed debate on this 
question and took on great significance at the Synod of Dort.”88 While the matter is 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, an example of the influence of Lombard’s 
distinction can be seen in the second article of the Remonstrantia, the controversial 
statement in 1610 that precipitated the convening of the Synod of Dort. The second 
article seems to be a direct, contradictory reply to Lombard’s position regarding efficacy 
and sufficiency: “The redemptive price paid by Christ is not only sufficient to redeem all 
of mankind, but is also by the decree and will of God paid for all, so that God can and 
will enter into a new covenant with sinners.”89 The Canons’ statement on limited 
atonement serves as a response to this declaration.90 
 
Theodore Beza’s Writings on Predestination, Election, and Specific Atonement 
Theodore Beza (1519-1605) “occupied a critical position among those who 
formulated the theory of the atonement before the Synod of Dort.”91 When it comes to 
evaluating the breadth and depth of his influence, however, scholars disagree. Some have 
pointed to Beza as the primary source for the development of a doctrine of limited 
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atonement in Reformed theology.92 Others, including myself, think that this statement 
goes too far.93 “Stated simply, a definite [i.e., limited] atonement is not strictly related to 
supralapsarianism, nor was it introduced to Reformed theology by Theodore Beza. A 
definite atonement was intertwined with predestination for over seven hundred years 
prior to Westminster or the existence of Theodore Beza. To argue that Beza’s 
supralapsarianism introduced the ‘post-Reformation doctrine of limited atonement’ 
ignores the historical facts to the contrary.”94 Early evidence demonstrates that it was not 
Beza alone who definitively shaped the Reformed or post-Reformed position on limited 
atonement. The seventeenth-century writings of William Twisse argue that “the doctrine 
of absolute reprobation did not find its origin in Beza; rather it had roots in medieval 
theology.”95 Although Beza did not introduce the doctrine of limited atonement found in 
the Canons, it is useful to examine the important role his thoughts and writings did play 
in the Canons’ formation of such a doctrine. His writings on predestination, election, and 
specific or limited atonement, along with John Calvin’s, were regularly consulted and 
referenced by many key figures at Dort. 
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As early as 1575, Beza had clearly expressed a strong belief in the limited extent of 
the atonement. In his work A Briefe Declaration of the Chiefe Poyntes of Christian 
Religion Set Forth in a Table, he wrote: 
Forasmuch therefore as he is merciful, and yet could not forget his justice, 
before all other things it was necessarie [sic] that a mediator should be 
appointed: by whom man might be perfectly restored and that this should 
be done by ye free mercy of grace which doth appear in ye free salvation 
of his elect… and finally with one only offering and sacrifice of himself 
should sanctifie [sic] all the elect . . . 96 
 
Beza expanded on the notion that only the elect benefited by the atonement in his 
work Ad Acta Colloquii Montisbelgardensis Tubingae Edita, Theodori Bezae Repsonsio, in 
which he wrote “propitiationis beneficium necessario ad solos electos, et, quia electi sunt, 
credentes pertinere. [The benefit of the atonement properly belongs to the elect alone.]”97 
One of Beza’s clearest expressions supporting his belief that limited atonement is limited in 
scope appears in what is arguably his most famous work, Quastionum et responsionum 
Christianarum libellus (more commonly known as Questions and Responses). Here, in 
response to a request to describe predestination, Beza writes: 
Common belief is that predestination is seen chiefly in the governing of 
human kind. Therefore, we will describe it this way: we say that it is the 
eternal and immutable decree of God, going in order before all the causes 
of salvation and damnation, whereby God has determined to be glorified 
in some by saving them in Christ by mere grace, but in others by damning 
them by His rightful judgement [sic] in Adam and in themselves. From the 
use of Scripture we call the former vessels of glory, and elect, that is 
predestined to salvation from eternity through mercy; the latter are called 
reprobates and vessels of wrath, that is, those who are predestined likewise 
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to rightful damnation from eternity (both of which God knew individually 
from eternity).98  
 
In response to the following question, Beza continued his explanation of God having set 
forth two very different ends for humankind, by writing: 
Then I say, that as often as the Scriptures make mention of the 
predestination of the elect—so often is the predestination of the reprobate 
confirmed, when the matter itself requires that, whereas some are elected 
to life, the rest must be understood to be predestined to death. 
Furthermore, if the vessels of glory are said to be predestined to glory, the 
opposition of contradictions wholly requires, that we should consider the 
vessels of wrath as predestined to death.99  
 
Beza went so far as to suggest that Peter Lombard’s distinction between the 
sufficiency of Christ’s death and the efficacy of Christ’s death only confused the matter 
when it came to understanding exactly for whom the atonement was meant. Beza argued 
that it was important to establish that Christ’s death was in no way intended for the 
salvation of all of humanity but rather affected only the salvation of those already elected 
by God. It should be noted, however, that “Beza’s strict formulation, rejecting the 
traditional distinction between sufficiency and efficacy, was not accepted by the majority 
of the Reformed theologians.”100 Even so, Beza’s influence on the spirit of early 
seventeenth-century Reformed thought and the discussions held at the Synod of Dort, is 
undeniable.  
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Jacob Arminius (1560-1609), the father of the controversial Remonstrant position, 
often mistakenly grouped together Calvin and Beza’s positions on predestination. In a 
debate on predestination with his colleague from the University of Leiden, Franciscus 
Gomarus (1563-1641), Arminius rejected the thinking of Reformed theologians such as 
Calvin, Beza, and William Perkins, because Arminius believed their position on 
predestination made God the architect of the fall. While it was well known at the time 
that supralapsarians did not regard God as the author of sin, Arminius nevertheless wrote, 
“according to the opinion of Calvin and Beza God is made to be necessarily the author of 
sin.”101 When Arminius started preaching in Amsterdam in 1588, he took explicit 
exception to Beza’s characterizations of God as predestining some to salvation and 
reprobating some to damnation prior to creation. Instead, Arminius was eager to maintain 
that salvation and damnation occur after the mediation of Christ (i.e., the atonement), as 
the inevitable consequences of faith in or rejection of God. 
In summary, this much can definitively be said about Theodore Beza’s opinion as 
to the extent of the atonement: Beza maintained throughout his writings that “God 
predetermines all events and all human destines by his eternal will, his decree”102 and as 
such God has decreed that the “benefit of the atonement properly belongs to the elect 
alone.”103  
 
Contextual Rationale for the Development of the Doctrine of Limited Atonement 
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Leiden, the second largest city in the province of Holland as of the mid-1500s, 
largely adopted Protestantism in 1572, when the city’s residents joined the Revolt against 
Habsburg Spain. The Dutch Reformation was not a national event during which the entire 
republic formally converted from Roman Catholicism to Reformed Protestantism. Rather, 
it was a highly local affair in which religious reform was introduced into Dutch towns 
one at a time. “Local circumstances were in fact of paramount importance to the success 
or failure of the establishment of a Calvinist Reformation in the Dutch provinces freed 
from Spanish rule. Precisely because power was so decentralized in Holland, Calvinist 
leaders were confronted in each locality by entrenched political structures and cultures 
that did not automatically accommodate themselves to this new and unfamiliar 
organization, the Reformed Church.”104 Logically, then, as Reformed influence spread, it 
did not become a mandated confessional position. In fact, it functioned much more as one 
among many confession statements.105 
As the young Dutch Reformed Church struggled to define itself in the late 
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, it faced a climate in which many theological 
viewpoints were being taught and preached. This diversity of positions contributed to 
growing discord within the Dutch Reformed Church and even fueled the increasing 
possibility of civil war within the Unified Dutch Provinces. After the political fighting 
had ended in the Protestant North now known as the United Netherlands, “a momentous 
struggle over doctrine broke out within the Dutch Reformed Church.”106  
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The initial theological disagreement between supralapsarians and infralapsarians 
focused on predestination, with the central question of whether God’s determination of 
who would be saved and who would be damned was a reaction to the fall or a precedent 
to the fall. However, some people protested against both of these views. Those protestors, 
who would be known as both the Remonstrants (i.e., those who vigorously object or 
oppose a position) and the Arminians, took the lead of Jacob Arminius, who had been a 
student of Theodore Beza and later became a pastor of a Reformed church and a 
professor of theology at the University of Leiden.  
Before examining Arminius’s theological positions in greater detail, it is helpful 
to understand why the existence of diverse doctrinal views in the United Netherlands was 
such a concern. The early Reformed church viewed itself as a confessional church, and it 
was precisely during Arminius’s lifetime that “the doctrinal statements of the 
Reformation were being codified and systematized. This systematization left increasingly 
less space for divergent doctrinal positions. Moreover, during this time in Holland both 
the Belgic Confession [1561] and the Heidelberg Confession [1563] had been adopted as 
the doctrinal guidelines for the churches in Holland, which left less room for doctrinal 
diversity.”107 It should be noted that while the writings of Luther were initially well 
received in the Netherlands, by the end of the sixteenth century Calvinism was quickly 
replacing Lutheran views. In particular, the Calvinists worked for “the maintenance of 
particular confessional standards. Following in the tradition of Erasmus of Rotterdam, 
however, Arminius championed the idea of the liberty of individual conscience relative to 
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doctrinal standards.”108 This entire matter of the doctrinal and confessional authority of 
the Reformed church substantially animated the ensuing struggle between the 
Remonstrants and the Calvinists to the degree that the “more liberal Arminians [the 
Remonstrants] were regarded as of dubious loyalty to both Church and State.”109 In part, 
this skepticism was due to political reasons, as the Dutch Calvinist Reformers were 
nationalists attempting to use doctrinal hegemony to further unify the United 
Netherlands.  
 
Jacob Arminius. During the 1590s, Arminius’s sermons and teachings raised the 
ire of the strict Calvinists in the Leiden area when he began expressing rather unorthodox 
opinions regarding the extent of God’s grace. Contrary to the generally accepted 
orthodoxy of the day, Arminius placed much greater emphasis upon the role and place of 
human freedom in the acquisition of faith than did Calvinists. He began to teach a 
doctrine of salvation predicated upon cooperation between the human will and God, 
rather than one exclusively due to the sovereignty of God. Furthermore, Arminius did not 
agree with the typical Reformed interpretation of Romans Chapter 9, which suggests that 
God elected and reprobated individual people. Arminius taught that the passage suggests 
that types of people, instead of specific individuals, would or would not achieve 
salvation. Ultimately, he believed that the atonement of Christ was universal and 
occurred prior to election and reprobation. Arminius maintained that God desires to save 
all people and does in fact offer salvation to all people. However, human free will often 
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gets in the way of God’s desire and thus God does not always achieve God’s purpose. 
Because of human free will, some people are saved while others are not. Of course, this 
stance directly contradicts the Augustinian/Calvinist position that God does not actually 
intend to save all people. 
In summary, Arminius reversed the traditional ordering of the decrees of election 
and atonement, saying that Christ’s atonement, preceding election, was sufficient for the 
salvation of all people and that the subsequent decree of election was intended for those 
people who repented and believed. Thus, the Remonstrant position has become known as 
Arminianism. To elaborate further, the Arminian position can be understood as follows: 
Election is the conditional choice of God based upon foreknowledge of who will believe. 
Thus, election is the result of humanity’s faith rather than its cause. While 
acknowledging the depravity of the human condition, this position assumes a view that is 
contrary to traditional Calvinist thought in its emphasis on the free will and responsibility 
of humanity to choose between good and evil. This view deemphasizes the sovereignty of 
God by making God’s choice of the elect contingent upon their faith alone. Additionally, 
this position allows humanity the ability to resist God’s grace. In light of these 
theological positions, Franciscus Gomarus accused Arminius of “deviation from the 
confessional standards of the Reformed church—the Belgic Confession (1561) and the 
Heidelberg Catechism (1563).”110  
  As a memorial to Arminius’s work, one year after his death, court preacher Janus 
Utyenbogaert directed forty-six Arminian ministers to sign the Remonstrantia: 
“remonstrating five offensive doctrinal points of the Calvinistic opposition and framing 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
110 Williams, “The Five Points of Arminianism,” 17. 
156 
five positive doctrinal points of their own.”111 This memorial or statement of opposition 
was sent to John van Olden Barneveldt, the advocate-general of Holland and Friesland, in 
the hopes that the group’s divergent opinions would be tolerated if not accepted by the 
leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church in Holland. However, those hopes were quickly 
dashed.  
Before examining the reaction of the more orthodox members of the Dutch 
Reformed Church, it would be useful to consider the five positive doctrinal statements 
put forth by the Remonstrants. In 1610, the Arminians presented to the Church of 
Holland for acceptance these articles: 
Article 1. Conditional Election: This article affirms election but considers this election to 
be conditional upon the faith of the believer. The election of certain believers to salvation 
before creation was based on God’s foreknowledge of who would freely choose to have 
faith. In other words, faith is not something given by God but rather results from 
humanity’s free will working in cooperation with the Spirit. “That God, by an eternal, 
unchangeable purpose in Jesus Christ his Son, before the foundation of the world, hath 
determined, out of the fallen, sinful race of men, to save in Christ, those who, through the 
grace of the Holy Spirit, shall believe on this his Son Jesus, and shall persevere in this 
faith, through this grace, even to the end.”112 In other words, the decree of salvation is 
meant for all who believe, have faith in Christ, and persevere in faith. 
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Article 2. Universal Redemption or General Atonement: This article affirms that Christ’s 
death made it possible for all people to be saved, not just particular people. However, not 
all people are actually saved. The acceptance of Christ’s redemption is what makes it 
efficacious. In other words, Christ’s death enabled God to enter into a new covenant with 
anyone who would believe. “That, agreeably, thereto, Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the 
world, died for all men and for every man, so that he has obtained for them all, by his 
death on the cross, redemption and the forgiveness of sins; yet that no one actually enjoys 
this forgiveness of sins except the believer.”113 This statement implies a universal 
redemption or a general atonement.  
Article 3. Total Depravity / Prevenient Grace: This article affirms that humanity has been 
affected by the fall from God’s grace but that it has not become entirely enslaved to a 
corrupt nature. The article intimates that God graciously allows and enables each person 
to employ his or her own free will, with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, to choose good 
over evil in spiritual matters. Thus faith is humanity’s contribution or act toward 
salvation. It is “needful that he be born again of God in Christ, through his Holy Spirit, 
and renewed in understanding, inclination, or will, and all his powers, in order that he 
may rightly understand, think, will, and effect what is truly good.”114 
Article 4. Resistible Grace: This article makes it clear that God’s grace is not irresistible. 
Free will allows humanity to choose to accept or reject the call of the gospel. The article 
takes the position that God does everything possible to bring a person to salvation but 
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that the Holy Spirit cannot renew or regenerate a person’s corrupted nature until that 
person chooses to believe. A person’s faith therefore makes the application of Christ’s 
saving work possible (i.e., the efficacy of Christ’s atonement is contingent upon human 
choice). Of course, this view also implies that a person can choose not to respond to 
God’s offer of grace, thereby inhibiting salvation. “But as respects the mode of the 
operation of this grace, it is not irresistible, inasmuch as it is written concerning many, 
that they have resisted the Holy Ghost.”115  
Article 5. Conditional Perseverance: This article leaves open the possibility that although 
a person may believe and have faith, thus achieving salvation, it is still possible for the 
believer to fail in maintaining faith and ultimately lose his or her salvation. Like election, 
perseverance in faith is conditional upon the efforts of believers. Whether “they are 
capable, through negligence, of forsaking again the first beginnings of their life in Christ, 
of again returning to this present evil world, or turning away from the holy doctrine 
which was delivered them, of losing good conscience, of becoming devoid of grace, that 
must be more particularly determined out of the Holy Scripture, before we can teach it 
with the full permission of our minds.”116  
 
The Reaction. In March of 1611, “a group of Calvinistic ministers, led by Festus 
Hommius, followed suit by preparing their own memorial, the so-called Contra-
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refuted each of the five positions outlined by the Remonstrants, but of most interest to 
this study was their statement regarding the extent of the atonement. They held that God 
delivered Christ to the cross “in order to save his elect, so that although the suffering of 
Christ . . . is sufficient unto the atonement of the sins of all men, nevertheless the same, 
according to the counsel and decree of God, has its efficacy unto reconciliation and 
forgiveness of sins only in the elect and true believer.”118 In other words, the suffering 
and death of Christ is sufficient for the atonement of all but is only efficacious unto God’s 
elect. This outlook echoed dramatically Peter Lombard’s seminal distinction. 
 Initially, the States of Holland declared that the Remonstrants “should not be 
subject to censure because of their opinions.”119 Tensions between the Contra-
Remonstrants and the Remonstrants continued, however, and Prince Maurice, the 
military leader of the young republic who sought to gain absolute monarchial control 
over the Netherlands, fueled the tension between the two camps to further his cause. He 
became a strong ally of the Contra-Remonstrants and ordered the imprisonment and 
beheading of Barneveldt, the principal lay leader of the Remonstrants, who favored a 
republican confederacy. According to Stephen Strehle, “Maurice’s rationalization was 
that the Remonstrants presented a threat of civil war and a synod was needed to preserve 
unity.”120 These actions prepared “the way for the formulation of the States-General, who 
should answer to his bidding, and by which this famous synod was convoked and all its 
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proceedings ratified.’”121 In other words, the Synod of Dort was convened in an effort to 
prevent civil war by ending the discord in the Reformed Church caused by the conflict 
among the Contra-Remonstrants, the Remonstrants, and other outlier groups.  
The particular teaching that most disturbed the conveners of the synod was the 
notion that humanity was not completely spiritually helpless. The Remonstrant position 
implied that each person possesses free will that he or she can then use to positively or 
negatively affect his or her eternal destiny by choosing either good or evil in spiritual 
matters. According to the Remonstrants, humanity is not enslaved by a sinful nature, and 
people can affect their own salvation. Contra-Remonstrants believed that this teaching 
failed to recognize the full sovereignty of God, especially when it came to the matter of 
salvation from sin. For many, it also echoed of Pelagianism, which had previously 
threatened the church’s unity. They feared, pragmatically, that if Remonstrant teachings 
were widely adopted, the young Dutch church would fracture and become isolated from 
the rest of the Reformed Church.  
In reaction to the Arminian articles of 1610, and in an effort to retain the unity of 
the young Dutch Reformed Church, eighty-six delegates from Reformed churches from 
across Europe met from November 13, 1618, until May 29, 1619, to respond formally to 
the Arminian Remonstrance. That the Synod of Dort eventually condemned Arminianism 
was no surprise. In fact, the “outcome of the Synod was never really in doubt; it affirmed 
the Calvinist character and doctrine of the Dutch Reformed Church and rejected Arminian 





doctrinal conference in which equals could air their theological views, but rather an 
ecclesiastical decision-making assembly, and the judicial and doctrinal machinery of the 
synod were controlled by the Calvinists.”123 
 
Limited Atonement According to the Canons of Dort  
The Canons of Dort offered an ecclesiastical declaration on the workings of 
salvation, specifically the limited extent or scope of God’s ontologically transformative 
response to the human condition. In time, this declaration assumed the form of orthodox 
doctrine. The “main focus of the Canons of Dort is the affirmation that salvation is 
wholly by divine grace rather than by human merit.”124 The relationship between God 
and humanity can be restored, but it is God who makes it happen. Humanity is certainly 
responsible but is meant to receive salvation, not affect it. The Canons make it clear that 
the process of reconciliation is solely the purview and work of God and that it is 
accomplished through the mediator Jesus the Christ. 
The Canons of Dort systematically articulated the five basic principles of 
Calvinist orthodoxy, and these principles “were reaffirmed by the Synod of Dort in 1619 
as the doctrine of salvation contained in the Holy Scriptures.”125 These five points, 
formulated as responses to the five controversial heads of doctrine submitted by the 
Arminians, address the matters of Total Depravity, Unconditional Election, Limited 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
122 Kooi, Liberty and Religion, 155. 
 
123 Williams, “The Five Points of Arminianism,” 35. 
 
124 Hoekema, “The Missionary Focus of the Canons of Dort,” Calvin Theological Journal 7, no. 2 (1972) 
209-10. 
 
125 House, Charts of Christian Theology and Doctrine, 100. 
162 
Atonement, Irresistible Grace, and Perseverance of the Saints. Each position will be 
explored in greater detail, but it is helpful to begin with basic definitions:  
(1) Total Depravity means that humans are entirely corrupted by sin and are 
thought to exist in a state of complete defilement or depravity, such that salvation 
from this state is possible only through a gift of God’s grace.  
(2) Unconditional Election is the idea that the determination of who will be saved 
rests entirely with the sovereign will of God, such that election is not determined 
or conditioned by any quality or act on the part of humanity.  
(3) Limited Atonement states that Christ’s atoning work, while sufficient to cause 
the salvation of all humans, was predeterminatively meant for only a limited 
number of people and that only the elect actually secure eternal salvation. 
(4) Irresistible Grace is the internal call of the Holy Spirit to God’s chosen people 
that cannot be rejected; therefore, the elect are irresistibly drawn to Christ.  
(5) Perseverance of the Saints means that individuals chosen by God for salvation 
are granted the power to maintain their faith until final ontological transformation 
occurs.  
As indicated throughout this chapter, I am most interested in the third matter of 
Limited Atonement. To provide necessary context, I have described each of the six 
significant matters upon which the canons commented, since these will be used during 
the comparative analysis in Chapter Five. While the Canons are structured in a systematic 
manner, the central ideas discussed in the comparative analysis are somewhat scattered 
throughout the text of the Canons. Thus the descriptions of the six principal points of 
comparison highlight key passages found throughout the Canons. The aforementioned 
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theological and political influences are often overtly present in the language of the 
Canons, but they are just as frequently implicit in the thoughts behind the text. It is safe 
to say that the Canons, in their final form, would not have been possible without all of the 
previously mentioned historical developments. 
 
The Human Condition (Total Depravity) 
The Canons clearly state the Dutch Reformed Church’s ultimate view of the 
nature of the human condition. This view can especially be found in the Third and Fourth 
Heads of Doctrine. Before outlining what these heads of doctrine posit regarding the 
nature of the human condition, an important first step is to explain why the Third and 
Fourth heads of doctrine were combined within the Canons. “It will be recalled that the 
Synod was called together to answer the Remonstrants, particularly to draw up a reply to 
the so-called Five Arminian Articles of 1610 . . . When the Synod studied the Third 
Arminian Article, however, it could not find anything wrong with it as such. The Synod 
therefore decided not to write a separate chapter against the Third Article, but to look at 
the Third Article in the light of what the Remonstrants said in their Fourth Article.”126 
Specifically, the Synod could find no fault with the position in Article Three of the 
Remonstrance that humanity does not have within itself either the necessary saving grace 
or the necessary energy to think or to act in ways that are truly good. Thus, the Canons 
maintained the five-point structure of the Remonstrant position, and today people still 
speak of the five articles of Dort.  
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Article One of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine begins by stating that 
humanity was created in the image of God and that all of humanity’s dispositions, 
attributes, propensities, and aspects upon creation (i.e., every aspect of its being) were 
entirely holy and filled with purity. 
In the beginning man was created in the image of God, adorned in his 
mind with true and wholesome knowledge of his Creator and of spiritual 
things, in his will and heart with righteousness, and in his affections with 
purity, so that he was completely holy.127 
 
This statement reflects an Augustinian understanding of the original righteousness of 
God’s creation of humanity. As discussed earlier, Augustine maintained that 
righteousness was a part of the original nature of humanity and that holiness, purity, and 
righteousness were intrinsic qualities of the original human condition. Thus humanity’s 
disposition was first oriented toward the fulfillment of a good and pure life. However, in 
Article One, the Canons describe how humanity’s relationship with God becomes broken, 
so that all of humanity’s dispositions, attributes, propensities, and aspects (i.e., affections) 
become filled with impurity. 
But, revolting from God through the instigation of the devil and through 
his own free will, he deprived himself of these excellent gifts, and instead 
brought upon himself blindness, horrible darkness, vanity, and 
perverseness of judgment in his mind; malice, rebelliousness, and 
stubbornness in his will and heart; and impurity in all his affections.128 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
127 Hoekema, “A New English Translation of the Canons of Dort,” 147. An older translation reads: “Man 
was originally formed after the image of God. His understanding was adorned with a true and saving 
knowledge of his Creator, and of spiritual things; his heart and will were upright, all his affections pure, 
and the whole Man was holy” (The Canons of the Synod of Dort, in The Creeds of Christendom, vol. 3, ed. 
Philip Schaff, 4th ed. [New York: Harper and Brothers, 1919], 587).  
 
128 Hoekema, “A New English Translation of the Canons of Dort,” 147. 
165 
This sense of the human condition as being impure continues throughout Article Two of 
the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine, where humanity is described as being corrupt 
and as having a depraved nature. “Since he was corrupt, he brought forth corrupt 
children. This corruption, therefore, has been derived from Adam by all his 
descendants.”129 The description of corruption being passed along to all descendants of 
Adam is closely aligned to the aforementioned trajectory of Augustinian thought 
regarding human nature and sin.  
 Finally, Article Three expresses that all people are “conceived in sin,” “born as 
children of wrath,” “inclined to evil,” and possessing a “depraved nature.”130 Article 
Sixteen confirms this view by stating that sin, “which has pervaded the whole human 
race, did not deprive man of his human nature, but corrupted it and brought into it 
spiritual death.”131 Humanity is totally and entirely depraved because sin has filled every 
corner of its being. In other words, “the effect of the fall upon man [sic] is that sin has 
extended to every part of his personality—his thinking, his emotions, and his will.”132  
 
Depravity is Due to an “Original” Conditioning Action (Original Sin) 
 The Canons make a point of relating how this human state of defilement and 
depravity is due to an “original” conditioning action. In other words, the entire human 
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grace, or the “original sin.” Article One of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine within 
the Canons describes how Adam’s revolt against God (through the instigation of the 
devil) of his own free will deprives him of God’s pure and holy affections. Adam’s 
rejection of God caused his human nature to be corrupted, thereby bringing forth Adam’s 
spiritual death. Article Two of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine relates how Adam 
came to pass his depraved nature along to his descendents. 
Such was man after the fall, such children he also brought forth. Since he 
was corrupt, he brought forth corrupt children. This corruption, therefore 
has been derived from Adam by all his descendents, Christ alone 
excepted, not by imitation, as the Pelagians formerly maintained, but by 
the propagation of a depraved nature, according to God’s righteous 
judgment.133  
 
This statement reaffirms clearly the Calvinist position on original sin. Calvin maintained 
that every human is related to the fallen Adam and that a biological solidarity exists 
between Adam and all of his descendents. Calvin built upon Augustine’s teachings that 
one receives one’s physical nature and soul from one’s parents in a germinal sense, so it 
stands to reason that Adam’s corrupt and depraved nature could not help but be passed 
along from generation to generation. The Canons’ First Head of Doctrine opens with 
language reflecting this belief: “Since all men have sinned in Adam and deserve the curse 
and eternal death . . . ”134 In other words, hereditary depravity is imputed to all of 
humanity.  
 
The Futility of Human Effort to Change the Human Condition 
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 The Second Article of the Second Head of Doctrine provides the first indication 
in the Canons of the futility of any human effort to affect the redemption of humanity and 
its subsequent salvation. While the First Article underscores the notion that because God 
is just, sin requires either punishment or satisfaction, Article Two states that since “we 
ourselves cannot make this satisfaction and cannot deliver ourselves from the wrath of 
God,”135 then God must make the necessary satisfaction on our behalf. God sacrificing 
Jesus to crucifixion accomplishes this satisfaction. 
Article Three of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine also addresses 
humanity’s complete inability to change or transform its defiled condition back into one 
of righteousness before God. Humanity is unwilling and unable to transform its corrupt 
nature as a result of sin, and that it is held completely in the bondage of evil. Rather than 
having the free will to choose good over evil, the sinner has a total inability to affect his 
or her own salvation. Thus, humans are left in a state of total corruption, depravity, and 
helplessness. 
All men therefore are conceived in sin and born as children of wrath, 
incapable of any saving good, inclined to evil, dead in sins, and slaves of 
sins. Apart from the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit; moreover, they 
are neither willing nor able to return to God, to reform their depraved 
nature, or to prepare themselves for its reformation.136 
 
Article Five of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine elaborates on this 
complete inability of humanity to affect its own ontological transformation by exploring 
the Synod’s sense of the failings of the Law of Moses. 
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What has been said about the light of nature must also be said about the 
decalogue, given by God through Moses particularly to the Jews. For 
though it reveals the greatness of sin, and more and more convinces man 
of his guilt, yet it neither points out a remedy nor gives him power to free 
himself from this misery. Rather, having weakened through the flesh, it 
leaves the transgressor under the curse. Man cannot, therefore, through 
the law obtain saving grace.137 
 
Humanity’s weakness is not simply confined to the moments before saving grace is 
obtained. The authors of the Canons did not assume that salvation is a one-time 
occurrence; they took a theological stance that salvation is a process rather than an event. 
They believed that when grace is granted, sinners are initially freed from sin but that 
perseverance is required for the sinner to reach the ultimate goal of perfection in 
salvation. Once again, humanity is described as too weak to accomplish this on its own, 
requiring God’s continual graceful presence in the human life.  
Furthering this notion about the helplessness of man, Article Three of the Fifth 
Head of Doctrine states, “Because of these remains of indwelling sin and also because of 
the temptations of the world and of Satan, those who have been converted would not be 
able to remain stedfast [sic] in that race if they were left to their own resources.” Self-
directed human efforts to obtain salvation and self-directed attempts to remain in God’s 
grace are doomed to fail.  
 
Transformative Response Originating “Outside” (Predetermined Election and Grace) 
Consistent with prior Calvinist positions regarding God’s grace, the Canons 
articulate that despite the depravity of the human condition, and humanity’s inability to 
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change this predicament from sinfulness to righteousness, God can and does affect the 
necessary transformation or regeneration in order to rescue humanity from darkness (i.e., 
salvation). No human action or effort of any sort is involved. The saving grace of God is 
obtained by the efforts of God alone. Transformative response comes from “outside” or 
beyond human efforts.  
This thinking is first expressed in the Second Article of the First Head of Doctrine 
when the Canons allude to passages from the Christian New Testament relating to God’s 
gift of Jesus. “But in this the love of God was revealed, that He sent His only Son into the 
world, so that everyone who believes in Him should not be lost but have eternal life (I 
John 4:9, John 3:16).”138 Note that it is God’s action that results in the attainment of 
eternal life (i.e., ontological transformation). The manner of God’s actions from beyond 
human efforts is described in more detail in Article Seven of the First Head of Doctrine. 
From eternity He has also appointed Christ to be the Mediator and Head of 
all the elect and the foundation of their salvation. Therefore He decreed to 
give to Christ those who were to be saved, and effectually to call and draw 
them into His fellowship through His Word and Spirit. That is, He decreed 
to give them true faith in him, to justify them, to sanctify them, and, after 
having powerfully kept them in the fellowship of His Son, finally to 
glorify them, for the demonstration of his mercy and the praise of the 
riches of His glorious grace.139  
 
The transformative response to the human condition is further described in Article 
Eleven of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine, which relates how God “penetrates 
into the innermost recesses of man, opens the closed and softens the hard heart, 
circumcises that which was uncircumcised, and pours new qualities into the will. He 
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makes the will which was dead alive, which was bad good, which was unwilling willing, 
which was stubborn obedient, and moves and strengthens it so that, like a good tree, it 
may be able to produce the fruits of good works.”140 Article Twelve describes this 
regenerative act as being “clearly a supernatural, most powerful and at the same time 
most delightful, marvelous, secret, and inexpressible work,” which is not unlike the 
power expressed in the creation itself.141 In other words, the transformative and 
regenerative act is entirely divine in nature. Almost by way of summary, Article Sixteen 
describes this transformative response to the human condition as “the divine grace of 
regeneration.”142 Divine grace is bestowed, faith is implanted or infused into the human 
heart, and the individual who is called by God is said to repent and believe. One’s 
previously corrupted and spiritually dead human condition and will is now healed, 
corrected, and brought back to spiritual life. Reparation has occurred. Finally, Articles 
Fourteen and Fifteen go on to describe this transformative act by God as being a 
completely free yet undeserved gift due to the sinful state of humanity.  
 
The Transactional Quality of the Process of Ontological Transformation 
The common understanding of the atonement, seen through the lens of Anselm’s 
Satisfaction Theory, can be easily gleaned from Articles One and Two of the Second 
Head of Doctrine. Article One states that, because God is supremely just, satisfaction is 
required for the sins of humanity. Article Two goes on to describe how “we ourselves 
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cannot make this satisfaction and cannot deliver ourselves from the wrath of God . . . [so 
instead God] has given His only Son as our Surety, who so that He might make 
satisfaction for us.”143  
Within Article Eight of the Second Head of Doctrine lies a sense of a transference 
to the elect of that which is acquired from Christ—faith. “God further willed that Christ 
should give to those so chosen faith (which, together with other saving gifts of the Holy 
Spirit, He acquired for them by His death).”144 The Canons take the position that Christ 
actually acquired faith and other saving gifts of the Holy Spirit. In turn, God wills Christ 
to give these acquired things to the chosen few (i.e., the elect). This understanding of the 
transactional quality of ontological transformation, though easily overlooked when 
examining how atonement was thought to occur, is important in Chapter Five’s 
comparative analysis. 
 
The Scope of Response to the Human Condition (Limited atonement) 
 Given that the limited scope of the mediated saving work of Christ is a focal point 
of the Canons, they contain plenty of statements regarding the limitedness of the objects 
of atonement (i.e., the elect). For the purposes of this study, I describe only a few. 
The First Head of Doctrine deals with predestination and the scope of redemption. 
Article Seven states that God has, “according to the most free good pleasure of His will, 
out of mere grace, chosen in Christ to salvation a certain number of specific men.”145 In 
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his “New English Translation of the Canons of Dort,” Anthony Hoekema makes a point 
of noting that this is “a literal rendering of certam quorundam hominum multitudinem 
[and] apparently the Synod wished to take pains to indicate that God did not simply 
determine to save a certain number of men, but that He chose specific individuals.”146 On 
the whole, Article Seven (“Election Defined”) of the First Head of Doctrine is the most 
complete articulation of the limited scope of atonement that can be found in the Canons. 
In its entirety, it states: 
Election is the unchangeable purpose of God whereby, before the 
foundation of the world, out of the whole human race, which had fallen by 
its own fault out of its original integrity into sin and ruin, He has, 
according to the most free good pleasure of His will, out of mere grace, 
chosen in Christ to salvation a certain number of specific men, neither 
better nor more worthy than others, but with them involved in a common 
misery.147 
 
This thinking is elaborated upon in Article Eight (“The Efficacy of the Death of Christ”) 
of the Second Head of Doctrine: 
God willed that Christ through the blood of the cross (by which He 
confirmed the new covenant) should effectually redeem out of every 
people, tribe, nation, and tongue all those and only those who were from 
eternity chosen to salvation . . . 148!
 
This language of Christ’s blood is consistent with Augustine’s transactional ransom of 
Christ’s blood being paid to Satan. 
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 The Second Head of Doctrine also deals with the efficacy and scope of the death 
of Christ. In particular, Article Eight teaches that the “saving efficacy of the death of 
Christ extends only to the elect.”149 It states: 
For this was the most free counsel and most gracious will and intent of 
God the Father, that the life-giving and saving efficacy of the most 
precious death of His Son should extend to all the elect, to give to them 
alone justifying faith and through this faith to bring them unfailingly to 
salvation. That is, God willed that Christ through the blood of the cross 
(by which He confirmed the new covenant) should effectually redeem out 
of every people, tribe, nation, and tongue all those and only those who 
were from eternity chosen to salvation and were given to Him by the 
Father.150 
 
Finally, in Article Fifteen of the First Head of Doctrine we find language entirely 
consistent with Augustine’s infralapsarianism, as it describes the ultimate “destiny” of 
humanity. 
This eternal and undeserved grace of our election is especially illustrated 
and indicated for us by Holy Scripture when it declares that not all men 
are elect but that certain ones have not been elected, or have been passed 
by in the eternal election of God. These God out of His most free, most 
just, blameless, and unchangeable good pleasure has decreed to leave in 
the common misery into which they have by their own fault plunged 
themselves, and not to give them saving faith and the grace of 
conversion . . . God has decreed finally to condemn and punish eternally, 
not only on account of their unbelief but also on account of all their other 
sins, as a declaration of His justice.151  
 
This understanding of the limited scope of response to the human condition, along with 
the other theological positions described in this chapter, provide a necessary foundation 
for Chapter Five’s comparative analysis, to which we now turn. 
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Chapter Five: Critical Cross-Cultural Comparison 
 
When the lights are out, itʼs less dangerous. Here we are now, entertain us. I feel stupid 
and contagious. Here we are now, entertain us. – Kurt Cobain of Nirvana (1991)1 
 
La nuit tous les chats sont gris. – French proverb 
 
 
Smells Like Christianity 
In his seminal 1990 clarion call for the development and application of a new 
comparative methodology, Jonathan Z. Smith reminded scholars of the vital “third term” 
of the comparative endeavor.2 Evoking J. G. Frazer’s and Otto Pfleiderer’s respective 
comparisons of Christ (as represented by Paul in Romans 6) and the “dying and rising 
gods” of the Mediterranean in The Golden Bough and Das Urchristenthum, seine 
Schriften und Lehren respectively, Smith concluded that “comparison is never dyadic,” in 
the sense of simply comparing phenomena x with phenomena y based upon the 
apprehension of surface resemblance.3 He recognized as well that the insistence upon 
dyadic comparison has been a central culprit in the failure of many past comparisons. 
Recall, Catholic missionaries Xavier, Cabral, and Valignano’s narrow observations of 
Japanese Shin Buddhism and their insistence upon positing the existence of similarities 
due to Lutheran influence.   
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2 Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianities and the Religions of Late 
Antiquity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 99. 
 
3 J. G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion, 2nd ed. (London, 1900): 1-12; Otto 
Pfleiderer, Das Urchristenthum, seine Schriften und Lehren (Berlin, 1887): 40; Smith, Drudgery Divine, 51. 
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Building upon Frazer and Pfleiderer’s work, Smith concluded instead that 
comparison is always triadic, in the sense of comparing phenomenon x with phenomenon 
y “with respect to” z. This third element, or third term — z — is arguably the most 
significant constituent of any comparative enterprise as it is the key to avoiding the 
pitfalls of Eliadian comparativism and a demonstration of the utility of comparison itself. 
“In the case of an academic comparison, the ‘with respect to’ is most frequently the 
scholar’s interest, be this expressed in a question, a theory, or a model.”4 In other words, 
critical cross-cultural comparison always involves not two, but three elements— 
phenomenon x, phenomenon y, and most importantly, the scholar’s academic concern.   
Just as magic is no longer regarded as a dark art, for when it is performed in a 
dimly lit auditorium the audience is able to suspend belief safely and temporarily for the 
purpose of entertainment, in a similar sense cross-cultural comparison is a “magical” 
form of intellectual play between otherwise incongruent occurrences for the purpose of 
providing “an occasion for thought.”5 Certainly, it is true that rigorous comparison makes 
it possible to see cultural phenomena in a new light and that useful interreligious learning 
transpires, but Smith is correct in that similarity and difference are never given. Rather, 
they are invented or determined by the comparativist’s interpretive – or magical efforts. 
The comparativist is like a collagist, combining objets trouvés for aesthetic interest.6 As 
Smith notes, a comparison is “the result of mental operations . . . It is the scholar who 
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5 Jonathan Z. Smith, Map is Not Territory: Studies in the History of Religions (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993), 309. 
 
6 Wendy Doniger, The Implied Spider: Politics and Theology in Myth (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998), 77. 
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makes [the comparands’] cohabitation —their ‘sameness’— possible, not ‘natural’ 
affinities or processes of history.”7 Why? The scholar finds the act of comparing the two 
phenomena to be compelling.  Too many sloppy, universalizing comparativists have 
made the mistake of suggesting otherwise, by arguing for the existence of objective 
universal “sacred” realities that simply exist “out there,” transcending cultural specificity 
while “awaiting the organizing ministrations of the contemporary interpreter.”8  
The real determinants of the comparative endeavor are a scholar’s concepts, 
structures and purposes – in other words, what is most interesting about comparison is the 
result of the scholar’s analogical imagination.   
Comparison does not necessarily tell us how things ‘are’… [rather] 
comparison tells us how things might be conceived… A comparison is a 
disciplined exaggeration in the service of knowledge. It lifts out and 
strongly marks certain features within difference as being of possible 
intellectual significance, expressed in the rhetoric of their being ‘like’ in 
some stipulated fashion. Comparison provides the means by which we ‘re-
vision’ phenomena as our data in order to solve our theoretical problems.9 
 
Whereas Smith regarded the magic of prior comparative enterprises in a negative light, I 
align my view of comparativism with the Smithian New Comparativists who are taking 
up his challenge by cultivating the re-envisioned potential for the discipline. Like them, I 
see “comparison as an indeterminate scholarly procedure that is best undertaken as an 
intellectually creative enterprise, not as a science but as an art – an imaginative and 
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critical act of meditation and re-description in the service of knowledge.”10 The 
comparative analysis of religious developments is a particular sort of intellectual 
bricolage in which the scholar creatively uses cross-cultural constructions for the 
purposes of furthering a unique discourse. Just as the late French-philosopher Jacques 
Derrida argued that, “Every discourse is bricoleur,” Smithian New Comparativists are 
well positioned as the tinkers with the methodological tools to craft a healthy and 
rigorous comparative discourse.11 
The first step the Smithian New Comparativist must take to avoid the Eliadian 
pitfalls of the past is to acknowledge, self-consciously, that the scholar always brings a 
particular agenda and point of view to the table of comparison. Historically the dominant 
paradigms employed in the comparative discourse have arisen from a Protestant Christian 
context. Significant examples include the privileging of terms such as “salvation,” 
“faith,” and “God” in the discourse of religious studies. As I discussed in Chapter One of 
this work, this privileging has been apparent especially in past comparisons of Reformed 
Christianity and Shin Buddhism, but it is also true of more general efforts in the Western 
academic study of religion. As Daniel Dubuisson notes, the search for a definition of the 
term “religion” itself has met with “powerful intellectual prejudices stemming from the 
Christian tradition” and the failure to counter this has “resulted from several factors, 
foremost among them… the absence of any systematic thought aimed at determining 
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satisfactory analytical criteria capable of winning unanimity among scholars.”12 Given 
the postmodern penchant for scrutinous deconstruction, though, one is left to wonder how 
unanimity regarding analytical criteria will ever be reached. 
Terms are simply linguistically embedded conventional designations for cultural 
phenomena and the classificatory category “religion” is as large and problematic a 
construct as one might find in comparative discourse. Evidence of this is the fact that 
many cultures and languages did not even have a word like “religion” in their lexicons 
until the late nineteenth century. By way of example, there is no equivalent for the term 
“religion” in the earliest languages of the Dharmic traditions (Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Jainism, and Sikhism). Dharmic religious traditions are Indian traditions predicated on 
ways of cultivating dharma, which can be understood generally as an underlying ordering 
principle that upholds both social and personal life. The Dharmic traditions tend to share 
notions of karma, sams#ra, and liberation, as well the core value of nonviolence 
(ahims"), but should they be referred to as “religions?” Within their respective contexts, 
instead of being considered a member of a given “religion,” one might speak of following 
the sanatanadharma (“the timeless Truth”) or the buddhadharma (“the teachings of the 
Buddha”). “But instead of this, what have we seen and do we still observe today? In a 
general way, that people have casually chosen the Western Christian model as a 
reference, reduced to what is considered its central framework in order to make of it a 
kind of ideal, intangible form.”13 In other words, Christian categories and terms have 
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become the implicit standard in the Western study of religion, and the comparative 
enterprise in particular.  
The danger in this imposition of Christian terms for non-Christian ones lies in the 
inevitable shifts in meaning that occur.  As Buddhist philosopher Jay L. Garfield notes: 
When we translate we transform in all of the following ways: we replace 
terms and phrases with particular sets of resonances in their source 
language with terms and phrases with very different resonances in their 
target language; we disambiguate ambiguous terms and introduce new 
ambiguities; we interpret, or fix particular interpretations of texts in virtue 
of the use of theoretically loaded expressions in our target language; we 
take a text that is to some extent esoteric and render it exoteric simply by 
freeing the target language reader to approach the text without a teacher; 
we shift the context in which a text is read and used.  No text survives this 
transformation unscathed.14 
    
I further argue that this impulse to define the terms of comparison based on Christian 
concepts is resultant from the fact that a majority of cross-cultural comparisons have 
originated in the West. As Dubuisson notes, “No important concept was borrowed by the 
history of religions from any foreign cultural sphere at all! – as if it were self-evident that 
the Western, Christian, Platonic terminology (‘god,’ ‘soul,’ ‘faith,’ ‘belief,’ ‘rite,’ 
‘church,’ ‘priest,’ ‘providence,’ etc.), specific as it is, held the power to describe 
everything and understand everything, starting with mankind.”15 This hubristic thinking 
is precisely the sort that has undergirded essentializing Eliadian comparisons of the past. 
Consequently, it is incumbent upon Smithian New Comparativists to reframe the 
discourse as much as possible, by identifying and employing comparative categories that 
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“characterize certain ranges of cultural data, and still not fall into [a] characterization of 
‘essentialism.’”16      
A means for accomplishing this is to admit that terms such as “religion” are 
merely theoretical interlocutors that temporarily stand in as a bridge to overcome cultural 
disjunction for the purpose of addressing scholars’ questions and concerns. Of course, 
any terms that arise from within the Western academic study of non-Western cultures are 
loaded with Western, Christian, and Platonic baggage, but it should be remembered that 
“all human knowledge comes in the form of cultural posits.”17 However, because “the 
subject matter of religion is as intricate and vari-colored as a Persian tapestry, the need to 
develop a foundation for coherent generalizations [remains] pressing.”18 In response, this 
taxonomic “universal” that we call religion should be understood as a construct that 
temporarily allows us to engage in discussion around some human activities. If not for 
the invention of a category like religion, while fully acknowledging the debate that 
surrounds its definition, it would be impossible for people to discuss what they believe, or 
think, or do with one another, with respect to certain human behaviors. This holds true for 
any category at which we might choose to look. Someone might say “I went to work 
yesterday and did x.” It could easily be asked, “What really constitutes work?” That 
which is “work” for you may be “play” for me.  What is work anyway? Should the term 
be understood in the ontological or metaphorical sense? Over time, if a construct called 
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“work” is not temporarily accepted at some level, human dialogue and interrelationality 
become impossible. Of course, at the level of the historical or cultural particular there 
may be significant differences in terms of meaning and content, but the category or 
universal “work” at least allows a starting point for responsible yet creative consideration 
of any similarities and differences. In other words, a temporary theoretical interlocutor 
allows discourse to begin. So too does this logic apply for cross-cultural comparison. 
Cross-cultural comparison helps us to conceive of all that transpires in human 
activity in something more than a case-by-case manner. When surface similarities are 
perceived there must be a means for responsibly and critically evaluating 
interrelationality. Critical cross-cultural comparison enables us to make some sense of 
why, for example, “do Quaker meetinghouses, Hopi kivas, and Gothic cathedrals use 
space differently” or, more to the point of this project, why did some late thirteenth-
century Japanese Buddhists and some early seventeenth-century Dutch Christians, who 
shared analogous conceptions of the human condition as well as a sense of the futility of 
human effort to change this condition, respond to a common ontological presupposition 
in such doctrinally divergent ways.19 Differences can “reveal not just an absence of 
approximation to the template, but rather a revelation of the factors which make versions 
of the theme (or prototype) different from each other.”20 This contributes to an even 
greater appreciation of historically situated, contextualized, culturally specific 
expressions of religious phenomena. As Barbara Holdrege notes, “One of the important 
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tasks of comparative study… is thus to challenge scholars of religion to become more 
critically self-conscious of the Protestant legacy that lingers in our categories and 
taxonomies and to reconfigure our scholarly discourse to include alternative 
paradigms.”21  
Thus, in this comparative project, I have consciously chosen to avoid the overtly 
Christian terms that have so regularly defined past comparisons—scripture, divinity, 
savior, salvation, deity, etc.— in lieu of what the late neopragmatic philosopher Richard 
Rorty called “alternative vocabularies.”22 Rorty’s premise was that “vocabularies are 
tools . . . for helping people to ‘cope’ with reality, and should not be seen as more or less 
transparent mediums for ‘representing’ reality.”23 Consequently, recognizing that the 
privileging of certain categories and terms runs the risk of reifying the hegemony of 
Protestant paradigms, suppressing cultural significance, and disfiguring unique religious 
phenomena, I have chosen two temporary interlocutors or “bridge concepts” in order to 
frame and initiate a Smithian occasion of comparative thought.24 These bridge concepts, 
designed to serve as provisional, linguistic rope-bridges, are meant to enable a thoughtful, 
yet respectful critical crossing of an otherwise incommensurate cultural chasm.  
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Bridge Concepts – Human Condition and Ontological Transformation 
As Aaron Stalnaker correctly observes in Overcoming Our Evil: Human Nature 
and Spiritual Exercises in Xunzi and Augustine (2006), any comparative enterprise faces 
two fundamental challenges. It must bring distant cultural phenomena “into interrelation 
and conversation, and it must simultaneously preserve their distinctiveness within the 
interrelation.”25 In the present study, careful analysis of the dharmalogical and 
theological influences on the doctrines of akunin sh!ki and limited atonement, and the 
historical-contextual rationale for their development, meets the second goal of preserving 
distinctiveness. The first goal of bringing these traditions and particular teachings into 
analogical relations is accomplished through the use of “bridge concepts.” 
The use of bridge concepts should be regarded as an efficacious response to the 
relative absence of any systematic thought when it comes to Eliadian comparisons. 
“Bridge concepts are general ideas, such as ‘virtue’ and ‘human nature,’ which can be 
given enough content to be meaningful and guide comparative inquiry yet are still open 
to greater specification in particular cases… they are chosen specifically to facilitate a 
particular comparison of a delimited number of objects, and so are chosen with those 
objects in mind. The process of selection and refinement is thus in an important sense 
inductive, and any broader applicability any given set might possess is essentially 
hypothetical and subject to further testing and revision in wider inquiries.”26 Note that 






well as Fitz John Porter Poole’s insistence upon examining only “aspectual 
characteristics of a given tradition . . . rather than entire religions.”27  
The two key bridge concepts I am employing in the present comparative analysis 
are “human condition” and “ontological transformation.” These bridge concepts are 
formulated in such a way that they are intended to be “projected” into the religious 
traditions and texts being compared (Shin Buddhism and the Reformed Christian 
tradition, and the Tannish! and the Doctrine of Limited Atonement) “as a way to 
thematize their disparate elements and order their details around these anchoring 
terms.”28 As I indicated at the onset of this project, the terms “human condition” and 
“ontological transformation” are admittedly problematic terms. Robert Cummings 
Neville notes in The Human Condition: A Volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas 
Project (2000), that the very notion of “human condition” is a twentieth-century idea, 
which has “European origin and global dissemination through the effects of modernity.”29 
As such, neither the author of the Tannish! nor the framers of the Canons of Dort would 
recognize this terminology. However, I have selected this idiom as a bridge concept for 
the express purpose of facilitating a particular comparison of the efforts of two traditions 
to understand humanity’s place in existence.  
While the historical pan-Buddhist tradition does not invoke the phrase “human 
condition” specifically, the first teaching of the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, 
is a comment upon existence itself. This first “Noble Truth” in Buddhist thought posits 
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that all existence, and in particular human existence, is best characterized as a condition 
of dis-ease, discontent, or suffering. As contemporary Buddhist scholar Rupert Gethin 
explains, “Buddhist thought starts from the premise that life presents us with the problem 
of suffering. The schema of the four truths analyses the nature of the problem, its cause, 
its solution and the way to effect that solution.”30 Donald W. Mitchell explains similarly 
that the Buddha was “concerned with helping humanity understand the nature and causes 
of its dissatisfactory condition and the path that leads to liberation from this condition.”31 
Gethin and Mitchell’s comments are applicable to the understanding of human existence 
found throughout Buddhist thought, and Shin Buddhist thought in particular. 
Early seventeenth-century Dutch Christians would also not have invoked the 
phrase “human condition” when reflecting upon the circumstances of existence in which 
they found themselves. However, the delegates at the Synod of Dort were the inheritors 
of centuries of Christian reflection upon precisely this matter. As professor of New 
Testament and Early Christian Studies, Paula Fredriksen, explains, “humanity finds itself, 
in [the apostle] Paul’s view, in a terrible, all-but-overwhelming plight so severe that 
nothing less than direct divine intervention—God sending his Son—could turn things 
around.”32 This outlook can be found in Paul’s letter to the churches in Corinth and 
Galatia (e.g. 1 Cor. 2:8; 2 Cor. 4:4; Gal 4:8). Christian theologians during the Patristic 
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period, such as Justin Martyr, Tertullian, and Irenaeus also emphasized aspects of Paul’s 
letters as they reflected upon the redemption necessary to transform the ignorance, evil, 
and suffering that marked the human plight. Origen of Alexandria provided a diagnosis 
and description of the human predicament in his Peri Arch!n (“On First Principles”) 
when he considered the way a fleshly human life is a burden and a punishment, and that 
this world is not the true home of the soul.33 Of course, as discussed previously it would 
not be possible to conceive of the authors’ of the Canons conception of the human 
predicament without mentioning Augustine of Hippo. Building upon Paul’s imagery 
found in Romans 9:19-23, Augustine described humanity as a massa damnata (“a lump 
of perdition”) that is “oriented toward ignorance and death.”34  
Implicit within these Buddhist and Christian statements regarding the plight of 
humanity is also a concern for a “solution” to what we might call the “problem of human 
existence.” The Primal Vow of Amida Buddha and the salvific act of Christ are each 
intended as means for changing, rectifying, mitigating or solving the dissatisfactory, 
disordered, depraved state of the human condition. In other words, at the heart of these 
two traditions is a belief that through contextually specific acts the essence or nature of 
being (ontology) can be transformed. Once again, while the term “ontological 
transformation” is entirely a Western academic construct and a “speculative intellectual 
aspect” that I am privileging; it, like the phrase “human condition,” can easily stand-in as 
a provisional, linguistic rope-bridge in the service of a comparative analysis.35 Examples 
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of scholars who have also previously employed the bridge concept “ontological 
transformation” include comparative theologian John B. Cobb Jr., Buddhist scholar 
Frederick Streng —who writes of the ultimate transformation of religious persons 
ontologically— and Randall L. Nadeau, who notes that the “intent of all religious belief 
and practice is… a solution to the problem of suffering or sin, an ontological 
transformation of the individual expressed in symbolic terms as movement from death to 
life, from bondage to freedom, from ignorance to enlightenment.”36 
 
An Occasion for Comparative Thought 
 As all comparisons are triadic in that they involve a comparison of phenomenon x 
with phenomenon y, “with regard to” z (with z being the scholar’s academic concern), it 
is important that I clearly establish the occasion upon which this study’s comparison is 
built. Much of the present comparative endeavor is predicated upon Doniger’s assertion 
that it is possible to bring into a single, harmonious comparative conversation the 
uniquely different approaches that two cultures have made to a similar human problem. 
Thus, my theoretical concern, my “with respect to,” is an ontological presupposition 
shared by two diverse religious traditions. This critical comparative analysis, or my 
comparative question, involves an examination of how culturally disparate religious 
teachings illuminate two respective traditions’ doctrinally divergent responses to a 
conceptually analogous understanding of the human predicament. Building upon the 
bridge concepts of “human condition” and “ontological transformation,” the six central 
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points of my comparison are: (1) the nature of the human predicament, (2) the past 
conditioning action(s) that led to this human condition, (3) the futility of any human 
effort to change the human predicament, (4) the ontologically transformative response 
that originates “outside” any human efforts, (5) the transactional quality of this process of 
ontological transformation, and (6) the scope of transformative response. 
 
Nature of the Human Predicament 
As indicated in Chapter Three of this dissertation, Pure Land Buddhist traditions 
have always been especially interested in the nature of the human condition. As Pure 
Land scholar J!kai Asai once noted, “questions such as “What is a ‘human being’? and 
‘How is the definition of ‘human being’ related to the Pure Land teaching?’ have been 
central to the tradition’s historical development.”37 Recall earlier in this project that Shin 
thought has answered the first of these questions by positing that the human condition is 
filled with defilements (bonn!), best understood as blind passions, and is consequently 
karmically bound to the cycles of rebirth. For example, Shinran maintained in his 
teachings that defilements such as greed, hatred, and delusion fully characterize and 
inform the human condition. As contemporary Shin scholar Sachiya Hiro summarized the 
matter, “if this delusion is something we all have, then perhaps in the truest sense of the 
word, bonn! or delusion is what our ‘human nature’ is.”38 
Recall also that the articulation of the nature of the human predicament found in 
the Tannish! is the result of Shinran’s unique conception of the human condition. Shinran 
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maintained that all human actions are ego-based and attachment-driven. Thus, all human 
actions should be regarded as evil in nature, and since human existence is the direct result 
of action (karma), the human condition itself is evil or depraved in nature.    
This view of the human condition is clearly articulated in section nine of the 
Tannish!, when Yuein-b! recounts Shinran’s teachings. “What suppresses the heart that 
should rejoice and keeps one from rejoicing is the action of blind passions.  Nevertheless, 
the Buddha, knowing this beforehand, called us ‘foolish beings possessed of blind 
passions.’”39 In other words, humanity is bound inextricably by evil desires and 
ignorance. Even before Shinran uttered these words the tradition had regarded the human 
predicament or condition as fundamentally dissatisfactory and depraved. Example can be 
seen in the Ky!gy!shinsh! as Shinran quotes a famous passage from one of the early 
patriarchs of the tradition, Zend! when he writes: 
The Deep Mind is the mind of Deep Faith. It has, again, two aspects. The 
first is that which believes deeply and determinedly that we are really 
sinful, ordinary beings, fettered to Birth-and-Death, continuously 
drowning and transmigrating since innumerable kalpas ago, and have no 
means of emancipation. The Second is that which believes deeply and 
determinedly that the Forty-eight Vows of Amida Buddha embrace the 
sentient beings, enabling those who trust His Vow-Power without doubt 
and apprehension to attain Birth assuredly.40 
  
All of this thinking culminates in the most significant and well-known phrase of the 
Tannish!, which neatly sums up the view of the human condition expressed by Shinran, 
“Even the good person is born in the Pure Land, so without question is the person who is 
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evil.”41 In other words, birth in Amida’s Pure Land is meant for all people, as all people 
are evil by nature.  
The Canons of Dort, and by extension the early Dutch Reformed Christian 
tradition, struck an even clearer position with regard to the state of the human 
predicament. As I noted in the last chapter, while Article One of the Third and Fourth 
Heads of Doctrine begin by positing that humanity was created in the image of God and 
that humanity’s general disposition was initially oriented towards the fulfillment of a 
good and pure life, lived in right alignment with God’s will, this orientation quickly 
changed. Through a rejection of God, Adam brought upon himself “blindness, horrible 
darkness, vanity, and perverseness of judgment in his mind; malice, rebelliousness, and 
stubbornness in his will and heart, and impurity in all his affections.”42 In other words, as 
elaborated upon in Article Two of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine, due to 
Adam’s resultant impurity and the corruption of his nature an inclination towards evil and 
a general condition of depravity was passed along to all of Adam’s descendents. The 
Canons clearly posit that humanity is utterly depraved because sin has filled the entirety 
of its being. In summary, the Canons are predicated on the contention that the human 
condition is completely defiled and depraved. 
 Shin Buddhism and the Reformed Christian tradition articulate a conceptually 
analogous understanding of the human predicament — as depraved, disordered, defiled, 
and filled with impurities. Specifically, Shin thought conceives of the human condition as 
being oriented towards an illusory ego, which only serves to enmesh humanity further in 
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delusion, ignorance and blind passions. This is not unlike mainstream Mah#y#na 
conceptions of the problematic nature of ego-consciousness, in which the degree of 
conviction that there exists a separate “I” or “self” is directly related to the relative 
strength of the three poisons of existence— greed, anger, and delusion. The more “I” 
focus upon “myself,” and the more attached “I” become to “my” activities and thoughts, 
the more entangled in blind passions I become. Depravity and defilement are thus reified 
as the very nature of the human condition. Hence the need for a dramatic solution that 
will allow sentient beings to transcend their limited understanding of existence, such that 
ignorance might be replaced with awakened comprehension. 
In a similar manner Reformed Christian thought conceives of the depravity of the 
human condition as being due to, and a form of, ego-orientation. Recall that Adam was 
created with an initial orientation towards the good and pure life, in right alignment with 
God’s will. However, Adam was also given the capacity for freedom of choice, and he 
used this trust and freedom to put “his” will before the will of God. Adam’s “original sin” 
was a decision to be self-oriented rather than God-oriented. As Emil Brunner explains, 
“sin, in relation to the good, is the ‘arrestation of our God-consciousness.’”43 God-
consciousness involves a primary concern for, and absolute dependence upon, God. In 
placing his own will and desires before the desires of God, Adam rejected the right 
relationality that God first established between Godself and humanity. This resulted in 
Adam’s fall from God’s grace and an attendant degradation of the human condition. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 Emil Brunner, The Mediator: A Study of the Central Doctrine of the Christian Faith, trans. Olive Wyon 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1947), 133. 
192 
Therefore, Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian thought share a similar sense of the 
depraved human condition as being, in part, due to ego-centeredness.  
However, within this analogous understanding also lies a difference with regard to 
the temporal framework under which it is possible to speak of the human condition as 
depraved, disordered, and defiled. According to pan-Buddhist thought, humanity has 
always been subject to blind passions (bonn!) and has always!existed in a state of 
delusion. This contention is based on the understanding that the sams#ric cycle of 
transmigration has always been turning. Like a circular river that has no beginning or 
end, beings have been flowing perpetually through the six realms of existence, and as 
such have always been subject to delusion. Shin thought affirms this way of thinking, as 
can be seen in Chapter 31 of the Larger S"tra on Amit#yus [i.e., Amida Buddha]: 
Because they are stupid and callous, such people do not accept the 
teachings of the Buddha; they lack forethought, and only wish to satisfy 
their own desires. They are deluded by their passionate attachments, 
unaware of the Way, misguided and trapped by anger and enmity, and 
intent on gaining wealth and gratifying their carnal desires like wolves. 
And so, unable to follow the Way, they are again subject to suffering in 
evil realms in an endless cycle of birth-and-death. How miserable and 
pitiable this is!44  
 
Humanity has always been trapped by blind passions. There was no “first” cause for this 
condition.    
Within Reformed Christian thought though it is understood that the depraved 
human condition is a change from the original state of humanity. When humanity was 
first created its ontological condition was one of purity and righteousness. This condition 
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only changed after Adam’s hubristic action. Unlike the Buddhist sense of defilement and 
impurity existing throughout time, the Reformed Christian position is predicated on an 
introductory moment when the human condition changed states. 
By taking a Smithian bilateral approach to the comparative analysis of the 
respective traditions’ conceptions of the human predicament it is possible to examine 
both their similarities and their differences. This demonstrates two levels of comparative 
contrast. First, it allows for the establishment of a starting point for comparing these 
traditions a bit more broadly, without relying upon the typical points of comparison found 
in past case studies of this sort. In other words, while the cultural specifics that produced 
these common formulations are vastly different, and the complex specifics of the actual 
concepts are distinct, the temporary bridge concept “human condition” allows us to 
recognize that that these traditions do share a common ontological presupposition.  
Second, it shows that even within apparent “sameness” resides important 
difference. Recall, that any real progress in the use of the comparative tool in the field of 
religious studies, requires attending as much or more to what makes religious phenomena 
different than to what makes them alike. By holding the traditions’ differences in creative 
comparative tension we are able to see variations on a theme (i.e., nuanced 
understandings of the plight of humanity), as well as examine this otherwise calcified 
concept with the light emanating from a cross-cultural source. We realize that any 
ontological statement is uniquely wedded to the cosmology from which it emanates. In 
other words, to speak of humanity as being depraved or fallen, in a Western Christian 
sense, assumes a fall “from” a prior point of stability. Whereas, to speak of humanity as 
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being depraved or defiled, in a Japanese Buddhist sense, assumes a beginningless 
constant state. 
This sort of reciprocal illumination also enables us to pay closer attention to the 
terms we use in any comparative endeavor. As Neville explains, “comparison is required 
both to detect the need for better terminology, and to generate and test proposed 
terminology . . . [Fortunately,] as the terminology improves, comparison gets more 
nuanced; and as comparison is more adequate, the terminology gets more accurate.”45 
The earliest comparisons of Shin Buddhism and Christian thought, conducted by Catholic 
missionaries in Japan, were clumsy conflations of terms and ideas. Mid-to-late twentieth-
century Eliadian comparativists were no more accurate than their predecessors as they 
employed uncritically imposed Christian terminology in the pursuit of pan-human 
universals. As this study has used the critical tools and self-awareness of Smithian 
Comparativism the comparison of these traditions grows more nuanced, subtle, and 
precise.     
 
Past Conditioning Actions that Lead to the Human Predicament 
Buddhist thought has largely maintained that existence in any of the sams#ric 
realms of rebirth is the direct result of residual karma (shukug!) and this past karma 
should be understood as being due to blind passions and ignorance. Therefore, a central 
premise of general Buddhist thought is that past actions condition or shape future 
rebirths. Shin Buddhist thought is not unique in this manner. 
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In section thirteen of the Tannish!, the author, Yuein-b!, responds to a 
misconception of the time, which posited that people who pridefully have no fear of 
committing evil acts because of the “inconceivable working of the Primal Vow” run the 
risk of not attaining birth in Amida’s Pure Land.46 Yuein-b! attempts to correct this 
misunderstanding when he writes:   
This statement is of one who doubts the Primal Vow and fails to 
understand the influence of good and evil karma of past lives. 
Good thoughts arise in us through the prompting of good karma from the 
past, and evil acts are conceived and committed through the working of 
evil karma. The late Master said. ‘Know that every evil act done – even as 
slight as a particle on the tip of a strand of rabbit’s fur or sheep’s wool – 
has its cause in past karma.47 
 
When recalling Shinran’s rejection of the duality of good and evil as simply a relative 
concept and his insistence that all human actions are best understood as delusional and 
depraved, it is easy to see that for Shinran, and by extension the teachings articulated in 
the Tannish!, all actions are due to shukug! and are thus evil. As contemporary Shin 
scholar Yoshifumi Ueda summarized the matter, the “karma from our past that rules our 
lives is always evil.”48 This position is reaffirmed in section nine of the Tannish! when 
Yuein-b! recounts Shinran as having said: 
Further, having no thought of wanting to go to the Pure Land 
quickly, we think forlornly that we may die even when we become 
slightly ill; this also is the action of blind passions. It is hard for us 
to abandon this old home of pain, where we have been 
transmigrating for innumerable kalpas down to the present, and we 
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feel no longing for the Pure Land of Peace, where we have yet to 
be born. Truly, how powerful our blind passions are!49 
 
Put differently, if the residual karma from our past lives and the blind passions that 
contribute to this were not so powerful we might more readily wish for birth in the Pure 
Land and rejoice in the conviction that we would soon be there. 
As alluded to in the previous section about the human condition, according to the 
Canons of Dort the human state of defilement and depravity is also causally due to a past 
conditioning action. That action was thought to be Adam’s sinful rejection of God, and 
his subsequent fall from God’s grace, otherwise known as the original sin. “The word sin 
denotes a transgression or attitude which, in the final analysis, is always directed against 
God . . . Sin, therefore, is the responsible guilt of man [sic] before God, the breach of the 
personal relationship, a turning away from God and one’s fellow-men.”50 Article One of 
the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine describes Adam’s free will-based decision to 
rebel against God, thereby resulting in a corruption of Adam’s human nature. Article 
Two of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine goes on to explain how Adam came to 
pass along his fallen and depraved nature hereditarily to all of his descendents. Building 
upon Calvin’s sense of the biological solidarity between Adam and his descendents, the 
Canons state, “Since he was corrupt, he brought forth corrupt children.  This corruption, 
therefore has been derived from Adam by all his descendents, Christ alone excepted.”51 
Thus the Canons maintained that not only was the human predicament one of complete 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 Inagaki, ed., A Record in Lament of Divergences, 13.   
 
50 Gerhard Schepers, “Shinran’s View of the Human Predicament and the Christian Concept of Sin,” 
Japanese Religions 15, no. 2 (July 1988): 4. 
 
51 Hoekema, “A New English Translation of the Canons of Dort,” 147. 
197 
and total defilement, but this condition was due to the conditioning action of Adam’s 
original sin, in which hereditary depravity was imputed to all of humanity. You will 
recall, as Augustine explained, because of Adam’s sin humanity cannot help but continue 
to sin.  
With respect to the Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian conceptions of the 
human predicament, it can be said safely that these traditions do share a common sense of 
there being a past conditioning action or actions that led to the human plight. However, as 
in the case of the previous section “different religions [can] share a common idea vaguely 
but specify it differently.”52 The difference in perspective between Shin Buddhism and 
Reformed Christianity, with regard to the past conditioning action(s) that lead to the state 
of the human predicament, has to do with breadth of causal influence. Not withstanding 
mainstream Mah#y#na thought, which suggests all karmic activity is linked together 
collectively, as in Indra’s web—in other words, all past karma (shukug! ) shapes all 
present and future karmic trajectories, which we conventionally refer to as individual 
persons—Shin thought demonstrates that each person’s past actions have been 
accumulating as negative karma, born out of ignorance, from the depths of a 
beginningless past. This karmic wave then collapses and manifests in the present moment 
as a karmically bound evil being. Put differently, “It is the past, not the present, that 
forms the center of causality [and] . . . the concept of past karma points directly to the 
individual himself.”53 
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This stands in stark contrast to the corporate sense of imputed depravity found in 
Reformed Christianity, and which is articulated concretely in the Doctrine of Limited 
Atonement. Here “original sin is founded on a common ancestor of all individuals.”54 
Despite having done nothing to warrant existence in a state of impure separation for God 
themselves, humans that are alive today are deemed by the Canons to be just as “guilty” 
before God as Adam was for his act of denial. The past act of one individual cast a 
shadow over all people. Conversely, in Shin thought the past actions of all sentient beings 
contributed to the present state of general depravity.   
Once again, while the cultural particularities or cargo of this comparison are 
distinct—I would never suggest that shukug! and sin are identical representations of 
reality—their structural similarities certainly advance our Smithian occasion for 
comparative thought. The benefit of a Smithian approach to the comparison of these 
themes is that it is possible to hold the apprehension of surface resemblance 
simultaneously, with regard to causal influence on a common ontological presupposition, 
in creative tension with the distinctive cultural and linguistic forms found in each 
tradition. In other words, shukug! and sin are similar enough conceptually that they 
warrant being marked and lifted up because of their intellectual significance to our larger 
theoretical question—How do two traditions with common understandings of the human 
condition respond doctrinally? As we do though, we will note that the differences in 
cultural understanding are distinct enough that it is possible to beginning considering 
whether, despite surface resemblances, these traditions are, in fact, pointing to different 




past Eliadian comparisons has been their assumption that regardless of the unique details 
of each tradition, when it comes to providing a solution to the human dilemma all 
religious paths culminate eventually at the same point—an “unequivocal, single reality.”55 
This pluralistic approach is described by theologian S. Mark Heim when he writes of the 
manner in which, “the most prominent contemporary pluralists relegate specific 
individual elements in a tradition and its concrete historical texture to secondary status; 
these are the culturally variable forms in which we encounter what is truly ultimate for 
religion.”56    
In order to counter-act this subtle, yet insidious “many paths, one summit” 
conception of soteriology we must steadfastly adhere to some of the strengths of 
Smithian New Comparativism: reframing the discourse with regard to analytical 
categories of cross-cultural comparison, grounding the comparison of ideas in the 
“events” of texts, and seeking difference alongside all similarities. Nevertheless, we will 
revisit Heim’s concerns later in this chapter.       
 
Futility of Human Effort to Change the Human Predicament 
In section thirteen of the Tannish!, Yuein-b! recounts Shinran’s belief that the 
influence of residual or past karma is so significant that humanity has no control over the 
quality of its actions.  As Yuein-b! explained, “We sentient beings cannot arbitrarily do 
evil, or perform good deeds.  [Shinran] says that even the evil or bad that we do is due to 
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our karma.”57  According to Yoshifumi Ueda, “Shinran’s model of time denies any sort 
of free will, since everything we do and have done is swamped in an abyss of 
unfathomable evil karma . . . [According to Shinran’s concept of karma,] we lack the 
potential to do anything that is not evil.  [Consequently] if whatever we do – even acts we 
consider to be good and virtuous – is in fact evil, then whatever our subjective thoughts, 
in reality we have no moral freedom of choice.”58 Shinran’s rejection of the traditional 
threefold path of self-effort (jiriki) was complete. He deemed any efforts to 
constructively affect the human predicament as doomed from the outset. In this way, Shin 
Buddhism is distinct from other forms of Mah#y#na Buddhism in that it is predicated on 
the contention that human effort and intentionality play no role with regard to a person’s 
ultimate liberation. As meditation and moral activity arise from within the karmically 
bound human condition they are not efficacious when it comes to release from sams#ra, 
let alone birth in Amida’s Pure Land. Only Amida’s Vow has the power do these things.  
As Shinran states in section fourteen of the Tannish!: 
I have no idea whether the Nembutsu is truly the seed for my being born 
in the Pure Land or whether it is the karmic act for which I must fall into 
hell. Should I have been deceived by Master H!nen and, saying the 
Nembutsu, fall into hell, even then I would have no regrets. The reason is, 
if I could attain Buddhahood by endeavoring in other practices, but said 
the Nembutsu and so fell into hell, then I would feel regret at having been 
deceived. But I am incapable of any other practice, so hell is decidedly my 
abode whatever I do.59 
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Put another way, Shinran would be sadly mistaken if he believed that his own 
efforts would ensure his birth in the Pure Land. From the Shin perspective human 
effort to change the human predicament is futile.    
 Early in Article Two of the Canons of Dort, the thought that humanity is 
incapable of rectifying the fallen or deprived nature of the human condition is delineated 
in a similar manner. Whereas Article One of the Canons posits that Adam’s sin requires a 
form of satisfaction or punishment, Article Two goes on to state, “we ourselves cannot 
make this satisfaction and cannot deliver ourselves from the wrath of God.”60 The 
original sin of Adam is so significant, and the subsequent depravity of humanity so 
complete, that only God can make the necessary satisfaction on our behalf.  God’s 
sacrifice of Jesus through crucifixion accomplishes this satisfaction. 
 Article Three of the Third and Fourth Heads of Doctrine also addresses 
humanity’s complete inability to affect this disordered and defiled condition 
constructively, when, evoking Augustine’s thoughts on the matter, it suggests that 
humanity’s sinfulness is so complete that humanity could not cease from sinning if it 
wanted to. Whereas Adam was created with free will, his descendents are held 
completely in the bondage of evil. As the Canons put it:  
All men [sic] therefore are conceived in sin and born as children of wrath, 
incapable of any saving good, inclined to evil, dead in sins, and slaves of 
sins.  Apart from the regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit; moreover, they 
are neither willing nor able to return to God, to reform their depraved 
nature, or to prepare themselves for its reformation.61 
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In other words, any and all self-directed efforts to return to a state of alignment with God 
are useless. According to the Canons, because of the deep indwelling of depraved 
sinfulness, it is simply beyond humanity’s ability to return to God’s grace on its own. The 
Tannish! and the Canons thus strike an analogous position with regard to the futility of 
any human efforts to affect ontological transformation constructively. The Tannish! 
conveys that self-power (jiriki) is useless due to the overwhelming nature of past karmic 
evil, while the Canons convey similarly that self-effort is useless due to the 
overwhelming nature of sin.   
 
Ontologically Transformative Response that Originates Outside Any Human Effort 
 According to Shin thought, any change in the human predicament, or ontological 
transformation, rests entirely on a source outside of any human effort. For Pure Land 
practitioners the symbolic representation of this “other-power” (他力 tariki) is said to be 
Amida Buddha and his Primal Vow. As examined in the previous chapter, liberation, 
characterized as rebirth in the Amida’s Pure Land, is the direct result of Amida’s Primal 
Vow. As Yuein-b! recounts Shinran’s teachings in section eleven of the Tannish!, 
Amida Buddha promised through the unimaginable workings of the Vow to bring all who 
call his name into his Pure Land: 
 To begin with, then, it is through Amida’s design that we come to say the 
Nembutsu with the belief that, saved by the inconceivable workings of 
Tathagata’s great Vow of great compassion, we will part from birth-and-
death. This being realized, our calculation is not the least involved, and so, 
in accord with the Primal Vow, we will be born in the true fulfilled land.62   
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As Alfred Bloom interprets this, Amida’s compassion for humanity is in no way 
dependent upon our efforts. “Shinran makes it clear that the completion of the Vow 
requires nothing from the side of man [sic] . . . as the causal basis for birth in the Pure 
Land.”63 Even the recitation of the nembutsu is the result of Amida’s decision to bestow 
entrusting hearts and minds upon humanity. This can be seen in Shinran’s thoughts 
regarding the nembutsu in section eight of the Tannish! when he notes: 
 The Nembutsu, for its practicers, is ‘non-practice’ and ‘non-good.’ Since it 
is not a practice performed out of one’s own designs, it is called ‘non-
practice.’ Since it is not a good act done through one’s own calculation, it 
is called ‘non-good.’ Because it arises wholly from Other Power and is 
free of self-power, for the practicers, it is ‘non-practice’ and ‘non-good.’64 
 
Taking a hermeneutical step that was distinct from his teacher H!nen, Shinran 
regarded even the ability to recite the Nembutsu as an expression of Other-Power. 
Whereas other Buddhist sects of his time regarded the recitation of the Nembutsu 
as yet another “good” act conducted through self-effort, Shinran saw the 
nembutsu as an act of gratitude arising from the Other–Power of Amida and his 
Vow. 
As I have suggested in the previous two sections, despite the state of the human 
condition and the past conditioning action that led to this predicament, and despite 
humanity’s inability to affect its own salvation, all is not lost according to the theological 
position articulated in the Canons of Dort. A solution to the plight of humanity has arisen 
from the compassion and love of God. According to Reformed Christian thought an 
ontologically transformative response to humanity’s depraved condition arises from 
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beyond all human efforts. The Canons maintain that God’s love for humanity is so great 
that God acts in such a manner as to provide the necessary satisfaction and regeneration 
of the broken relationality, which results in eternal life for those who believe. This 
thinking is expressed in the Second Article of the First Head of Doctrine when the 
Canons refer to passages from the Christian New Testament relating to God’s gift of 
Jesus.  “But in this the love of God was revealed, that He sent His only Son into the 
world, so that everyone who believes in Him should not be lost but have eternal life (I 
John 4:9, John 3:16).”65 
Subsequent Articles of the Canons go on to describe this ontologically 
transformative act by God in greater detail. Article Eleven relates how God imputes new 
dispositions, attributes, and propensities upon humanity as God “makes the will which 
was dead alive, which was bad good, which was unwilling willing, which was stubborn 
obedient, and moves and strengthens it so that, like a good tree, it may be able to produce 
the fruits of good works.”66  
In an effort to clarify further that this transformative and regenerative act is 
entirely divine in nature, and not the result of any human effort, the Canons posit in 
Article Twelve that salvation is “clearly a supernatural, most powerful and . . . 
inexpressible work,” which is akin to the power expressed in the creation itself.67 Finally, 
Articles Fourteen and Fifteen note that the sinful state of humanity was so complete that 
this transformative act by God is a completely free, yet undeserved gift. In other words, 
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the Canons take the position that soteriology rests entirely on the divine assistance and 
favor of God. Ontological transformation is solely due to God’s grace.   
 
Transactional Quality of the Process of Ontological Transformation 
 Building upon the work of his teacher, H!nen, Shinran maintained that Amida’s 
articulation of the Primal Vow generated an unlimited storehouse of karmic merit, which 
he in turn transfers to all sentient beings in two phases. The two phases—first expressed 
by Chinese monk Donran (476-542), considered by Shin practitioners as the Third 
Patriarch of the tradition—are “going forth” (!s!-ek!) and “returning” (gens!-ek!). As 
Hisao Inagaki explains in The Three Pure Land Sutras: A Study and Translation (2000), 
the phrase “going forth” is in reference to Amida’s transfer of merit from his great karmic 
storehouse in order for people to “attain birth in the Pure Land together with all sentient 
beings by endowing them with one’s merits. The phrase of ‘returning’ is to re-enter the 
worlds of Sams#ra to lead sentient beings to the Buddhist Path.”68 Thus, Shinran has 
interpreted Amida’s merit-transference as a transactional-like process of ontological 
transformation. Amida gives humanity shinjin for the purpose of facilitating our birth in 
the Pure Land and in return humanity perpetuates the process of liberating all sentient 
beings by returning to the realms of sams#ra to assist with the liberation of others. As 
Yuein-b! recounts Shinran’s teachings in the fifth section of the Tannish!: 
As for me, Shinran, I have never said the Nembutsu even once for the 
repose of my departed father and mother, For all sentient beings, without 
exception, have been our parents and brothers and sisters in the course of 
countless lives in many states of existence. On attaining Buddhahood after 
this present life, we can save every one of them. Were saying the 
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Nembutsu indeed a good act in which I strove through my own powers, 
then I might direct the merit thus gained toward saving my mother and 
father. But that is not the case. If, however, simply abandoning self-power, 
we quickly attain enlightenment in the Pure Land, we will be able to save, 
by means of supernatural powers, first those with whom we have close 
karmic relations, whatever karmic suffering they may have sunk to in the 
six realms through the four modes of birth.69   
 
Mainstream Mah#y#na thought (and some Therav#da traditions as well), on the other 
hand, maintains that it is possible to direct or transfer merit through self-power (jiriki). 
This merit is accrued through the performance of good acts. In the fifth section of the 
Tannish! Shinran has instead positioned merit transference as a transactional activity in 
which Amida directs virtue and merit towards us. Humanity plays no role in the 
transaction, as long ago Amida Buddha acquired the karmic merit necessary to “solve” 
the dilemma of human existence. As human calculations are always evil and thus lacking, 
it is only Amida’s merit transference that can affect the ontological transformation 
necessary for birth in the Pure Land. Even the central human act of reciting the nembutsu 
should be understood as simply a response of gratitude for Amida’s soteriological action. 
As Shinran explains in section fourteen of the Tannish!, “Thus the nembutsu that we say 
throughout a lifetime . . . should be recognized as entirely the expression of our gratitude 
for the benevolence and our thankfulness for the virtuous working of the Tathagata’s 
great compassion.”70    
Looking across the cultural chasm between Shin thought and the Reformation, it 
is easy to see evidence of the common understanding of God’s ontologically 
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transformative activity, or reconciling atonement, within Articles One and Two of the 
Second Head of Doctrine of the Canons of Dort. Article One of the Canons states that 
because God is supremely just, satisfaction is required for the sins of humanity. Article 
Two goes on to describe how “we ourselves cannot make this satisfaction and cannot 
deliver ourselves from the wrath of God… [so instead God] has given His only Son as 
our Surety, who so that He might make satisfaction for us…”71 This way of thinking is 
consistent with common interpretations of Anselm’s Satisfaction Theory.  
Within the Eighth Article of the Second Head of Doctrine, though, lies a subtle 
sense of a transactional quality to the process of ontological transformation. This position 
can be easily overlooked when examining the process of reconciliation and atonement, 
but when recognized it provides a unique opportunity for considering the Christian 
doctrine of atonement in a new light, as well as a compelling opportunity for comparative 
analysis. The key is the statement, “God further willed that Christ should give to those so 
chosen faith (which, together with other saving gifts of the Holy Spirit, He acquired for 
them by His death) . . . ”72  If we bear in mind the Canons’ dependence upon Anselm’s 
Theory of Atonement, we see that the Canons take the position that Christ acquired faith 
and other saving gifts of the Holy Spirit through his crucifixion. In turn, God willed 
Christ to give these acquired things to those few individuals whom God has elected to be 
recipients. As Richard Swinburne explains, works of supererogation, such as Christ’s 
death and resurrection, create a certain moral standing for the acting agent. One of the 
two central acts of supererogation takes the form of favors that benefit others directly. 
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Through this, the supererogatory agent “stacks up merit for himself.”73 According to 
Richard Cross, this merit accords Christ a reward from God. “The reward is to be 
whatever Christ asks for [and] . . . Christ asks that God forgive the sins of those who 
repent and apologize to God. . . So the redemptive result of Christ’s sacrifice is God’s 
being obliged to forgive those who repent and apologize to God.”74 In other words, there 
is to a transactional-like transference of that which is acquired, from Christ to the elect. 
Once again, the cultural specifics implicit in Shinran’s interpretation of Amida’s 
directing of merit towards humanity and Anselm’s interpretation of Christ’s 
supererogatory good act, which accrued ample merit to compensate humanity’s debt, 
remain distinct— as they are. As Dubuisson reminds us, “If we do not respect the 
structural uniqueness of each cultural continuum, all cultures in effect become 
comparable, but at the price precisely of that which made them unique.”75 I am reminded 
of Wendy Doniger’s cautionary note that an interpretive imbalance is “demeaning to the 
individualism of each, [and] a reflection of the old racist, colonialist attitude that ‘all 
wogs look alike.’”76  
Eliadian comparisons tend to do precisely what Dubuisson and Doniger caution 
us against, resulting in a blurring of cultural distinctiveness, the ignoring of context in 
favor of generalizations, and the academically destructive privileging of Protestant 
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Christian essentialist categories of comparison. However, when temporarily using the 
bridge concept “ontological transformation,” it becomes possible to place these otherwise 
culturally incongruous theoretical premises onto a common table of comparative analysis, 
in the service of exploring the third term — the scholar’s intellectual interest. Recount 
that for this project the primary interest is how two religious traditions that share a 
conceptually analogous understanding of the human predicament conceive of a solution 
to humanity’s plight. Each tradition has a long dharmalogical and theological history, 
respectively, of maintaining that the human predicament can be remedied or over-come. 
Both Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity are predicated on the contention that this 
solution, or ontological transformation, has a transactional-like quality about it.  
While this dissertation is unique in its consideration of the structurally similar 
transactional-quality to the theories of ontological transformation found in these 
respective traditions, we are again reminded of the cultural distinctiveness of the 
traditions’ use and interpretation of the term “merit.” Just as the terms shukug! and sin 
are not identical representations of reality, when Shinran and Anselm discussed “merit” 
they had quite different notions in mind. Whereas Shinran was teaching in a culture 
informed by the mainstream Mah#y#na notion of conducting religious practices for the 
benefit of others, Anselm was writing and living in a culture informed by monetary 
efforts to resolve the debts of indentured servants. When Shinran wrote of Amida’s 
transference of merit from his limitless storehouse he was describing the incalculable 
religious benefit accrued by the act of Amida invoking the Primal Vow and establishing 
his Pure Land. When Anselm wrote of Christ’s ample merit to compensate humanity’s 
debt he was playing with the status of currency and its ability to render a debt paid in full.   
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The pay-off of this fifth element in my systematically organized comparison is 
two-fold. First, we are able to revision Anselm’s merit theory of atonement based on our 
reading of Amida’s merit transference. Recall that the common interpretation of 
Anselm’s Theory of Atonement focuses on the satisfaction required by God for the sins 
of humanity. This traditional and calcified interpretation makes little or no mention of the 
transactional-like nature that is also present in Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo, and which runs 
through the Canons. With the tools of Smithian Comparativism I have accomplished 
Bernard Faure’s goal of cutting across Buddhist and Western discourses for the purpose 
of reviewing certain Western notions in light of Buddhist theories. Like Faure, I have 
attempted to see “whether certain Buddhist notions, through the slight shift that they may 
prompt in our habitual ways of thinking, might not lead us to reformulate a number of 
classical problems of Western thought.”77  
Second, we are able to see further evidence that these traditions are engaged in 
divergent soteriological endeavors. At night all cats may look grey, but in the clear light 
of a Smithian Comparative day we see that temporary interlocutors for comparison, such 
as “merit” and “transactional quality,” are as tenuous as the bridge concepts “human 
condition” and “ontological transformation. The term “merit” can stand in long enough to 
help us question deeply-rooted assumptions regarding what is normative, but quickly 
enough the rope-bridge of comparison begins to unravel and we see that it is only Smith’s 
third term at work.  The perception of similarity may help set the table for academic 
inquiry, but the deeper we go into the comparative discourse the broader the cross-
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cultural chasm becomes. Why should we conceive of the religious aim of each tradition 
as being commensurate ultimately, if we have learned that: 
(1) the respective traditions’ understandings of the human condition are 
intimately tied to the dominant cosmologies of the given culture;      
(2) the past conditioning actions that have most influenced the human condition 
are different with regard to meaning of terms and breadth of causality; 
(3) the source of the ontological transformation that originates outside the human 
predicament is distinct; 
(4) the interpretation of the transactional quality of the process of ontological 
transformation is embedded deeply in the cultural milieu of the time and 
place.          
An examination of the final element of comparative analysis will answer the question. 
 
Scope of Transformative Response 
Consistent with the pan-Mah#y#na position on the matter, Shin thought maintains 
that liberation from the cycles of rebirth involves transcending the duality of good and 
evil, thereby enabling liberation from the binding passions, delusions, and judgments of 
sams#ric existence. Shin thought, as influenced by Shinran’s teaching, distinguishes itself 
from other Mah#y#na teachings, however, in that it is predicated on a radical non-
dualistic conception of karma. In other words, all karma is evil and by extension all 
sentient beings are evil. This results in the knowledge that “the Primal Vow of Amida 
makes no distinction between people young and old, good and evil; only the entrusting 
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heart, shinjin, is essential.”78 Put differently, there is no discrimination with regard to 
whom Amida extends loving-compassion and similarly there is no discrimination with 
regard to who shall be born in the Pure Land. In Shin thought it is accepted that there is 
an ontological equality among all sentient beings due to their shukug!, and consequently 
ontological transformation, or birth in the Pure Land, is meant universally. As presented 
in section three of the Tannish!: 
It is impossible for us, who are possessed of blind passions, to free 
ourselves from birth-and-death through any practice whatever. Grieving 
over this, Amida made the Vow, the essential intent of which is the evil 
person’s attainment of Buddhahood. Hence, evil persons who entrust 
themselves to Other Power are precisely the ones who possess the true 
cause of birth. Accordingly [Shinran] said, ‘Even the good person is born 
in the Pure Land, so without question is the person who is evil.’79  
 
As the evil person is the true object of Amida’s Primal Vow (akunin sh!ki setsu), and all 
people are deemed evil persons, ontological transformation is for everyone. James 
Dobbins interprets the Tannish! to be asserting that there is nothing, either good or evil 
that can impede the work of Amida’s liberating Vow. “In short, Amida’s saving power 
extends to all situations and circumstances, and it reaches out to people whatever their 
failings may be.”80 The scope of ontological transformation according to Shin Buddhist 
thought knows no bounds and in this way should be understood as a universal experience. 
As Inagaki explains, “the Power [of the Vow] fills us completely and changes our karmic 
course toward the Land of Bliss. Birth in the Pure Land and subsequent attainment of 
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Enlightenment are, therefore, the natural result of the working of this Power. Amitabha’s 
[i.e., Amida’s] saving power is available here and now, and no one is excluded from his 
salvation.”81    
 On the other side of this occasion for comparative thought stands the Reformed 
Christian tradition’s conception of the scope of ontological transformation. As noted in 
Chapter Three of this dissertation, one of the central focal points of the Canons of Dort 
was the limited mediated saving work of Christ. Recall that one of the more pressing 
impetuses for convening the Synod of Dort involved the Remonstrant question as to the 
extent of God’s grace. Contrary to the generally accepted orthodoxy of the day, Jacob 
Arminius believed and taught that the atonement of Christ was in fact a universal event, 
meant for all people. In direct response the Canons clearly posited in Article Seven that: 
Election is the unchangeable purpose of God whereby, before the 
foundation of the world, out of the whole human race, which had fallen by 
its own fault out of its original integrity into sin and ruin, He has, 
according to the most free good pleasure of His will, out of mere grace, 
chosen in Christ to salvation a certain number of specific men, neither 
better nor more worthy than others, but with them involved in a common 
misery.+, 
  
According to the calculation of the authors of the Canons, neither God’s grace nor the 
atoning power of Christ’s death is universal. God has intentionally rendered the scope of 
ontological transformation to be limited. Lest there was any confusion on the matter, the 
authors of the Canons went on to note in Article Eight that Christ’s atoning death “should 
effectually redeem out of every people, tribe, nation, and tongue all those and only those 
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who were from eternity chosen to salvation . . .83 This language regarding “the elect,” in 
other words a limited number of individuals for whom salvation was possible, was 
continued in Article Fifteen of the First Head of Doctrine, as the authors write:!
This eternal and undeserved grace of our election is especially illustrated 
and indicated for us by Holy Scripture when it declares that not all men 
are elect but that certain ones have not been elected, or have been passed 
by in the eternal election of God.  These God out of His most free, most 
just, blameless, and unchangeable good pleasure has decreed to leave in 
the common misery into which they have by their own fault plunged 
themselves, and not to give them saving faith and the grace of 
conversion… God has decreed finally to condemn and punish eternally, 
not only on account of their unbelief but also on account of all their 
unbelief but also on account of all their other sins, as a declaration of His 
justice.84 
 
While Christ’s death and resurrection constituted a powerfully atoning act that more than 
ameliorated humanity’s broken relationship with God, salvation, according to the Canons 
is and was a limited event, meant for only those whom God has previously elected. 
 The comparison of these scopes of transformative response clearly shows that 
whereas Shin Buddhism conceives of birth in the Pure Land as meant for all people— in 
other words, liberation or ontological transformation is a universal experience— the 
Reformed Christian tradition conceives of salvation as an event meant only for those 
whom God has elected, in other words ontological transformation is a limited experience. 
The “events” of the Tannish! and the Canons of Dort may have begun with a 
conceptually analogous understanding of the plight of humanity, but their respective 
statements of religious orthodoxy could not be more divergent. Previous comparative 
scholarship has focused primarily on perceived similarities between the two traditions, 
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and through a bilateral methodological approach I have also examined points of surface 
resemblance. However, I have argued throughout this comparative analysis that despite a 
common understanding of the human condition as being defiled and depraved, the 
traditions’ divergent doctrinal responses to this condition imply different salvations 
ultimately. Like Heim, I disagree fundamentally with the essentializing proposals of 
Eliadian universalists and contemporary religious pluralists in that I argue “there is real 
diversity of actual religious ends.”85 When Shin Buddhists are born in Amida’s Pure 
Land they are not standing elbow-to-elbow with the God’s chosen ones, as their differing 
paths lead to different summits.86 Religious traditions can be understood as responses to 
human quandaries, and Doniger remains correct that it is possible to examine divergent 
responses to common dilemmas cross-culturally, but the examination may unearth widely 
disparate paths. Furthermore, some chasms truly are incommensurate.      
 
Disciplined Exaggeration in the Service of Knowledge 
Whereas past Eliadian comparisons have been content to note surface 
resemblance between two phenomena, confuse perceived similarity with identity, and 
then posit the existence of certain pan-human and transcultural realities, which are 
imminently comparable by virtue of their “sameness,” I have chosen instead to engage in 
a disciplined Smithian exaggeration in the service of knowledge. Smithian New 
Comparativism is rigorous and responsible in that it marks certain features within 
similarity and difference as being of use to the scholar’s theoretical concerns. This is 
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accomplished by the self-conscious acknowledgment of the limitedness and cultural 
embeddedness of all terms used in comparative analysis. Once granting that, though, it 
still remains possible to employ temporary theoretical interlocutors as bridge concepts for 
beginning a discourse of cross-cultural analysis around a common question. In the service 
of establishing a healthy case study that demonstrates the best methodological tools of 
Smithian Comparativism I have limited my theoretical interests to a comparative 
examination of how two culturally distinct religious traditions, which share a 
conceptually analogous ontological presupposition, have responded to the human 
dilemma in doctrinally divergent ways. As bridge terms I chosen to employ the 
alternative vocabularies of “human condition” and “ontological transformation.” 
The result of these efforts has been a temporary designation of “like” or “similar” 
on five of the six central points of comparison that have served as the scaffolding for my 
comparative endeavor. This is stated with the full recognition, however, that as quickly as 
similarity is perceived it dissolves into cultural uniqueness, as the languages in which the 
central documents under review are different, the dharmalogical and theological 
influences that shaped the doctrines in questions are different, and the meaning of the 
vital terms for comparison are generally incommensurate. Nevertheless, as Smith 
intimates, the comparison of two phenomena that are identical brings nothing of 
originality to the academic table. Indeed, even if we think we are comparing what might 
seem to be identical phenomena, this is impossible; as Wittgenstein famously quipped, if 
two things are the same, how can they be two things?  Instead comparison requires the 
creative use of analogical imagination for the purpose of examining something the 
scholar finds compelling.      
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In this Smithian comparison I have chosen to consider six positions that I 
maintain are present to some degree in both Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity. 
They are as follows: (1) the nature of the human predicament, (2) the past conditioning 
action(s) that led to this human condition, (3) the futility of any human effort to change 
the human predicament, (4) the ontologically transformative response that originates 
“outside” any human efforts, (5) the transactional quality of this process of ontological 
transformation, and (6) the scope of transformative response. From my comparison I have 
concluded that Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christian thought, as found in the Tannish! 
and the Canons of Dort respectively, share thematically parallel expressions of: 
(1) the human condition as being unavoidably depraved and defiled;  
(2) the human predicament being best characterized as inherently impure due to 
“original” conditioning actions, namely, past karma (shukug!) and original sin;  
(3) the futility of the human effort to effectively change one’s own corrupted 
existence;  
(4) transformative responses to the human condition that originate outside the 
capacity of the individual, namely the “Other Power” (tariki) of and entrusting 
(shinjin) in Amida Buddha, on the one hand, and the predetermined election and 
grace of God on the other; and  
(5) the transactional quality of the processes of ontological transformation in 
response to each tradition’s understanding of the human condition, namely, 
Amida Buddha’s transference of merit (shishin ek!) to all sentient beings for their 
rebirth in the Pure Land, and the application of merit as seen in Anselm of 
Canterbury’s substitution or commercial theory of atonement.  
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The traditions in question though reach dramatically divergent responses with regard to 
the scope of ontological transformation. It is here that the temporary designation of 
“likeness” and “similarity” ends. I maintain that the doctrines of akunin sh!ki and limited 
atonement provide different interpretations as to the scope of transformative response to 
the human condition. Specifically, I have argued that the Reformed Christian doctrine 
posits a limited response, whereby only the predetermined elect are granted salvific 
redemption, and that the Shin Buddhist doctrine posits a universal response whereby all 
sentient beings, and most especially evil persons, are assured rebirth in Amida Buddha’s 







Chapter Six: Conclusion and Comparative Implications  
The “end” of comparison cannot be the act of comparison itself.—Jonathan Z. Smith, 
“The ʻEndʼ of Comparison: Redescription and Rectification (2000)1  
 
Contemporary cultural theorist Russell McCutcheon argues there are four 
interrelated tasks found in the academic study of religion—definition, description, 
comparison, and redescriptive analysis.2 He further argues that the first three tasks are all 
conducted in the service of the fourth ultimately. According to McCutcheon, we define, 
describe, and compare in order to begin asking the important questions—What new 
information has been gleaned through this study? How are we to interpret all that we 
have discovered? Have our theories and tools been useful relative to our academic 
concerns? Can the lessons learned from this study be applied more broadly? In other 
words, once a comparison has ended the real work begins. It has been my aim, through 
this comparative analysis of Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian perspectives on, and 
responses to, the nature of the human predicament, to accomplish all four of these 
interrelated tasks.  
In order to begin a critical examination of religious phenomena it is vital that we 
first define clearly the concepts, terms, texts, and theories under review. By doing so 
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scholars of religion are able to be more forthcoming with regard to their theoretical 
concerns, as well as the structures of analysis that they employ. As McCutcheon notes, it 
is important that we (teachers and scholars) help students especially to see that “there is 
something at stake in the way in which we go about defining and classifying objects in 
the world.”3 As has been noted throughout this project, too many Eliadian comparativists 
of the past have assumed that phenomena x and phenomena y just exist “out there” in the 
world, and it falls to the comparativist to simply place these two givens side-by-side in 
order to reveal their relative “uniqueness,” value, dependence, or location on some 
mythic developmental ladder. Sixteenth-century Catholic missionaries in Japan, Karl 
Barth, and countless modern scholars of comparison who have been drawn to the 
apparent resemblances between Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity all fit this 
Eliadian bill. Recall Gregory Alles’s caution though that multicultural studies will 
continue to devolve into random juxtapositions of cultural datum unless the comparative 
endeavor is conducted in a manner that is more rigorous and healthy. 
In order to accomplish the task of academically self-aware definition when 
analyzing cross-cultural phenomena comparatively I have made use of the first 
significant tool of Smithian New Comparativism—ask non-Eliadian questions. Heeding 
Wendy Doniger’s suggestion, I have “slice[d] the matter sideways.”4 Rather than 
continue following the well-paved course of comparing these traditions based on 
privileged Protestant Christian concepts such as “faith,” “salvation,” or “grace” I have 
instead examined the differentials by which two religious texts articulate divergent 
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responses of scope to a conceptually analogous ontological presupposition. In other 
words, by using the methodology of Alles’s “analogical cart” I have identified two 
paradigmatic cultural instances by which a common human quandary is approached in a 
divergent fashion. In this way I have also made use of the second tool of Smithian New 
Comparativism—reframe the discourse. By rejecting common, universalizing categories 
of comparison in favor of temporary bridge concepts—“human condition” and 
“ontological transformation”—and an alternative macromyth, I have heeded Smith’s 
overarching concern for establishing a “discourse of difference.”5 Finally, like Smith, I 
have argued that all comparative studies are triadic, in this sense of comparing two 
phenomena with respect to the scholar’s creatively invented academic concern. 
The second task in the academic study of religion involves description. In order to 
compare two phenomena it is necessary to engage in thick description of the context, 
particularity, and individuality of the respective comparands. In the case of this project’s 
comparative efforts I have used the third, fourth and fifth tools of Smithian 
Comparativism—ground ideas in the “events” of texts, demonstrate concern for the 
contextual influences that have shaped a given religious position, and examine 
phenomena in situ. Whereas many past Eliadian comparisons have placed religious 
phenomena upon the table of comparison in an ahistorical and non-textual manner I have 
instead chosen to analyze Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian positions with regard to 
ontological transformation as found in two historical documents that have dramatically 
influenced the developmental trajectories of these traditions—the Tannish! and the 
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Canons of Dort. Like Alles, I prefer to “replace ‘meaning’ with ‘event’ as the central 
category for the history of religions.”6 In this way, I avoid the tendency to make the 
sweeping generalizations and universalizing statements found so commonly in Eliadian 
hermeneutical enterprises. Thus, the specific details and statements used in a comparison 
of Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian responses to a conceptually analogous 
understanding of the human condition are drawn from significant religious works rather 
than from disembodied religious ideas. This mode of investigation also allows for the 
examination of the dharmalogical and theological influences that led to the construction 
of akunin sh!ki setsu (the theory that the evil person is the object of Amida Buddha’s 
liberating power) and the Doctrine of Limited Atonement (the position that God intends 
the salvation of only those who among the elect). Finally, examining these doctrinal 
expressions of orthodoxy in their full cultural embeddedness further defamiliarizes 
otherwise normative positions and ensures the establishment of a comparative analytical 
equilibrium between generalizing explanation and concern for particularity. The 
articulation of contextual influence provides the nuance and rigor necessary for any 
comparative effort to be useful. 
According to McCutcheon the third task in the academic study of religion is, of 
course, comparison. In order to proceed with rigorous comparison though it is necessary 
to first delimit the scope of intellectual concern. In other words, it is important to employ 
analytical control when selectively choosing particular elements to compare. 
McCutcheon agrees with Smith and William Paden’s concern for controlling aspectual 
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focus when he notes, “The scholar’s role is to make explicit and then defend the criteria 
by which she decides to ignore this or that aspect of a datum in an effort to compare some 
other aspect.”7 I have sought to accomplish this sixth tool of Smithian Comparativism by 
choosing to focus on six analogical matters within the Tannish! and the Canons. Recall 
that this comparative project has revolved around six positions that I maintain are present 
to some degree in both Shin Buddhism and Reformed Christianity. They are as follows: 
(1) the nature of the human predicament, (2) the past conditioning action(s) that led to 
this human condition, (3) the futility of any human effort to change the human 
predicament, (4) the ontologically transformative response that originates “outside” any 
human efforts, (5) the transactional quality of this process of ontological transformation, 
and (6) the scope of transformative response. Concentrating upon only these matters, 
rather than the totality of the religious traditions, has resulted in “reciprocal illumination” 
and meaningful interreligious learning.8 In other words, it has allowed us, like Bernard 
Faure, to see if viewing otherwise calcified Western ideas through the lens of Buddhist 
theories might reveal new insights. At this point it should go without saying that any 
academically useful insights garnered through this comparison are also the result of the 
seventh tool of Smithian Comparativism—systematically organizing an investigation. 
Too many academic inquiries are haphazard juxtapositions rather than critical 
comparisons. Through a bilateral examination of both similarities and differences, 
conducted in a methodical fashion, it is possible to consider the final task of the academic 
study of religion—redescriptive analysis. 
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The meaning and value of redescriptive analysis is not unlike the Zen saying, 
which suggests that when a person first begins the way of Zen a cup of tea is just a cup of 
tea. But in time, after some discipline and effort, the practitioner realizes through the 
Doctrine of Dependent Co-Arising that the humble cup of tea is as expansive as the sky, 
as high as the mountains, and as deep in meaning as the seas. However, after even greater 
discipline and rigorous effort the practitioner comes once again to appreciate the cup of 
tea just as it is—as a humble cup of tea. This awareness though is a much richer one than 
with which the practitioner began. It is the result of deep analysis and introspection. As 
Paden puts it, “In music, the trained ear hears more structure but also more difference, 
more detail, and it inevitably hears every new instance of music within the overall 
context of the history of musical expression. It is the same with religion. Comparative 
perspective is educated perspective.”9 In light of training, practice in the art of disciplined 
inquiry, and critical perspective “The task of the history of religions is [thus] not to 
compile exhaustive collections of methodically sifted data but to formulate insights into 
the unity and diversity of religious realities.”10 In other words, in light of a Smithian 
comparison of Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian responses to a common 
understanding of the human condition, which has been conducted with a methodological 
toolset capable of reclaiming the promise of the comparative endeavor, what can we now 
say?  
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First, when presented with Shin Buddhist teachings, missionaries Francis Xavier 
and Alessandro Valignano were not wrong to think that they were considering something 
they had seen before. The effort to make meaning out of perceived “sameness” is a 
natural human process. The problem however lies in the fact that these initial perceptions 
with reified by later scholars. Content to conflate similarity with identity, Eliadian 
comparativists impeded the progress of the academic study of religion. Conducting 
arbitrary, unanchored comparisons that were largely devoid of meaningful analysis, past 
comparativists created an environment in which comparison was deemed a useless tool in 
the study of religion and culture. The history of twentieth-century comparisons of Shin 
Buddhism and Christianity demonstrates this clearly. Using the tools of Smithian New 
Comparativism though I have argued that it is possible to revisit this case study, thereby 
unearthing previously unseen similarities and differences between these traditions. The 
most dramatic example of this, of course, is the suggestion that despite numerous 
structural and conceptual parallels the Shin Buddhist and Reformed Christian traditions 
not only have widely divergent conceptions of the scope of “salvation” and liberation, but 
that their respective religious paths also lead to divergent religious ends. This is a 
suggestion that warrants further exploration in future studies. Additionally, I maintain 
that the methodological approach to comparison demonstrated throughout this project is a 
serviceable step toward reclaiming the promise of the discipline. As Paden notes, 
“Comparative perspective is built up over time.”11 The time for Smithian Comparativism 
has begun. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Glossary of Important Japanese Terms and Names 
aku (悪) evil 
akunin (悪人) = evil doer; evil person 
akunin sh!ki (悪人正機) = evil persons are the object of Amida’s Primal Vow 
Amidabutsu (阿弥陀仏) = Buddha of the Western Pure Land 
Amidaky! (阿弥陀経) = Smaller Pure Land Sutra 
Ashuku (阿 ) = Ak$obhya Buddha 
bodai (菩提) = enlightenment, awakening 
bonbu (凡夫) = foolish being
bonn! (煩悩) = defilements; afflictions; evil, polluting passions  
bonn! gusoku (煩悩具足) = evil inclinations - 
bussh! (仏性) = buddha-nature 
chikush!d! (畜生道) = the realm of animals
denki (伝記) = biography or biographical record 
Daigobon (醍醐本) = short title for the manuscript called A Biography of Honen Sh!nin, 
found at Daigo-ji temple in Kyoto in 1917 
Donran (曇鸞) = Tan-luan; (476-542); third patriarch of Pure Land Buddhism 
eshin (廻心) = turning of the mind; change of heart 
Eshinni (惠信尼) = wife of Shinran Sh!nin 
futaiten (不退転) = the stage of nonretrogression 
gedatsu (解脱) = liberation; coming undone from the cycles of rebirth 
g!h! (業報) = karmic consequence  
gokuraku (極楽)= sukh#vat.; the “Land of Bliss”
Gutoku (愚禿) = foolish, bald-headed old man; Shinran’s adopted personal name 
gy! (行) = practice 
his! hizoku (非僧非俗) = neither monk nor layman   
H!nen (法然) = Shinran’s teacher; sixth patriarch of Pure Land Buddhism; (1133-1212)  
hongan (本願) = the Primal Vow 
Hongwanji-ha (本願寺派) = sectarian branch of Shin Buddhism 
H!z!-biku (法蔵比丘) = Dharmak#ra Bhiksu; the legendary ahistorical figure who 
eventually becomes revered as Amida Buddha 
ianjin (異安心) = heretical views; aberrant faith  
ichinen (一念) = one moment; akin to “one thought-moment” 
igy! (易行) = easy practice 
jaken (邪見) = wrong views 
jinen ni (自然に) = spontaneously; naturally 
jiriki (自力) = self power 
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j!butsu (成仏) = buddhahood 
j!domon (浄土門) = the Pure Land Path 
J!do (浄土) = Pure Land 
J!do ronch" (浄土論註) = Commentary on Vasubandhu’s Treatise on the Pure Land 
J!do Shinsh" (浄土真宗) = True Pure Land Sect   
J!do wasan (浄土和讃) = Hymns of the Pure Land 
kai (戒) = precepts 
Kanmury!juky! (観無量寿経) = S"tra on Contemplation of the Buddha of Infinite Life 
k" (空) = emptiness; %"nyat# 
ky! (経) = “sutra;” scripture 
Ky!gy!shinsh! (教行信証 Collection of Passages Revealing the True Teaching, Practice, 
and Realization of the Pure Land Way) 
makoto no kokoro (まことの心) = true, real, and sincere heart and mind 
mapp! (末法) = later days of the Dharma; the last Dharma 
Matt!sh! (末灯鈔) = Lamp for the Later Ages 
metsudo (滅度) = nirv#na 
Miroku (弥勒) = Maitreya Buddha 
my!g! fushigi (名号不思議) = wondrous name 
Mury!juky! (無量寿経) = Larger Pure Land Sutra  
“Namu-Amida-Butsu” (南無阿弥陀仏) = “Homage to Amida Buddha;” “Honor to 
Amida Buddha” 
nangy! (難行) = difficult practice 
nehan (涅槃) = nirv#na 
nembutsu (念仏)= recitation of Amida’s name; meditation on the buddha 
!j! (往生) = birth; birth in Amida’s Pure Land
rokud! (六道) = sams#ra; the six realms of existence 
Ry"ju (龍樹) = N#g#rjuna; first patriarch of Pure Land Buddhism  
sangaku (三學) = the three learnings; the threefold practice of precepts, meditation, and 
 wisdom 
sanmai (三昧) = sam#dhi; a mental state of concentration 
sanshin (三心) = doctrine of the threefold mind 
satori (悟) = awakening 
seigan fushigi (誓願不思議)= the wonderous vow   
senju nembutsu (専修念仏) = exclusive nembutsu 
sesshu fusha (摂取不捨) = never to be forsaken 
setsu (説) = doctrine; exposition 
shabad! (娑婆道) = The Realm of Shaba; the world of endurance; sah#  
shingyo (信行) = true entrusting 
shinjin (信心) = entrusting heart; faith 
shinnyo (真如) = “thusness”; tathat#; “things as they are”
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Shinran (親鸞) = founder of the True Pure Land sect; (1173-1262)    
Shinran Sh!nin (親鸞上人) = Master Shinran
shishin (至心) = sincere mind 
sh!d!mon (聖道門) = the path of sanctification
Sh!nin (上人) = holy master; Master; “saint” 
Sh!shinge (正信偈) = Hymn of True Shinjin and the Nembutsu 
shukug! (宿業) = past karma 
s!gya (僧伽) = sangha; the Buddhist order 
Tannish! (歎異抄) = A Record in Lament of Divergences 
tariki (他力) = Other Power     
tenjin (天神) = devas, gods of heaven 
tsumi (罪) = evil; offence; to doubt 
yokush! (欲生) = aspiration for rebirth in the Pure Land 
Yuien-b! (唯円房) = probable author and compiler of the Tannish! 
zaig! (罪業) = karmic evil; defiled karma  
!
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